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Understanding disillusionment in EU-Russia cooperation

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Abstract

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A promising agenda of cooperation between the European Union (EU) and Russia tends to result in mutual frustration manifested in continuous, paradoxical *disillusionment* and isolation between the partners. In this paper, I offer a possible way to reflect on an uneasy EU-Russia relationship. My study advances the academic debate in the area of EU-Russia studies and provides a meaningful understanding of collaboration between the EU and Russia. Informed by M. Bakhtin's dialogic analysis and drawing from N. Onuf's constructivist accounts, I strike a balance between theoretical and empirical analyses and develop a model for understanding the EU-Russia partnership. This model of international cooperation can be transferrable beyond its borders to similar examples of relationships currently existing all over the world. The scheme of analysis in this study may also serve as a model for understanding possible events in EU-Russia cooperation.

Introduction

"It is entirely your phrase, and not mine.
Your own, and not just the sequel of our conversation.
'Our' conversation didn't take place at all…"
(Shatov in Dostoyevsky, F., & Magarshack, D. (1971). The devils (The possessed). Penguin Classics, p.253).

In less than two decades, the relationship between the European Union (EU) and Russia has quickly transformed from exclusively bilateral relations between individual European states and the Soviet Union to a new political reality inconceivable during the Cold War period – an officially declared partnership between the EU and Russia. However, scholarly analysis and conference reports, official statements and public opinion polls demonstrate that EU-Russia relations "are still in a state of protracted crisis" (Rossiia i Evropeĭskiiĭ Soiuz: ot krizisa k novomu dogovoru, 2005): legacies of the Cold War era and mistrust between the partners endure, ambiguity of common strategic goals are resurfacing and economic asymmetry continues to exist (Aleseeva 2007; Arbatova, 2006, 2008; DeBardeleben, 2008; Medvedev, 2008; Report by the Committee "Russia in the United Europe", 2005). Apparently, a promising agenda of cooperation has tended to result in mutual frustration manifested in continuous, paradoxical "disillusionment" (Medvedev, 2008, p.4) and isolation between the partners.

This study offers one of the possible ways of reflecting on an uneasy EU-Russia relationship. I make problems in EU-Russia cooperation *discursively* visible by looking at the EU-Russia political and security dialogue and exploring the following question: *What do the official standpoints articulated in the EU-Russia political and security dialogue show about cooperation between the EU and Russia?*

Official standpoints are political statements employed by both the EU and Russia to indicate their strategic choices and articulate their views about cooperation. I demonstrate that these political

statements, or “speech acts” (Searle, 1969; Bakhtin, 1986; Onuf, 1989) create conditions for a responsive dialogue and, eventually, form a set of prevalent “discursive practices” (Reiss 1982, p.11) that re-produce and re-enforce certain modes of thinking in EU-Russia political and security discourse.

In this study, I seek to understand what stands behind the discourse by scrutinizing the interplay of its main components and placing them in a specific context of cooperation. In order to do so, interpretive methodology with textual analysis of political discourse is employed in the study. First, I discuss the theoretical framework chosen in this study for reflection upon EU-Russia dialogue in the political and security sphere. Second, I examine selected speech acts and draw the picture of what is produced during the EU-Russia political and security dialogue. In conclusion, I address the paradox of disillusionment in EU-Russia cooperation and draw implications for future research.

Section 1: Theorizing EU-Russia dialogue

This study employs a constructivist theoretical perspective as an analytical tool to explore the problem with disillusionment in EU-Russia cooperation. What insights can be gained in understanding EU-Russia relations when viewed through the constructivist lens and what is this lens? First and foremost, authors writing in a constructivist vein recognize the lack of agreement on the meaning and substance of constructivism (Zehfuss, 2002, p.6). “The intellectual diverseness of work that is represented as constructivist, either by its author or by others, makes it difficult to critique the approach at all, as it is not clear that there are claims and assumptions which are shared across the spectrum” (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 9). Some authors make an effort to define at least “three constructivisms” (Checkel, 2004; Zehfuss, 2002, p.10). For instance, Checkel offers distinction among conventional, interpretative and critical (radical)variants (Checkel, 2004, p.3). Others suggest a dichotomous division into “conventional” and “consistent” constructivism: “the former [accepts] the existence of an objective

world, while the latter [emphasizes] 'merely' language" (Fierke, 2007, p.174). Some scholars attempt to integrate diverse theoretical arguments and draw a picture of one constructivist theoretical paradigm (e.g., Bernett, 2005; Wendt 1999). Such authors offer a clear interpretation of constructivism without having previously agreed on the definition of constructivism in the study of International Relations (IR). Fierke claims that "traditional theories of IR, which have often assumed the sameness of states, for instance, across time and space, have prioritized the identification of regularities for the purpose of generalization and theory construction. Constructivists, on the contrary, have sought to understand change at the international level" (Fierke, 2007, p.168). As a result, the substitution of one universal bias towards *identification of regularities* with another bias towards *identification of change* occurs for the same purpose of theory construction. However, it is necessary to ask the question in analogy to the one asked by S. Roach in regards with the critical IR theory: "Is there a common terrain upon which to formulate 'a cohesive, empirically relevant [constructivist] IR theory?'" (Roach, 2008, p. 342).

I believe that it would not be fair to simplify the arguments and assertions of many constructivists and place them under one monolithic theoretical umbrella - constructivism in IR. Wendt, Kratochwil, Onuf, or Ruggie (Wendt 1992, Kratochwil, 1989, Onuf, 1989, Ruggie 1998) – all these authors have played their role in the making of constructivism in the sphere of International Relations. Therefore, it would be more fruitful to consider their arguments in detail instead of judging about applicability or inapplicability, "betterness'" or "worseness" of one, single constructivist theoretical perspective. Indeed, among themselves constructivists build on different disciplines and traditions emphasizing different key issues. For instance, in response to over-determination of structure in the neorealist and neoliberal theories, Wendt places an emphasis on the relationship between agency and structure (Wendt, 1989, 1992). He questions the determinant logic of anarchy as an objectively existing, pre-given international reality and opposes the exogenously given character of interests pursued by

individual states (Wendt, 1992, p. 391). Instead, Wendt claims that identities and interests of states as an agency are changeable in the process of interaction rather than pre-given or fixed. He offers to look at identity formation and introduces “the possibility of agency” (Fierke, 2007, p.168) in the construction of the international world order (Wendt, 1992). For Ruggie, constructivism becomes important because it offers an equal ontological emphasis on the ideational and material nature of “the building blocks of international reality” (Ruggie, 1998, p.879) He contends that “ideational factors have normative as well as instrumental dimensions; that they express not only individual, but also collective intentionality; and that the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place” (Ruggie, 1998, p.879). Kratochwil emphasizes intersubjectivity of knowledge and the intersubjectivity of meanings or “intersubjective context” (Kratochwil, 1989, p.10-11) in his attempts to understand the existing state of affairs in the world of global politics.

The so-called “interpretative constructivism” (Checkel, 2005, p. 3) is mostly concerned with the “world of words” (Zehfuss, 2002, p. 158) and how they construct reality. An interpretative constructivist reconstructs the actor’s identity in their research agenda placing the greater emphasis on the domination of language approaches and claiming that the world and words are mutually constitutive (Onuf, 1992 as cited in Zehfuss, 2002, p.158). The main idea is that human beings construct reality through speech acts which in turn may, through repetition, be institutionalized into rules and norms (e.g., EU-Russia legal agreements), reproduce or change realities (e.g., lead to cooperation or to conflict in EU-Russia relations) and provide the meaning for action (e.g., introduce a new EU-Russia security architecture). Therefore, the interpretative constructivist points out the importance of the actual political discourse when explaining the meaning of a political action through the application of linguistic approaches.

What distinguishes most forms of constructivism from the other theoretical alternatives to the mainstream IR theory? One subtle difference is expressed well in D. Campbell's critique of the constructivist theoretical agenda: "even some constructivists…maintain a strict sense of the material world external to language as a determinant of social and political truth." He continues, "one has little to do with materiality of specific elements and much to do with power of particular discourses materializing elements into comprehensible forms with political effects" (Campbell, 2007, p. 217). Campbell, in essence, offers to move away from "the immediate cause and context of material events…to understand the larger ethical and political issues" (Campbell, 2007, p. 217). Material component, however, is recognized by many constructivists as a limit to the agency's action. Campbell's claim clearly indicates that constructivists prescribe importance to the existence of material reality (they do not reject it), but for them this reality also depends on the meaning, which different actors prescribe to it. Agents "make the material world a social reality for themselves as human beings" (Onuf, 1998, p.64). Therefore, allowing some generalizations, constructivists "[do] not grant sovereignty to either the material or the social by defining the other out of existence" (Onuf, 1989, p. 40); rather, they stress the role of what is "socially made" (Onuf, 1989, p.40) without denying the material reality that exists beyond social constructions. In other words, everything is related to both the social and the natural world; in order to produce understanding and knowledge, an informative relationship between the two worlds needs and has a chance to occur through, for instance, the study of a linguistic activity, the study of discourse.

Despite the existence of a fair amount of literature on EU-Russia cooperation, remarkably little work has been done by both Russian and Western scholars to explore the EU-Russia official political and security discourse. Therefore, an almost non-existent constructivist agenda in the area of EU-Russia studies can enhance the current academic debates presenting a different view on the reasons for growing

tensions between the EU and Russia. I apply theoretical assumptions of one constructivist author, instead of trying to generate one more interpretation of "true" constructivism and to test its applicability by fitting the hypothetical reality of EU–Russia relations into the supposedly constructivist accounts. I employ the constructivist approach and the speech act theory offered by Nicholas Onuf[1] with the goal to reveal a connection between the official speech acts and reoccurring crises in the EU-Russia relationship. I also conceive of EU-Russia cooperation through a constructivist lens, simultaneously leaving the place for novelty in my conceptualization, which is informed but not driven by constructivism.

Onuf's constructivism is concerned with "puzzle paradigms of rule" (Onuf, 1989, p.25) for understanding social and political realities. "Rules ...tell us how to carry on... in a socially constructed world" (Onuf, 1989, p.51). People, as well as social constructs such as states, become agents in society through rules. Rules define agents in terms of structure, and structures in terms of agents (Onuf, 1998, p.64). Moreover, agents act within an institutional and social context, but at the same time they act on this context through deeds. For Onuf, "constructivism begins with deeds" (Onuf, 1989, p.36). They may consist of words, acts or physical actions (Onuf, 1989, p. 36). Deeds make the world, provide interaction between agents and contribute to the mutual constitution between agents and structure. A speech act as a deed is the "act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act" (Onuf, 1998, p. 66). Therefore, for Onuf, "the point of a speech act is to have an effect on some state of affairs" (Onuf, 1998, p. 98).

What is the connection between rules and speech acts? Rules both develop from speech acts and are expressed in the form of a speech act (Onuf, 1989). For Onuf, language in this speech act becomes representative and also performative (Onuf, 1989, p.82): it can be used to perform deeds and constitute a

[1] The word "constructivism" was initially introduced to the IR by Nicholas Onuf in 1989 (Fierke, 2007, p.172).

social reality and its rules (Onuf, 1989, p.82). Consequently, an agent can "make" the world not only through its physical actions but also through its speech acts. "The speaking of language is a part of an activity, or of a form of life" (Wittgenstein, 1968, par23, in Onuf, 1989, p.44). Consequently, Onuf's speech acts follow the pattern: "I (you, etc.) hereby assert (demand, promise) to anyone hearing me that some state of affairs exists or can be achieved" (Onuf, 1998, p. 66). Onuf's pattern simultaneously leads in two directions: first, the message sent by the agent needs to be heard by the receiver. As a confirmation, the receiver needs to produce a response back to the agent. Otherwise, any effect of the speech act is questionable. Second, in order to be understood, a speech act needs to be situated in a specific context. Onuf contends that observers can never step outside of the world of constructions and be neutral observers (Onuf, 1989, p.43). "We can represent the world, including our place in it, through language" (Onuf, 1989, p.43). However, we "are always within our constructions, even as we choose to stand apart from them, condemn them, reconstruct them" (Onuf, 1989, p.43). In line with this particular view, I suggest that the use of the first person is required in keeping with the constructivist mode of this study, especially where I give a personal judgment. Indeed, "the use of the neutral, anonymous third person is deceptive when applied to [either quantitative or qualitative] research because it obliterates the social elements of the research process" (Webb, 1992, p.747). Therefore, this study is written in the first person.

In the textual analysis introduced in section two, I refer to the classification of speech acts offered by Onuf. According to Onuf's classification, *assertives* are "speech acts stating a belief… [with the intention] that the hearer accepts this belief" (Onuf, 1989, p.87); *directives* contain an action the speaker wishes the hearer to perform (regulative intent). *Commissives* consist of the declaration of the speaker's commitment to a stated course of action. Therefore, commissives produce rules for the

speaker, whereas assertives and directives try to impose rules on the hearer (Onuf, 1989, p.87–8). In essence, all three are *proactive* elements of a speech act.

As described above, Onuf emphasizes the dynamics of discourse, as well as the necessity to explain the performative and transformative impact of language in this discourse. In addition to Onuf, dialogic analysis, as a unique analytical concept introduced by Mikhail Bakhtin (Bakhtin, 1979), offers a fruitful conceptual and methodological insight to this study. Indeed, in the literature on EU-Russia relations, the official political statements are normally analysed *outside* of the framework of EU-Russia dialogue. Such an understanding of these official speech acts is based on a specific mode of thinking, which considers official speech acts as the individual units of analysis that are free from the effects of human interaction, i.e., they are not affected by the influence of "real" communication, the influence of a dialogue. Bakhtin's analysis pays attention to responsiveness (*obraschennost', adresovannost'*) in a speech act (Bakhtin, 1979, p. 275, "Translation mine"): the author does not isolate one speaker from the other; instead, he looks at the responsive logic, at reactions reflected in the speech acts of one dialogue and, in case of EU-Russia dialogue, recorded in the official texts. He emphasizes the necessity to talk *with* someone versus to talk to someone: "he [the main hero] talked with the world, not to the world" (Bakhtin, 1979, p. 275, "Translation mine"). Hence, text can be understood as part of a conversation that reflects dialogic relations (*dialogicheskie otnosheniia*) (Bakhtin, 1979, p.292, 304, "Translation mine"): in the case of EU-Russia dialogue, the text of political statements reflects how the partners collaborate. Therefore, Bakhtin's dialogic analysis offers a valuable methodological insight for this study: it gives an opportunity to see the *relationship* that emerges in EU-Russia discourse instead of analyzing the EU's and Russia's speech acts as mechanical statements articulated by partners separately from each other.

"Utterance implies others talking" (Bakhtin, 1979, p.250, "Translation mine"): from the very beginning it is constructed in consideration of the response; it is "deeply dialogic" (Bakhtin, 1979,

p.275, “Translation mine”). It means that the sender of the message creates its message not independently, but in consideration of the receiver’s possible response. The sender enters into the relationship with the receiver while producing its utterance. Therefore, the process of creating and sending the message is not only proactive, but also reactive in its character. The *reactive* feature of Bakhtin’s utterances does not automatically mean that they lose the *proactive* characteristics described by Onuf. For instance, the EU’s Strategy and Country Paper towards Russia (section 2 of this paper: analysis) are a “*reactive”* policy-response to external actor’s actions (Russia) and, simultaneously, the EU’s “*proactive”*” step to re-confirm its own new identity as Russia’s strategic partner, to make Russia act and change its state of affairs. Hence, as argued by Onuf, speech acts continue to *proactively* affect the specific situation, simultaneously having a *reactive* effect, as contended by Bakhtin. Onuf emphasizes a social *action*, Bakhtin - a social *interaction* in the process of communication. The defining principle of Bakhtin’s dialogism (*dialogichnost’, dialogicheskaia aktivnost’*) as a *dialogic interaction (dialogicheskoe obscheniie)* (Bakhtin, 1979, p. 80, “Translation mine”) with the addressee versus the influence on the receiver of a message is important for this study.

Thinking in both Bakhtin’s and Onuf’s terms, EU-Russia discourse is a “social phenomenon” (Bakhtin, 1982, p.259; Onuf. 1989, p.31); each political statement in this discourse represents a complete utterance - the unit of analysis in EU-Russia dialogue with a specific goal in a particular sphere of communication. However, for Bakhtin, “it has a meaning, which requires a responsive understanding” (Bakhtin, 1979, p. 305, “Translation mine”). To continue Bakhtin’s logic, EU-Russia cooperation presents “the mutual interaction” (Bakhtin, 1982, p.4) of two voices recorded in the texts of official documents. Each official document in EU-Russia cooperation is not a monologue; rather, it is a part and a result of EU-Russia dialogue.

In this vein, textual analysis as the main methodological tool employed in this study allows studying textual material through, first, the in-depth inquiry into the text - deconstruction of the basic elements of political discourse reflected in the EU's and Russia's political messages - and, second, relating its parts to the whole with the aim to reveal important meanings about EU-Russia cooperation. Moreover, textual analysis of these documents helps us understand dialogic relations between the EU and Russia, in particular, information they send in their messages to each other and their thinking about each other and about cooperation.

In order to provide an account of the effects created by EU-Russia dialogue, it is necessary to address the following questions: how is EU-Russia dialogue produced, and what is the relationship between the sender of a political statement and the receiver of the message? The scheme provided below schematically illustrates the way that I offer to understand EU-Russia discourse in this study. An agent in the dialogue is either the EU or Russia who manifests in the selected speech act its own world-views, its vision of the partner or of cooperation. Because the focus of analysis is EU-Russia dialogue, cooperation is a common theme in the agent's message and the receiver's response. The language of the speech acts serves as the means for the partners to articulate their perceptions of the world and to run the process of their world making. Hence, by acting through language, the EU and Russia express themselves and produce a specific type of cooperation. The preliminary structure of the relationship between the speaker (agent) and the receiver of the speaker's message (other) can be portrayed as follows:



The *agent* manifests its view on the current or desired state of affairs in its symbolic message sent to the receiver, calling its conversant into action. However, there is some information or knowledge that is left latent in the agent's manifestation, for instance, presumptions that are implied by the agent as a self-evident truth and, therefore, not problematized in its message. The *receiver* in its response may or may not question the latent message sent together with the agent's manifestation. The success of the agent's speech act depends not only on the fact of receiving a response back from the conversant, but also on the consenting or non-consenting character of this response. The agent's manifestation is aimed to successfully indoctrinate the agent's view; the success or failure of such an indoctrination should be visible in the receiver's response back to the agent. Therefore, in EU-Russia dialogue, I examine what information and how much information the receiver questioned in the agent's message. I also scrutinize the success or failure of manifestations and indoctrinations voiced by both partners.

Furthermore, the *receiver* sends its *manifestation* together with a *latent message* back to the agent in the response format. *Absent presence* is a non-articulated position or view intentionally repressed by both the speaker and the receiver in their manifestations. I examine whether

disillusionment occurs during the process of production of the response by "the other" and the subsequent acceptance of this response by the agent. Even if the indoctrination is completed successfully, it may create the split in the receiver's personality: the receiver has to assume the agent's view and to produce a response alienated from the receiver's "self." To demonstrate the way in which scrutinization of EU-Russia discourse may help to understand disillusionment in EU-Russia cooperation, I next turn to the analysis of EU-Russia political and security dialogue, leaving the space for the emergence of new elements in the structure of EU-Russia discourse suggested above.

Section II: Analyzing disillusionment

Why is it important to look at the EU-Russia interaction in the form of its official declarative statements? These official standpoints not only provide the formal legal context, but they also influence the environment of EU-Russia cooperation, create new structural conditions, alter or reproduce perceptions of the partners about each other and their cooperation. Moreover, these key primary sources reflect the internal negotiations and "basic discourses [about things] that are considered to be viable, desirable and necessary" (Hansen, 2006, p.51-52); they reflect discourse between the EU and Russia.

The starting point of my analysis is that "all actions by human beings involved with others in a social group are, as Bakhtin (1986, 1990) claims, dialogically and responsively linked in some way, both to the previous already executed actions, and to anticipated next possible actions" (Shotter, p.49). Following this logic, the aforementioned political statements are related to each other within the framework of one conversation between the EU and Russia and involve "shared intentionality" (Searle, 1992, p.21-22). It means that they are not a matter of an individual speech act or an individual intention; rather, they are representations of a conversational, dialogic activity. This *interrelatedness* of political statements in EU-Russia dialogue, currently overshadowed by the central focus on individual interests and intentions in

political and academic discourse, is very important for understanding EU-Russia cooperation and, therefore, it requires a closer scholarly attention.

In order to sharpen the analytical focus, I search for an answer to the following questions that serve as a guide for travelling through the selected key texts:

- *Perception of "self" and "other."* What perceptions and representations of "self" and "other" co-emerge in EU-Russia dialogue? Is there any contradiction in partners' perceptions? Indeed, the way the EU and Russia perceive each other is indicative of their own worldviews and political thinking. Therefore, in order to understand what partners "think" of themselves (their self-image) and of the other (their partner), I examine information that Russia and the EU communicate about each other.
- *Expectations and goals*. What do the EU and Russia assume to happen in their cooperation? What do the EU and Russia aim for in their cooperation?
- *Latent message*. What do the partners assume as a self-evident truth in the texts of political statements and, therefore, do not problematize in their messages to each other?
- *Absent presence*. What goes unsaid in the EU's and Russia's messages to each other?
- *Outcome*. What do both partners mutually produce as a result of their dialogic relations?
- "*The significant third.*" Do the EU and Russia refer to something or somebody in their speech acts towards each other? Is the relationship between the two partners influenced by a "third?"

The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

EU-Russia cooperation cannot be understood except in its historical context. The growing speed of European integration and the establishment of the EU in 1992 with its powerful economy, wider responsibilities and the growing political weight made it necessary for a resurgent Russia to set up a

coherent policy framework and institutionalized cooperation with its powerful Western neighbour. The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (The Agreement, PCA), signed in 1994 and adopted in 1997 for the period of 10 years (The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 1997), forms a legal basis for EU-Russia relations and creates structural-institutional conditions for cooperation. The Agreement serves as the crucial point of departure for the EU-Russia partnership. It also provides a historical context and is used as a reference by both partners later on in their cooperation; indeed, the presence of the Agreement is obvious in any communication that has ever occurred between the EU and Russia. The presence of the Agreement is even more obvious in the current situation when both partners need to negotiate a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The latest EU-Russia summits have confirmed that partners are willing to replace the old Agreement with a new up-to-date legally-binding treaty (e.g., EU-Russia summit in Khanty-Mansiysk, June 2008). The aspiration of both partners to create and ratify a new agreement will inevitably lead them to go back in the history of their relationship in order to re-address and re-think the old PCA. This unique situation allows to link the present and the past and to understand the current state of affairs better by connecting it with the historical context in the EU-Russia relationship. Therefore, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement serves as the starting point for the discussion of EU-Russia discourse in this section.

How do the EU and Russia present themselves in the Agreement? The text of this document is replete with articles based on principal-agent relations: the EU acts as an *invisible principal* whose mission is to spread its democratic and liberal economic rules on the territory of Russia, whereas Russia plays the role of a *silent agent,* who needs to follow the EU's directions. In the text of the Agreement, Russia's political and economic reforms become the prerequisite for EU-Russia cooperation, and Russia's one-sided transformation appears to be the only requirement for the success of EU-Russia cooperation (PCA: Preamble, Article 6). As a result, the EU sets up the basis for its superiority in

cooperation; transformation or change within the framework of the EU-Russia partnership becomes an exclusive burden for Russia, not for the EU. Therefore, the superiority of the EU *is not problematized* in the Agreement constituting the meaning of *the PCA's latent message*.

What is the EU's emergent "*self*"? Paradoxically, the EU's self-representation in the Agreement is itself blurry: it can be "the commitment of the Community and its Member States acting in the framework of the European Union by the Treaty on European Union of 7 February 1992" (PCA: Preamble), or the will of the member-states, or even the actions of the Community alone. Throughout the document, the EU does not refer to itself as the EU, which indicates the ambiguity of its own self-identification. Such an ambiguity in EU identity is understandable when placed into the historical context of the EU's internal development[2]. This ambiguity, however, provides the EU as a quite young international actor with freedom for manoeuvre hiding the EU's difficulty to speak with "one voice" within the framework of EU-Russia dialogue. As a result, problems with the EU's ongoing transformations and with ambiguity of its international identity remain *unsaid* in the PCA.

What are the partners' *expectations* voiced in the Agreement? Partners anticipate that cooperation will deepen and widen relations established between them in the past: it will lead to strengthening political and economic freedoms (PCA: Preamble, Article 1) and to increasing stability and security (PCA: Article 6). In the text of the Agreement, partners express their belief that by developing the regular political dialogue and intensifying political relations (PCA: Preamble, Article 1, 6), increasing convergence on international issues (Article 6) and developing economic cooperation (PCA: Preamble, Article 1), a gradual rapprochement between Russia and Europe as *the main goal* of

[2] The European Union was established relatively recently, in 1992, and it represented a new actor searching for its own niche, its own identity in the world of global politics.

cooperation can be reached (PCA: Preamble). In facilitating rapprochement, the partners intend to improve conditions affecting business and investment (PCA: Preamble, Article 1); they seek to prevent money laundering and drug demand, illegal immigration and other illegal activities (PCA: Article 81, 82, 83, 84). “The paramount importance” (PCA: Preamble) is given to the rule of law and respect for human rights, free and democratic elections and economic liberalization (market economy) (PCA: Preamble, Article 1, 2, 6). The partners also proclaim in their cooperation the principles of mutual advantage, mutual responsibility and mutual support (PCA: Article 1). As an *outcome* of cooperation, they expect a closer integration between Russia and a wider area of cooperation in Europe, as well as the future establishment of a free trade area between the European Community and Russia (PCA: Article 1). The partners expect to achieve such a result by establishing new institutional practices, such as the Cooperation Council (PCA: Article 88, 90-93, 101) or Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (PCA: Article 9, 95-97).

Despite the expressed claims for *mutuality* in cooperation, Russia does not seem to articulate any views or concerns of its own in the text of the Agreement, which makes it difficult to identify what kind of Russia co-emerges in EU-Russia dialogue. Again, the historical context helps to understand such a silence from the Russian side. At the time of negotiation of the Agreement, Russia was going through the transition period and was trying to “please the EU’s ears.” It could not miss a chance to establish a new connection with its powerful neighbour holding plenty of potential for Russia’s economic and technical support.[3] Perhaps driven by the fear of disconnectedness, Russia intentionally occupied a “silent” position and agreed to act as an “unequal” partner and a passive receiver of the EU’s directions.

[3] The EU’s assistance is later rendered through such programs as: TACIS, INTERREG I. II, III, ENPI etc. According to some scholarly research, the amount of such assistance from the EU’s side is not sufficient enough to make a difference (e.g., Pashkovskaia, 2007, p.42-51).

As a result, the mutually produced Agreement allowed for the EU's emergence of "self," somewhat superior in relation to Russia as an "unequal other," and Russia's "silent" agreement with this status of the "unequal other." Therefore, at the very early stage of EU-Russia cooperation, both partners laid the basis for a potential future conflict.

In the text of the Agreement, partners consent to "[promote] regional cooperation" (PCA: Article 56 (3)) and commit to cooperate in the framework of the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and other fora (PCA: Preamble). Obviously, the image of the *"third"* - the international community and the closest neighbours - is non-conflictual in the text of the PCA.

To sum up, in Onuf's classification the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement represents the type of *commissives* consisted of partners' mutual declaration to cooperate in order to achieve further rapprochement. However, it carries some elements of *assertives* and *directives* with the intent from the EU's side to regulate transformation and modernization of Russia (Onuf, classification: Section 1).

Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia

In 1999, the EU and Russia adopted the second fundamental document in the EU-Russia relationship - the Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia (the EU's Common Strategy, Common Strategy) (Common Strategy of the European Union on Russia, 1999). At first sight, the Common Strategy is replete with broad references to policies already mentioned in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. Why did the EU need this Strategy? Apparently, the EU's Strategy was a clarification of the EU's own view, an elaboration in response to the already executed PCA joint statement. The PCA and the Common Strategy are dialogically linked within one EU-Russia conversation. Therefore, in its Common Strategy, the EU *gave its response* to the dialogue started in the

PCA by sending the message to its receiver – Russia. The EU's Common Strategy is not only a *reactive* response to the PCA; it is also a *proactive* message sent from the EU to Russia in anticipation of a Russian response. Indeed, the EU's political statement exemplifies well both the *proactive* and *reactive* nature of speech acts.

The Community and its member states finally transform in the Common Strategy into one voice - the EU. It is the EU that articulates the "vision…for its partnership with Russia" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1) in the Common Strategy. It is the EU that "[invites] Russia to work" together on the basis of the Common Strategy (EU Common Strategy: Part 1). It is the Union's actions and institutions that implement provisions of the Common Strategy (EU Common Strategy: Instruments and means (1)). Moreover, the EU emphasizes its managerial skills as a partner in coordination, implementation and evaluation of EU-Russia cooperation promoting the development of effective mechanisms, for instance, the mechanisms to fight organized crime (EU Common Strategy: Part 3).

In its message towards Russia, the EU clearly draws *the image of Russia* that it welcomes as a friend. It is a "stable democratic and prosperous Russia" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1), which "rightfully" belongs to "the European family" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1) and "asserts its European identity" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1). Paradoxically, the "paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights….and market economy" written down earlier in the PCA (PCA: Preamble) transforms in the Common Strategy into the pre-condition for Russia to fulfill in order to finally occupy its "rightful place in the European family" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1*).* Obviously, in the Common Strategy, the EU crystallizes its perception of Russia and strengthens its "conditional" attitude towards the partner as an "unequal other," which, as already articulated in the PCA, needs to reform and change in order to be welcomed in "the European family". The language of the EU's political statement aims to

have the effect of a prescription, *a directive* issued to the hearer (Onuf, classification: Section 1). In Russia's response, it will become obvious whether the EU's directive is followed, followed with amendments, or completely rejected.

Furthermore, *the EU's "self*" also crystallizes in the Common Strategy through its relation to *the "other."* The EU draws a clear image of Russia as a desirable partner: this image is based on what the EU "is" and what Russia "is not." In analogy to the EU's vision of Russia articulated in the Part one:"Vision of the EU for its partnership with Russia," the Union can be characterized as a "stable democracy…governed by the rule of law and underpinning a prosperous market economy" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1: EU's strategic goals). This implicit assumption by the EU about itself underlines the logic of the Common Strategy and plays a role of *the latent message* sent to Russia.

What goals and expectations does the EU articulate in the Common Strategy? The EU defines modernization of Russia as its strategic interest in the framework of the EU-Russia partnership (EU Common Strategy: Preamble). It *expects* Russia to *"*consolidate democracy and the rule of law," mentioned earlier in the PCA, through the building of civil society and "the establishment of public institutions" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1) with particular attention given to relations between different branches of government at all levels of governing (EU Common Strategy: Part 1). Provided Russia acquires the necessary features to become treated as a "friend," partners have a chance to establish a strategic partnership and to cooperate on "the New European Security Architecture" (EU Common Strategy: Part II). Hence, *the goal of the EU's Common Strategy* is to clarify and define the exact criteria that Russia needs to meet in order to become partners with the EU and to build "a common European economic and social area" (EU Common Strategy: Principle objectives: (2)).

The EU aspires to build cooperation "benefiting alike all the people of Russia and of the European Union" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1). In its message, however, the EU explicitly demonstrates that "the main responsibility for Russia's future lies with Russia itself" (EU Common Strategy: Part 1), which means that any deviations in the Russian course of transformation become an individual responsibility of Russia. In this vein, *the main agent's (EU) message* can be defined as follows: in order to be given an opportunity to cooperate with the EU, Russia needs to modernize and be responsible for its own modernization itself. Sending such a message, the EU demonstrates an individual intention rather than mutuality in its cooperation with Russia. Such a message complicates the analysis of the EU's political statement as a representation of EU-Russia dialogue, because the statement becomes a matter of an individual speech act rather than a part of dialogic activity. By such a message sent to its partner, the EU hinders the interrelatedness in EU-Russia dialogue, and the very spirit of mutuality and cooperation as the "operation together" is absent.

When compared with the PCA, the EU's Common Strategy prescribes even more importance to the "continuity, flexibility and substance" (EU Common Strategy: Part III) of the existing political dialogue with Russia. The EU goes beyond the PCA's suggestions and emphasizes its willingness to establish a permanent policy and security dialogue (EU Common Strategy: Principles: 3), facilitate participation of Russia in the West European Union missions (under "Petersburg Tasks"[4]) and to "develop joint foreign policy initiatives in support of common foreign policy objectives" (EU Common Strategy: Part II; Areas of action: 3(a)).

[4] The "Petersburg tasks" are an integral part of the European security and defence policy (ESDP). They were explicitly included in the Treaty on European Union (Article 17) and cover: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peace-keeping tasks; tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (source: Europa glossary: http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/petersberg_tasks_en.htm).

What remains "*unsaid*" in the EU's message towards Russia? The EU talks about *common interests* in addressing common challenges on the European continent and common problems with money-laundering, illegal trafficking, drug trafficking, organized crime, energy resources etc (EU Common Strategy). However, the EU does not talk about *uncommon interests*; it only articulates the changes that Russia needs to make in order to become closer (i.e., similar) to the EU, or it opens up discourse on "commonality" between the partners as the symbol and guarantee of the future success in cooperation. As a result, *differences between the partners* remain "indefinable" in the EU's message because they are perceived by the EU as the factors that hinder the effectiveness of EU-Russia cooperation; the factors that interfere with the EU's intentions to homogenize and "commonalize" EU-Russia cooperation. Finally, the factors that need to be *absent* in EU-Russia dialogue.

As in the PCA, the EU discusses and expands the non-conflictual notion of "regional cooperation," promising to promote cooperation with Russia in "the various fora for regional cooperation (CBSS, BSEC, Barents Euro-Arctic Council [Northern Dimension])" and to enhance the "cross-border cooperation with neighbouring Russian regions (including Kaliningrad)" (EU Common Strategy: Part 2: Areas of action:(c)) – all appropriated in view of the EU's enlargement. Therefore, initially "neutral" reference to the "third" in the PCA – i.e., international institutions and neighbouring countries - changes into an exclusive domain of the EU's enlargement policy in the EU's Common Strategy. Moreover, the EU is ready to enhance EU-Russia cooperation in the area of preventive diplomacy by contributing to conflict management and "curbing the proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction]" within the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the United Nations (UN) (EU Common Strategy: Preventive diplomacy). However, the EU leaves out in its message a discussion of the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) due to the fact that this organization represents an extremely conflictual "third." Indeed, the discussion about NATO within

the framework of EU-Russia dialogue can be conceived as problematic for the EU's own internal development, for instance, the formation of the European Security and Defence Policy as a security and defence component in the EU's architecture that is supposedly independent from NATO. The discussion on NATO becomes even more conflictual for the EU's external collaboration with Russia whose interests fall far short of NATO.

In sum, the EU's Common strategy, containing a set of criteria for actions that the EU wants Russia to perform, provides a good example of a *directive* speech act (Onuf, classification: section 1). The part of the EU's message about the importance of the rule of law, democracy and human rights carries insignificant elements of *assertives* (Onuf, classification: section 1). As a result, the EU's Common Strategy reinforces the "principal-agent" discursive practice introduced earlier in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy Towards The European Union

Russia did not wait long to respond to the EU's Common Strategy. The adoption of the Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy towards the European Union (2000-2010) (The Russian Federation Middle Term Strategy Towards The European Union (The Russian Strategy), 1999) affirms careful attention of Russia towards cooperation with the EU and recognition of the EU's status as a partner. It appears that the Russian Strategy presents the necessary rapid response to the EU's actions. For instance, in its response to the EU's Strategy, Russia says: "The [Russian] Strategy reflects the main orientation and objectives of the European Union Collective Strategy with respect to Russia, adopted by the European Council in Cologne last June" (Russian Strategy, 1999: Preamble).

In its Strategy, *Russia portrays itself* as a sovereign nation-state, which has a consistent foreign policy and a developed, coordinated approach towards Europe that echoes its National Doctrines[5] (Russian Strategy: Preamble). *Russia perceives the EU* as a group of the European nation-states (e.g., "common histories of nations," "responsibility of European States" (Russian Strategy: Preamble)) rather than a "non-traditional," "post-modern," or "post-national entity" (S. Smith, 2003, Ruggie, 2000). To put it simply, Russia perceives the EU through the lens of its own concept of the sovereign nation-state, which it attempts to build in a coherent manner.

In response to the EU's strategic interest in Russia's modernization articulated in the EU's message, Russia explicitly replies that it is not Russia, but also the EU who needs to transform or change in order for successful cooperation to occur. "Europe [is] currently going through the transition period in its development (the need to stabilize economy and maintain the socially oriented reforms in Russia, expansion, institutional reform, creation of "defence identity", consolidation of the common foreign and security policy and of the EU economic and monetary union)…" (Russian Strategy: Preamble). Moreover, Russia clearly occupies *a defensive position* towards the EU's demands for change, seeking to "*protect* Russia's national interests in cooperation" (Russian Strategy: Preamble) during the difficult period of Russia's transition. In "*securing* the Russian interests in an expanded European Union" (Russian Strategy: section 5), Russia demonstrates the will to "[eliminate or set off] possible negative consequences" (Russian Strategy: section 5) of the EU's expansion. As *a result of EU-Russia dialogue*, in its response to the EU, Russia acquires a voice: the voice of resistance and defence.

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[5] Several National Doctrines including the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. (2000) (http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/25.html) were issued around the same period as the Russian Strategy during the first term of V. Putin's presidency.

Moreover, in the text of its Strategy, Russia treats the EU as a source of modernization "[mobilizing] the economic potential and managerial experience of the EU" (Russian Strategy: Preamble) within the framework of the partnership. Such an instrumental rhetoric about the EU as a *source* rather than a *partner* exemplifies that Russia simply "responds with the same coin" to the EU's individualistic approach to cooperation demonstrated in the EU's Common Strategy. As a *result of EU-Russia dialogu*e, both partners gradually lose the very spirit of "operating together" in their messages to each other. They establish the relationship based on the model of one partner attempting to impose and another, to resist. Moreover, the EU's and Russia's self-presentations co-emerge in EU-Russia dialogue according to the same model of one partner dominating and another counteracting.

In section two "Enlarging the format and improving the efficiency of the political dialogue," Russia accepts the EU's willingness to continue developing the political and security dialogue and joint foreign policy initiatives. It also recognizes and successfully accepts the necessity of institutionalization of EU-Russia dialogue expressed in the EU's political message to Russia. As well, the EU achieves a great success in the part of its message concerning the establishment of the New European Security Architecture (EU Common Strategy: Part II). As obvious from the text, Russia places a great emphasis on "building pan-European Security" (Russian Strategy: section 1 (5); (8)) together with the EU and establishing a pan-European economic and legal infrastructure. However, Russia continues emphasizing the importance of "taking into consideration Russia's concerns" in EU -Russia dialogue and securing Russia's interests (Russian Strategy: Section 2).

Paradoxically, the Russian response clearly voices what remains "*unsaid"* in the EU's message. In its Strategy, Russia openly reflects on the EU's ambiguous, flexible and unstable identity in the sphere of defence and security, and the potential this ambiguity and indefiniteness can provide in

establishing, jointly with Russia, the new security architecture in Europe. Moreover, Russia openly discusses the creation of the new security architecture as a possibility for counter-balance to NATO centrism in Europe – the topic that is largely conflictual and, therefore, "*absent*" in the EU's message (Russian Strategy).

Russia responds, though insignificantly, to the notion of "common" in the EU's message, briefly mentioning "common histories of [European] nations…and complementarity of their economies." It is not hesitant, however, to emphasize differences existing between partners that remain indefinable and unsayable in the EU's message. Russia clearly defines its own image very differently from the EU's vision of Russia, saying that as "a world power situated on two continents, Russia should retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies, its status and advantages of an Euro-Asian state and the largest country of the CIS, independence of its position and activities at international organizations" (Russian Strategy: Part 1). Moreover, it clearly points out that the EU-Russia partnership is not aimed at "Russia's accession to or 'association' with the EU" (Russian Strategy: Part 1). This statement has an important declarative meaning in Russia's response to the EU: it is a manifesto of the Russian resistance and refusal to a "submissive" position in the EU-Russia partnership.

Writing section twelfth "Ensuring the implementation of the Strategy inside Russia" (Russian Strategy: Section 12), Russia directly responds to the EU's pressures for Russia's self-responsibility in modernization. Russia clearly states that its own modernization and the success of EU-Russia cooperation depend on an "evolution within the EU," "development of international situation" and an outside "organizational, legal and material support" for change in Russia (Russian Strategy: Section 12 (1)), rather than on an one-sided transformation of a self-responsible state. By refusing to accept the

EU's demands for self-responsibility in its modernization, Russia demonstrates how its own internal change is interrelated with a number of the outside factors. In this particular instance, Russia temporarily abandons its "exceptionalist" and "particularist" position that is *latently present* in the Russian response to the EU, trying to emphasize interrelatedness and interconnectedness between the partners.

Russia's main expectation from EU-Russia cooperation is "the construction of a united Europe without dividing lines and the interrelated and balanced strengthening of the positions of Russia and the EU within an international community of the 21st century" (Russian Strategy: Preamble). One more time, Russia voices its desire for an equal status in its cooperation with the EU. Obviously, equality and balance become *the essential components* in Russia's responsive act. These two main elements of Russia's response illustrate an example of an *assertive* action from the Russian side (Onuf, classification: Section 1). Such an assertive action signifies Russia's understanding of the necessity to interrelate partners' positions, to build some kind of mutuality and to "travel together" rather than "walk apart."

In its message, Russia responds not only to the EU's Common Strategy but also to the starting point of EU-Russia dialogue - the PCA. It demonstrates a very pragmatic approach to the PCA emphasizing that "the Russia - EU partnership should be based on the maximum use of benefits offered by the PCA and the fullest possible realization of its provisions and follow-up goals" (Russian Strategy: Part 1(4)). However, the discussion of specific internal problems and the domestic situation in Russia, mentioned in both the PCA and the EU's Common Strategy, is *absent* in Russia's response. Similar to the EU, Russia leaves out the discussion about its internal state of affairs and does not refer to the part of the PCA that raises concerns about democracy, human rights, and organized crime issues in Russia. Apparently, keeping internal problems in silence helps Russia to make its "loud response" on the EU's

message less vulnerable to the critique from the EU frequently voiced in the previous texts of the PCA and Common Strategy.

Russia increasingly refers to the wider international community in the text of its response to the EU. For instance, “the protection of national production in certain sectors of economy is justified, subject to international law and experience,” or “Strategic partnership with an emphasis on supremacy of international law” (Russian Strategy: Preamble). Suddenly, the “third” acquires significance in building cooperation with the EU, which indicates that Russia most likely avoids problems in the framework of cooperation where the EU shall impose and Russia shall accept; it is unable to work with the EU directly through such a framework. As a result, Russia refers to the abstract symbolic image of the international community, international law and international society as its last resort, the escape.

The analysis of the Russian Strategy has shown that Russia, to some extent, committed to the EU’s course of action; the EU’s directive did succeed in encouraging Russia to send the response and to voice its own view. “Raising its voice” and demonstrating resistance to the agent’s message, Russia’s speech act signifies a reactive-resisting action and a proactive-assertive action with the intent to make the hearer accept Russia’s views and beliefs. Therefore, *assertives* and *commissives* are the two main elements of Russia’s speech act (Onuf, classification: section 1). Furthermore, Russia’s declaration expresses desire and commitment to the future cooperation with the EU. However, the number of issues raised by the EU’s message and questioned or even explicitly rejected by Russia’s response makes the success of the EU’s *directive* questionable. As an *outcome* of the dialogue, Russia’s Middle Term Strategy demonstrates that the EU did not completely succeed in trying to build EU-Russia dialogue on the basis of its directives and the dominant attitude towards Russia. Despite an insignificant attention paid by Russia to the necessity of interrelatedness, both partners tend to treat cooperation instrumentally

and to avoid building "mutuality" or sincere (co)-operation. The EU's response to the Russian Strategy will confirm whether the Russian "loud message" results in weakening or strengthening the discursive practice introduced in the PCA and reinforced by the EU's Common Strategy.

<u>*Road Maps and EU's Country Strategy Paper*</u>

"Road Maps of Four EU-Russia Common Spaces" were signed in May 2005 (Road Maps of Four EU-Russia Common Spaces, 2005): they declared one more time "the coming closer together" that occurred in fours spheres of cooperation (Road Maps of Four EU-Russia Common Spaces (Road Maps), 2005). Paradoxically, the initiative developed with participation of *both* sides through discussions during the EU-Russia summit meetings (e.g., St Petersburg Summit in May, 2003 and 2005) and the activities of the Joint working groups (e.g., Working group on the creation of the Common Economic Space) acquired different meaning for the EU and became "an expression of EU policy towards the Russian Federation …a robust and coherent approach to Russia" (Country Strategy Paper, 2007) - i.e., a response towards Russia. Despite the importance of the Four Road Maps as one more step in EU-Russia cooperation, the questionable character of this document does not allow me to include it as an example of the EU's response to the Russian political statement. Instead, I refer to the EU's Country Strategy (2007-2013) adopted in 2007 (Country Strategy Paper: Russian Federation, 2007 (Country Strategy Paper)) as the EU's response to Russia. Moreover, the text of the Country Strategy Paper itself confirms my choice of the EU's responsive speech act: "the road maps remain, in any event, the short and medium term instruments for the EU-Russia relationship, and this is likely to be confirmed in the new agreement" (Country Strategy Paper: 2, p.7).

In its Country Strategy, contrary to the previous documents, the EU starts recognizing and talking about *its own internal problems:* "the EU seems a great deal weaker following its constitutional

crisis (it is already clear that the Kremlin considers Berlin, London, Paris and Rome of more significance than Brussels)" (Country Strategy Paper: 3(2)). Although the EU starts speaking more openly about its own "*self,*" it continues positioning itself within the framework of EU-Russia cooperation as a stable democratic and prosperous democracy. However, Russia succeeds in its assertive action aimed at the "improvement of the image of Russia in Europe" (Russian Strategy: Preamble) leading the EU to change *its perception* about Russia. For instance, the EU recognizes that Russia "becomes more assertive" (Country Strategy Paper: 3(2)) and "[has improved] financial position on the back of substantial energy export revenues, its economic standing as a member of the G8, and indeed its sheer size" (Country Strategy Paper: 2.). The EU emphasizes Russia's key role in the UN Security Council (Country Strategy Paper: 3) and "significant influence on its [Russia's] near abroad" (Country Strategy Paper: 3). Russia's proactive response seems to succeed in its claims for equality with the EU, who is ready to recognize Russia as, for example, a "key ally in EU efforts to combat new threats to security, crime terrorism" (Country Strategy Paper: 3).

Is the EU really willing to give Russia a special status of the strategic partner by "establishing, in cooperation with the Federation, the quite distinct Common Spaces framework" and supporting a financial cooperation (Country Strategy Paper: 2)? The EU continues to insist on "a significant degree of economic integration and political cooperation, on the basis of shared values and common interests" (Country Strategy Paper: 2), and there is very little space in the EU's thinking for utilizing numerous differences that legitimately exist between the partners. As it is clear from the Country Strategy's text, the EU maintains the old tactics of applying its own well-developed criteria for democracy to Russia and criticizing Russia for the state of its democracy: "it is far from being the case that everyone in Russia shares the European view of what a stable, secure and prosperous Federation will involve: accountable institutions and an independent judiciary, a free market system integrated with the rest of the European

economy, and a strong civil society" (Country Strategy Paper: 3.1). Therefore, *latently*, the EU continues to conceive of Russia in terms of an "unstable," "undemocratic," "unlawful" country repeatedly pointing out in its Country Strategy Paper that these characteristics of Russia cannot "be taken for granted" (Country Strategy Paper: 3.2), they "cannot be discounted" (Country Strategy Paper: 2).

The EU pays noticeably more attention to Russia's actions trying to interpret and understand Russia's goals and the trends of its development. For instance, the EU uses a lot of "Russia seems to be…", or "the signs are that Kremlin…" (Country Strategy Paper: 3.2). However, the level of the EU's uncertainty of "what Russia really is" confirms the lack of communication in EU-Russia dialogue. This uncertainty is *one more result* of EU-Russia cooperation in which the spirit of mutuality and "operating together" is missing.

In its Country Strategy Paper, the EU refers to numerous EU documents, policies and strategies, as well as to the PCA. It seeks to generate "a robust and coherent approach to the EU relationship with Russia" (Country Strategy Paper: 2) based on all documents issued by the EU towards Russia, or wider EU neighbourhood (e.g., EU Neighbourhood policy, 2004), or the rest of the world (e.g., European Security Strategy, 2003). Apparently, the EU has an ambition to build its new self-image of an international actor that has a strong external foreign policy based on a "policy mix" - i.e., "a large spectrum of EU policies, including external policies like the Common Foreign and Security Policy, European Security and Defence Policy and trade policy" (Country Strategy Paper: 6.1). It remains uncertain whether the new EU international identity is accepted or rejected by Russia.

Paradoxically, the reference to the Russian Strategy *is absent* in the EU's Country Strategy Paper, which leads me to a conclusion that the EU makes its political statement an individual speech act

outside of the EU-Russia dialogue providing a one-sided approach to cooperation. The EU seeks to create an objective, independent view of EU-Russia cooperation neglecting an influence of Russia's statements on the EU's standpoints. In other words, the EU tries to distance itself and to become "internally closed" (*vnutrenne zamknutym*) (Bakhtin, 1979, p.81, "Translation mine") in order to "think" about Russia more neutrally, more objectively. Such a trend in the EU's responsive action undermines the very possibility for *interrelatedness* in EU-Russia cooperation.

In its Country Strategy Paper, the EU defines EU-Russia cooperation as follows: "EU cooperation with Russia is conceived in terms of, and is designed to strengthen, a strategic partnership founded on shared interests and common values" (Country Strategy Paper: 2). Such a definition of cooperation sets up the requirement of *commonality* as a prerequisite for the success of the EU-Russia partnership and identifies the components of cooperation (interests and values) that should be in *common* between the two partners in order to ,firstly, meet the EU's requirement and, secondly, to succeed in EU-Russia cooperation (Country Strategy Paper: 2). Once introduced, the concept of commonality starts playing a special role of *the latent message* in the EU's message to Russia. The EU is *latently* taking for granted the notion of commonality as something that guarantees the success of cooperation with Russia. *Uncommon* interests and other differences between the partners become objectified in the EU's discursive practices as a self-evident obstacle to the success of cooperation.

Furthermore, the EU widely discusses in its Country Strategy Paper all conceivable Russia's problems that are *absent* in Russia's speech act, starting with Kaliningrad issues and ending with the socio-economic inequality in the North Caucasus. Time and again, the EU emphasizes that Russia is solely responsible for all these problems, and the EU's exclusive role is to provide a financial assistance in numbers carefully written down in the EU's Country Strategy Paper (Country Strategy Paper: 1, 2).

However, the notion of mutual responsibility, interrelatedness and joint response is left out again in the EU's message, with the exception of several moments in the text when the EU is talking about "mutually-beneficial engagement with...the Russian government" or "a spirit of …mutual self-interest" in cooperation (Country Strategy Paper: 6). Instead of the cooperative rhetoric in the EU's voice, the section "lessons learned" (Country Strategy Paper: 5.2) demonstrates well the EU's talents in monitoring, evaluating and managing its instrumental financial support rendered to Russia under TACIS or ENPI (Country Strategy Paper: 5.2), as well as other donors' support coming from the World Bank, UN Development Program (UNDP) etc. (Country Strategy Paper: 5.2).

In the EU's Country Strategy Paper, relations with the "third" - neighbouring countries to the south and east - become an exclusive domain of the EU's Neighbourhood Policy. Regional and cross-border cooperative initiatives, as well as the strategic partnership with Russia are implemented with the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) (Country Strategy Paper, 5.2). All other relations with the "third" are regulated under the framework of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, as well as the European Security and Defence policy. Obviously, the EU aspires to appropriate its relations with the "third" outside of EU-Russia dialogue. Russia, for its part, has little to add as "a strategic partner" to all the spectrum of EU policies adopted and implemented without Russia's participation and outside of the framework of EU-Russia cooperation.

To sum up, the EU's Country Strategy Paper is an example of assertives and directives in Onuf's classification: it asserts that Russia must accept the EU's view of EU-Russia cooperation as a strategic partnership founded on shared interests and common values. The Country Strategy Paper also sets up several instruments for regulating the state of democracy in Russia (e.g., Country Strategy Paper: 6.4-6.7) and directing EU-Russia cooperation towards the creation of Common Spaces (Country Strategy

Paper: 3.7). Despite the fact that the EU responded well to Russia's resistance and partially recognized Russia's "equal but different" status, Russia was not able to weaken the EU's discursive practice launched in the PCA, reproduced in the EU's Common Strategy in 1998 and reinforced later in the EU's Country Strategy Paper.

Concluding remarks

In this study, I looked at the discursive practices exercised in the EU-Russia political and security dialogue in order to answer the main question: what do the official political statements in the EU-Russia political and security dialogue show about EU-Russia cooperation? "The body" of EU-Russia cooperation is its legal and institutional framework established by both partners. In this study, I examined "the face" of the EU-Russia partnership and expressions it gains in the process of dialogic interaction. The goal was not to overload the reader with new facts about the partnership but to engage closely with the official texts as carriers of the EU-Russia conversation. As results of my textual analysis have shown, the way the EU and Russia practice their speech acts is conflict-creating and crisis-prone: it produces distance and isolation between the partners. However, the paradox of disillusionment in EU-Russia cooperation disappears with a closer look at partners' dialogic relations: these relations continuously reproduce inequality and asymmetry, dominance and resistance, inevitably leading to re-occurring tensions in EU-Russia cooperation.

Examination of EU-Russia dialogue revealed that Russia tried to strongly resist inequality and asymmetry announced at the very first stage of EU-Russia cooperation (PCA), whereas the EU repeatedly re-established this inequality and asymmetry with all the means available at its disposal. By applying such tactics, Russia did not succeed in its attempts to discursively disposition itself in EU-Russia dialogue. The EU, for its part, did not succeed in its efforts to use the power of norms, rules and

economic instruments to exercise control and homogenise the cooperative space with Russia. Finally, both partners did not succeed in "operating together;" they did not succeed in creating a common space of mutuality, understanding and acceptance. Instead, they succeeded in co-creating images of the "exceptionalist" Russia and "individualist" EU and increased the gap between the two.

EU-Russia cooperation did not achieve its main goals to build rapprochement, understanding and trust and to produce effective results of interaction by (co)-operating together. At present time, the EU perceives the partnership with Russia as a tool of its ideological normative expansion, whereas Russia uses cooperation with the EU as a power-balancing concept. The very possibility of cooperation is conditioned by both the EU's criteria imposed on Russia to be considered as a friend and by Russia's claims for equality with the EU. However, both sides are responsible for the final product of their dialogue. Both are responsible for the improvement of communication. Both need to make cooperation work. Not to criticize or recognize irreconcilability of differences; not to discuss numerous gaps existing between each other, but to actually utilize differences and learn a way to co-exist with a very different "other."

By agreeing to cooperate, the EU and Russia have made a step towards introducing new practices in the world of international politics; they created the common space of cooperation in which they committed to co-exist. This paper showed the way to develop an understanding of the EU-Russia partnership as a model of international cooperation that can be transferrable beyond its borders to similar examples of partnership currently existing all over the world (e.g., the EU-Canada partnership, EU-US partnership). Despite the existing disillusionment, both partners have an opportunity to view their cooperation as an open concept for re-thinking and re-definition. Both partners need each other: they have every reason to cooperate on the problems of migration, crime, counter drug trafficking to Europe

from Central Asia and other threats causing instability in a so-called shared neighbourhood. Therefore, the EU and Russia need to consolidate their efforts in order to create better understanding of each other and of their cooperation. Otherwise, they will never agree over the problems in Chechnya, or Georgia, or Kosovo.

The scheme of analysis offered in this study may also serve as a model for understanding possible events in EU-Russia cooperation. Indeed, the EU's Country Strategy Paper that follows the adoption of Four Road Maps has not received an official response from Russia yet. Moreover, this study is especially important in the light of the adoption of a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which is currently delayed. The new Agreement has a symbolic sense of continuation. It is not a "final say" in EU-Russia dialogue; rather, it is a "new" beginning:

"*When dialogue ends, everything ends. Thus dialogue, by its very essence, cannot and must not come to an end"*

(Bakhtin (1984). *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics*. University of Minnesota Press. p. 252).

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