early version of: **Roth, W.-M.** (in press). Individual remembering as interactive achievement: reminiscing in collective interviewing/remembering. In Å. Mäkitalo, P. Linell, & R. Säljö (Eds.), *Memory practices and learning: Interactional, institutional, and sociocultural perspectives* (xxx–xxx). Charlotte, NC: Information Age Publishing.

((((make sure you open all comments))))

Space-times and Lifetimes: Reminiscing in Collective Interviewing/Remembering

Wolff-Michael Roth, *University of Victoria*

> There is here, as it were, a fundamental position of time and also the most profound paradox of memory: The past is "contemporaneous" with the present that it has been. (Deleuze, 1966/2004, p. 54)

Memory, as the introductory quotation shows, involves a paradox: the contemporaneity of past and presence. As the well-known phenomenological analyses of time consciousness show, this contemporaneity – i.e., in the simultaneity of retension and now – is a condition for consciousness of object and events (Husserl, 1928/1980). The contemporaneity of past and presence also was the result of literary analyses, which concluded that the world that creates the text always is intertwined with the text created, for "the reality reflected in the text, the authors creating the text, the performers of the text (if they exist) and finally the listeners or readers who recreate and in so doing renew the text – *participate equally* in the creation of the represented world in the text" (Bakhtin, 1981, p. 253, emphasis added). It is precisely in this interpenetration of the creating and created worlds that language is the living phenomenon we observe it to be, one that changes in use (Vološinov, 1930). Both worlds, the creating and created, are characterized by particular time-spaces (chronotopes) that thereby come to interpenetrate when people talk about shared experiences such that the telling of autobiography is itself a biographical event intertwined with the autobiography. In the present chapter, I focus on this co-presence and intertwining of the world of the narrators and the narrated world in "collective remembering" (e.g., Middleton & Edwards, 1990) during interviews with groups that account for shared moments in time. I am particularly interested in those instances when the members to the setting *formulate*[1] and talk about remembering, forgetting, and the quality/certainty of the memory involved – the issue of memory that is of greater interest to discursive psychologists than the use and operationalization of the memory concept on the part of professional psychologists (Edwards & Potter, 1992). We observe the intersection of these topics in the following fragment from an interview situation, where an environmentalist (Stuart) – who had served as the chaperon to a group of middle school students (Michelle, Jennifer) in an innovative environment-oriented curriculum over a year earlier – and two members of the group were interviewed (by Frances) about their experiences that had taken them to do bi-weekly field research.[2]

---

[1] *Formulating* is a common practice, by means of which members to a setting make available for one another the "'sense' of practical activities as an 'invariant structure of appearances'" (Garfinkel & Sacks, 1986, p. 178).

[2] As the original tapes have been destroyed according to the ethics procedures, the original raw transcript, which did not have timing information, is used. The following transcription

An interaction analysis conducted in the form of applied conversation analysis

Fragment 1

→ 219 S: I'm just enjoying listening to you. I'm kind of blank so-
220 M: La=dee=da=dee=da.
→ 221 S: No. I'm just thinking of scrambling around. That's what I remember.
→ 222 M: I remember that every time we went to the site number one, I think it was, we always missed it.
223 S: Yea.
224 M: "There it is. We missed it again." A little, U-ie and turn back.
→ 225 S: Always go in the same person's driveway.
226 M: Yea.
227 J: And run across the road.
228 S: Yea.
229 M: And skitter across the road, run back.

In this fragment, Stuart formulates what he is doing in this part of the interview as "just enjoying listening" to the others (Michelle, Jennifer), and then, as a form of providing a rationale for listening (rather than contributing), says that he is "kind of blank" (turn 221). That is, he does not contribute to recounting (reminiscing) about the time he had shared with the two students while conducting field research on the health of a local creek and its human and natural environment. In the return to Michelle's reply "La-dee-da-dee-da," he first uses the negation "No," and then in fact formulates that he remembers just then some "scrambling around" (turn 221). The next turn then adds to the topic of scrambling, thereby affirming the description of what has happened, by stating that the (autobiographical) protagonists of the plot had missed some "Site #1" (turn 222). Initially, there is only the affirmative adverb "yea," but, following Michelle's quotation of what they had said at the time – "There it is. We missed it again." – and a description of the U-turn they had taken, Stuart does in fact begin to contribute to a description of the event – i.e., that they had "always go[ne] into the same person's driveway" (turn 226) – even though he just has said that he was blank. That is, in the course of talking about a type of incidence that had re-occurred in the past, Stuart does begin to remember, as per his formulating, and contributes particular aspects to the narrative about missing the entry to one of their research sites. It is in the active work of collective remembering (Gr. *anamnēsis*) that a memory (Gr. *mnēmē,* Lat. *memoria*) returns. It is in, with, and through the collaborative accounting that memories are not only constituted but also, at the individual level, that they return. As I show in this chapter, what returns

---

conventions are used: the arrow (→) points to turns of interest; the equal sign (=) referst to connected syllables; square brackets ([,]) in consequtive lines show the extent of overlap in speech; italicized text in double parentheses ((*Points*)) are transcriber comments. The interviewer was also the transcriber. Punctuation, including quotation marks, reflect her hearing of the talk. That is, when there are quotation marks, for example, then she heard the person quoting. When there is a question mark, she heard a question. The transcription therefore is an insider's rendering of what could be heard. The turns are consecutively numbered from 1 to 405.

is more than the sum of what individuals remember at the beginning of producing their narrative account of past events they are in the process of reminiscing about. At that point, Jennifer, who has been silent on this issue to this point, also adds that they had run across the road (turn 227), a description affirmed in the next turn by means of further elaboration of the quality of that running: it was in fact a skittering, that is, a very rapid running.

In this fragment, the talk provides, in part, an account of past events – how the three members of the group had missed the entry to their research site and what they had done to get to it. In the same breath as evolving this account, the conversation also anchors the account in the present by making reference to the fact that they are currently thinking or remembering something, along with other references to – technically, *formulations* of – what they are doing *at the present time* and in this situation. While the past events come to be articulated in and for the present, made present again (even grammatically using the same present tense in turns 225 and 227 as the reference to present actions, such as "I'm listening" and "I remember"), and, therefore, co-exist with the present *in the present*, we observe a transition from not remembering to remembering, that is, evidence of the temporality of memory in the course of the present interview. The process of the interview, the returning of memory and memories, and the remembered events all unfold together with the interview talk. The space-times of the past and present lives come to be intertwined and constituted simultaneously.

The study of memory has a long history in philosophy from Plato (e.g., the *Phaedrus*) and Aristotle (*Physics*) to more recent times (Bergson, 1929; Derrida, 1972) and in literature (e.g., Proust, 1919), but it also constitutes an important feature of everyday life.[3] In mundane as in professional settings, memory frequently is treated as something like a storehouse (e.g., "long-term memory) from which some homunculus pulls representations of the past into working memory. This storehouse image of (long-term) memory is fraught with many logical problems and inconsistencies (Changeux & Ricœur, 2000; Ricœur, 2000, 2005). The special feature of humans is their ability to regulate the functioning of their brain by means of signs from without, which means, that rather than focusing on the structures of the brain we can focus on those collective practices that are used to control the brain, for example, allowing us to remember (Vygotskij, 2005). Narratives are structured sign complexes that organize, and provide resources to, memory. This is why Bakhtin (1981), as Ricœur (1984, 1985, 1988), is in a position to suggest that the objective forms of culture, which include the *forms* of written language and spoken speech, constitute that which can be handed on (events of the past) rather than individual subjective memory or some kind of collective psyche. Although Bakhtin says little about the relation between memory and narrative in his chapter on "Forms of time and of the chronotope in the novel," and even though he downplays the mnemonic

[3] In the present chapter, memory, the capacity and effectuation of remembering is distinguished from memories, the contents of memory, the things and events that are made present in remembering processes and by means of remembering practices. Husserl's distinction between noesis and noema; Aristotle's *mnēmē* as pathos and *anamnēsis*, an active search and recall.

function of certain literary forms, I employ the *chronotope* as an analytic category to exhibit the complex layering of temporal forms and relations – as per the introductory quotation by Deleuze – in situations where groups produce narrative accounts of what has happened some time past. The collective work by means of which such narrative accounts are produced is *reminiscing*, which is

> a phenomenon more strongly marked by activity than *Reminding* [in original]; it consists in reliving the past by evoking it together with others, each helping the other to remember shared events or knowledge, the memories of one person serving as reminders for the memories of the other. This memorial process can, of course, be interiorized in die form of meditative memory, an expression that better translates the German *Gedächtnis*, with die help of a diary, Memoirs, or anti-memoirs, autobiographies, in which the support of writing provides materiality to the traces preserved, reanimated, and further enriched with unpublished materials. In this way, provisions of memories are stored up for days to come, for the time devoted to memories . . . But the canonical form of reminiscing is conversation in the province of orality: "Say, do you remember . . . , when . . . you . . . we . . . ?" The mode of *Reminiscing* [in original] thus unfolds on the same level of discursivity as simple evocation in its declarative stage. (Ricœur, 2000, p. 46–47)

In reminiscing, inherently shared, collective narrative forms, such as auto/biography, configure the relations between plot and characters in such a way that they constitute an aspect of memory that is due to language generally and the constraints of the genre specifically rather than to the computing powers of an individual mind. Not computing power structures and mediates memory but – because in a very strong sense, "Language speaks" (Heidegger, 1985) – memory exists in, and is the result of, language and linguistic forms mobilized in local, situated, relational practices. To exhibit memory practices in situations of reminiscing, I draw in the following on situations organized as interviews with middle school students about events that they have lived and lived through in the past during a science curriculum organized as environmental activism. Also present in the interviews is an environmentalist, who had served as a facilitator in the implementation of the science curriculum. In the interviews, there is a multiplicity of layers, all organized in terms of the superposition of temporal-spatial relations that structure the relationship of plot and characters. Moreover, the narrative present itself becomes part of the account of who remembers what, to what extent, and who has forgotten what, including the fact that s/he was not part of the event currently recounted. I discuss the results in terms of temporality, which emerges from/ with the temporal relations between past and present, the associated relations between narrative and event, and the opportunities that simultaneously arise to both remembering and forgetting.

The Source of the Materials

In this study, I draw my materials from a database consisting of a set of interviews conducted almost exactly one year after the interviewed now-eighth-grade students had completed a specially designed 5-month science curriculum during their previous school year. In this unit, rather than following lectures and doing predetermined investigations, the seventh-grade students followed an invitation that an environmentalist activist group had launched in and to their community to participate in environmental action. The students designed their investigations focusing on the environmental health of a watershed and its main water-bearing body, Hagan Creek (e.g., Roth & Barton, 2004). They worked in small groups of three or four that then went out to different sites along the creek to conduct their investigations. The group in which the two students (Michelle, Jennifer) participated had been supervised by Stuart, a doctoral student who had become part of the environmental activist movement – even filled in as its director – that he also investigated as part of his thesis work. There were two more students in the group (Lisa, Laura), who were not physically present in the interview but appeared in the narrative accounts of the past events. The fourth participant in the conversation was Frances, a graduate student hired to conduct interviews for the purpose of finding out whether there had been any lasting effects of the curriculum on the participants. The interviews were conducted at the middle school. Stuart later commented on the interview process in his report:

> The [interviews] went very well, we found that having Frances there, who knows nothing about the project, was really useful, as it draws peoples' stories out, whereas with me, well I know what we did. It was good to have me there, because as they told the story, I could prompt and probe them, draw more detail out.

Formulating the Work of Reminiscence

In mundane conversations, as in some scholarly treatments of the subject, memory is considered in an analogy of computing: some form of storehouse where things to be remembered – representations, declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge – is housed until it is called up to be employed for the task at hand. Piaget's work on object permanence, which develops with age (around 8–12 months), shows that there is more to remembering that an object has been in a place than just representations.[4] Thus, memory, the fact that we remember, that is, that we are capable of making present again a past present (including phenomena and objects), is not a raw and natural capacity but, as outlined below, intimately tied to culturally and historically specific relations in society. It is in, as, and by means of (societally and historically specific) relations with others that specific memories not

[4] Much of psychology and the (social) constructivist paradigm implement Kant's program according to which we have access to the world only through representations (*Vorstellungen*).

Content analysis in terms of the WHAT of **formulating** remembering and forgetting

only exist but also can be made to return for individual members of a group engaged in reminiscing past events. An integral aspect of (the inherently collective work of) reminiscing lies in the ways in which participants to reminiscence work formulate for each other that they (do not) remember or forget (have forgotten) and in the ways that they attach markers of certainty to some of the memories.

In the present study, accounting for and formulating (not) remembering and (not) forgetting are integral parts of the reminiscence work. In the 12.3 pages of the transcript from which the present fragments were taken, there are frequent formulations of: (not) remembering (*n* = 28), forgetting (*n* = 3), and (problematic) stages in between, when the speaker does not know whether s/he remembered something (correctly) – e.g., using "I know" (*n* = 11), "I think" (*n* = 12), "I guess" (*n* = 2), or "or something like" (*n* = 12) to indicate uncertainty about whether something has actually been remembered. Comparing different interviews shows that the actual frequencies of these terms that marked an instance or level of certainty of remembering and forgetting change – e.g., in Graham's interview the frequencies of forgetting (*n* = 7) and uncertainty markers were much higher ("I know," *n* = 2; "I think," *n* = 18; "I guess," *n* = 47; "or something like," *n* = 2) and the frequency to the terms directly marking remembering (*n* = 7) was lower. Their functions, however, were invariant across interview-reminiscence situations.

content analysis

What is Being Remembered (Easily): On Highlights and Genres

"Well I remember that part because I just about fell in"
(Michelle)

It is a common experience that some events are more easily remembered than others; and in those events, some aspects stand out more than others, which may in fact have completely disappeared. Michelle's comment that she remembered an event "because she just about fell in [the creek]" highlights the fact that dramatic (aspects of) events are more easily remembered than others. Precisely the features that makes certain genres interesting, such as drama or the comical, also contribute to making them memorable. Central to the philosophical discussions of memory are narratives, which are marked by specific characters (hero(in)es, anti-hero(in)es) and plots. Plots and anti/heroes evolve together and stand in mutually constitutive relations. The emplotment makes use of specific spaces/places and times, chronotopes (Bakhtin, 1981) that creates the genre-typical effect. Memory is mediated by the intensity of the effect, for example, the unfolding drama. In the present interview, Michelle introduced an event in which there was a falling tree that scared her.

Despite the remarkable nature of the event, the initial account produced was rather short but contained characters and a plot. As she talks about collecting dirt samples, measuring moisture levels, and figuring out the plants growing in the area, "the tree fell on us just about" (turn 8). Stuart is constituted as the onlooker, and Michelle as the patient, on whom the tree "just about fell." There is a dramatization, as Michelle talks about being scared even though the tree fell "just about" on them,

which gives the rendering its dramatic plot. The tree was not just falling, but falling on them. Michelle was sufficiently scared to make her act in an anti-heroine way, "hiding behind big, big trees," and articulates the reasons in terms of direct speech: If the tree is falling on her, it is falling on the big trees (she is hiding behind) first.

Fragment 2

	8	M:	And like the dirt samples and sand and figured out how moist it was, and the plants around it and the tree fell on us just about ((*laughs*)).
→	9	S:	Yea ((*laughs*)), just about. I had forgotten about that
→	10	M:	((*Laughs*)) You remember that it scared me.
→	11	S:	I was, "What's going to happen here?" ((*laughs*)). "No!"
	12	M:	I was hiding behind big, big trees. "If it falls on me, it's falling on the tree first."
	13		((*Everyone laughs*))

The internal logic of dramatic events with (anti-)hero(in)es allows a situated reconstitution of events even if just prior to the account details of the reminisced events had been forgotten. There are other instants in the interview with dramatic elements, such as when the water in the creek was so deep that it almost reached the rim of Michelle's riding boots (the second highest boots of all), and when she (the anti-heroine) all about but fell in, and where Lisa (another anti-heroine) got her boots filled. That there was a special effect within the group that the account created can be seen from the fact that all laughed once Michelle was done with her account (turn 13). Such laughter is typical of slapstick movies, where something happens to the otherwise sympathetic anti-hero. Such points stand out when the three participants in the curriculum attempt to think about what else they remember. Thus, a relevant turn sequence begins with Stuart's statement that he is trying to think of other things – those that Frances might want to ask them about – but that he can't really think of (i.e., remember) anything (turn 192). Michelle articulates remembering as being hard, and then lists two of the dramatic events in which she had been the patient (anti-heroine) – the tree falling nearly on here, falling in the creek – and then adds coliform. This then becomes the starting point for a continuation of the interview/reminiscing activity, which will last from there on again as long as it had so far.

Fragment 3

	192	S:	Do you have any other questions, Frances? I'm trying to think. But I can't really think of anything.
→	193	M:	It's hard to remember though.
	194	S:	Yea.
→	195	M:	I just remember the tree falling, just about falling in, and all of the coliform.

We also see in the fragment that members to the setting articulate the difficulty of memory work and that they are trying (hard) to remember; and they connote the

possibility that even though one tries hard, it may be impossible to remember anything or any more.

When someone does not remember a memorable event, this itself may become topic of the talk. Thus, when Stuart notes that he "remembered a lot of things" from the curriculum unit, the interviewer (who know him) remarks that he did not remember the falling tree (as he himself had said), which she subsequently articulated as "one of the highlights" (turn 287), Stuart marks it as something that he wondered about how he had forgotten. That is, the narrative quality of the account was such that it staged the drama of the falling tree as a memorable thing; and when it is not remembered, a question may be raised how this is possible.

Fragment 4

→ 283 S: I just remember you guys scrambling around. Well, I remember a lot of things
→ 284 F: But you didn't remember the tree falling.
→ 285 S: Well once she told me it, how could I forget.
286 ((*Everyone laughs.*))
→ 287 F: That was one of the highlights.

The participants then further elaborated the story and, thereby, constituted the context within which the plot unfolded. Michelle states that it had been a windy day (turn 288), and Stuart's comment, which included an onomatopoeia that recreated the sound of a strong wind among the trees (turn 289), confirmed the presence of wind on that day. The wind was so strong that Michelle suggests having said, "a tree is going to fall down," which, in fact, occurred about five minutes later. She reiterates that the falling tree had made her sufficiently scared to run and hide behind a tree. In fact, she was so scarred that she "almost" "jumped out of her pants" (turn 290). But the story does not end there, for Jennifer adds that they were then running out of that place, allowing Michelle to add another dramatic element: they had to jump over a barbed wire, which was falling in, and that this made her "just about fall into a pothole" (turn 292).

Fragment 5

287 F: That was one of the highlights.
288 M: Well, that was like a really windy day and I had seen
289 S: I know all of the trees were ((*whooshing sounds*))
290 M: I said, I said, "You know a tree is going to fall down." It was like five minutes later CRCRAASHSH!! I like jumped out of my pants. I was like so scared and I hid behind a tree
291 J: And we ran out of there.
292 M: Then we had to jump over a barbed wire that would fall in and just about fell in a pothole. Oops.

discourse analysis of reminiscing and remembering, which focuses on the language of reminiscing, the functions of statements within, and the possibilities of hearing.

The fact that something after the fact is marked as having been fun, and, therefore, as having stood out of the more ordinary parts of a day, does not guarantee it being actively remembered. In Fragment 6, Stuart attempted to begin the work of remembering what kind of measurements they had conducted. The two following turns both mark that something is being remembered "Oh, yea" (turns 84 & 85) and that the particular measurement activity – "floating a little something down" (turn 83) – had been "fun" (turn 86). That is, now that the memory has returned, the past event is present again, it also is remembered as having been fun. The subsequent turns then articulate particulars of the event, some associated with drama ("I kept getting caught up in grass and stuff," turn 87), and the clay that they were stepping into, which Jennifer is saying to have thrown on the road (turn 90).

Fragment 6

→	83	S:	So we did our tests. What did we do on those? I remember a velocity test where we were trying to float a little something down
	84	M:	[Oh, yea.]
	85	J:	[Oh, yea.]
→	86	M:	That was fun.
	87	S:	It kept getting caught up in grass and stuff cause there wasn't much water.
	88	J:	Yea, and there was like clay or something like that around there; it felt like it.
	89	S:	Yea.
	90	J:	I was throwing it on the road.
	91	S:	It was very clay=ee.

A dramatic event or the dramatic moments of an event may overshadow other aspects of the situation, as seen in the following fragment where Michelle accounts for the fact that Stuart finally had ceded and allowed them to go through a culvert. (This is similar to the noises in the audience that produces grey spots in the memory of a mnemonist [Luria, 1968].) That traversal of the culvert was the memorable part, and it was so strong that Michelle said having forgotten about whether they actually tested the water, which had been the purpose of their presence. Going through the culvert is constituted as something adventurous, especially through describing the fact that the fourth member of the group, Lisa, did not go through it being "afraid of snakes" and being "too much of a chicken" (turn 76). The possible dangers involved in going into and through the culvert are constituted by the fact that Stuart initially had not allowed them to enter it (turn 78), because of insurance purposes, as he added (turn 79). But then finally he finally ceded and let the girls go. They then went through the culvert not only once but four or five times.

Fragment 7

75	S:	And we went through the culvert. I remember that.
76	M:	That was fun. Lisa wouldn't go through. She was too much of a chicken. She was afraid of snakes.
77	J:	I tried to go through every time.

78 M: But he ((*turning toward Stuart*)) wouldn't let us.
79 S: That's right. I kept saying it was for insurance, well it was.
80 M: But then finally he let us go through and then we did it like four or five times in a row and like did we, I don't remember if we even tested the water that was going through the culvert.
81 S: Yea that was one of our sites. That was site three, right?
82 M: Yea.

The accounts generally were tied to specific places where an event had taken place, or where they had done something specific: On the property of the lady who got upset, in Centennial Park, on the site near Malcolm Road, or the open-house event where Michelle had presented the results of her group's project.[5] Frequently there were dramatic elements to the places, such as when: Michelle got scared when they were in a place without trails where a tree was falling; Jennifer crossed the creek on trees, something they were not allowed to do (Stuart forbid it); she climbed a tree hanging over the water; Michelle almost fell into the creek and Laura, the third member of the group not present during the interview, actually fell in; they went through the culvert repeatedly (4 or 5 times) after Stuart had given, and this was so important that the Michelle had forgotten whether they actually tested the water in the culvert; they always appeared to miss the access to their research Site #1; the "plowed through the fern" (Stuart); and they jumped the barbed wire and Michelle almost fell into the pothole.

Kick-starting Individual Remembering

Even though some aspect of the past events may not be present to an individual, the articulation of the slightest aspect may unleash a substantial account of what had happened at a particular day and time. It is as if a single note or cord sets off (triggers) an entire (kinetic) melody that unfolds correctly in time even though it had not been present (Luria, 1973; Sheets-Johnstone, 2011). It has been suggested that the function of language is to let a phenomenon show itself from itself (Heidegger, 1977), that is, make it possible for a phenomenon, such as a memory, to give itself to the subject who had forgotten it. In the turn pair 126 | 127, we observe a question | response sequence about remembering a day in the field when the girls apparently had brought a "ghetto blaster" to record bird songs. There are two markers that the girls *just now* remember something ("Oh yea" and "Right"), and then the account unfolds about no birds being there on *that* day, though there had been birds on other days. A follow-up question introducing into the talk another tool used on that specific day, the camera, leads to a further elaboration of the events and details about the unfortunate events that had prevented the girls from doing what they had set out to do.

[5] In that situation, photographs, artifacts, and texts apparent on the display functioned as external devices that allowed Michelle to produce an account of what her group had done.

Fragment 8

→ 126 S: So you guys also wanted to, do you remember, one day you wanted to do, I think was it, bird songs or something? You brought your ghetto blaster.
→ 127 M: Oh yea. But that really didn't work. There were no birds that day.
128 J: Right.
129 M: There were no birds that day. The week, like the time we went before, there were so many birds. There were like barely any birds that day. We didn't get any.
130 S: And did you, oh, you took your cameras that one time.
131 M: Yea. I took my camera.
132 J: Did that ever work?
133 S: There was a problem with the film wasn't there?
134 M: Yea my film didn't catch like always so I got a new camera the other week, a couple of weeks ago.
135 J: That's too bad though because well we did have a few pictures like Mrs. Roche got some.
136 S: Yea.
137 M: But yea like my film when we went to Mexico, it didn't catch.
138 S: Oh geez

Stuart does not appear to know what the specific problem with the film or camera was, but Michelle, now that the situation has been evoked, accounts for some of the details such as that the film in the camera that apparently did not catch, which also was the case during her Mexico vacations, leading her to purchase a new camera.

There are instances when the account of one person allows another member to the setting to remember, and this movement from having forgotten to remembering itself becomes the topic of the talk. As Michelle recounts with some laughter an event where some "tree fell on us just about" them, Stuart, who joins in the laughter, acknowledges that he had forgotten about it. At the same time, he provides evidence that he remembered, because when Michelle asks him whether he remembered that it (the falling tree) had scared her (turn 10), Stuart reports himself as having thought or as having said something at the time (turn 11). That is, in this public arena, Stuart initially marks the particular event as forgotten but, as soon as the account occurs, he not only remembers it generically but also reports remembering a specific thought our statement.

Fragment 9

6 F: What kind of samples did you look at?
7 J: Ummm. Water and if we found any bugs or anything
8 M: And like the dirt samples and sand and figured out how moist it was, and the plants around it and the tree fell on us just about ((*laughs*)).
→ 9 S: Yea ((*laughs*)), just about. I had forgotten about that
→ 10 M: ((*Laughs*)) You remember that it scared me.
→ 11 S: I was, "What's going to happen here?" ((*laughs*)). "No!"

12 M: I was hiding behind big, big trees. "If it falls on me, it's falling on the tree first."
13 ((*Everyone laughs*))

Participants, although they individually might not remember some event, in their relation with others and *as* this relation, achieve to make memories present again. That is, although individuals may have forgotten specifics, in, as, and through (by means of) their relation, the memory is reconstituted and the memories come to be articulated for everyone to take a position with respect to them. Fragment 10 follows the interviewer's question about what they had done. Jennifer states that they did some "measuring thing," and then adds that they had done "something like that" (turn 58). In this, the content of memory (memories) is marked as vague, as being of a certain (general) kind without specifics. But, the interjections "Oh," which marks surprise, and "yea," an adverb marking agreement, assent, or affirmation, marks the preceding turn as a statement that brought about remembering. Michelle says that they had measured the depth of the water (turn 61), but Jennifer again uses a marker of uncertainty (Roth & Middleton, 2006) "something like that" (turn 62). The uncertainty of the statement is further put into relief by the statement that she "can't remember" (turn 62).

Fragment 10

58 J: Well we did, umm, one measuring thing at like Centennial ((*Park*)) or something like that
59 M: Oh, yea.
60 J: Where we like
61 M: measured the depth of the water
→ 62 J: measured it from a like a tree or something like that. I can't remember.
→ 63 S: What was that about?
64 M: The moisture and also the depth of the water.
→ 65 S: Oh yea, yea.
→ 66 J: Oh yea and we were seeing
→ 67 M: I remember the depth part.
68 J: How much plant life or whatever was like in a certain amount of area.
→ 69 S: Yea, I remember that. It's all coming back to me now.
→ 70 F: Yea. You guys have a good memory for this. It's last year that you did that, right?

The turn "What was that about?" (turn 63) not merely asked about the incident that the girls appear to be referring to, but also the questioner's ignorance concerning its nature. That is, Stuart thereby also stated that he did not know what the girls were referring to, and, with it, that what they have said so far is insufficient for him to remember, if indeed he could do so. In her reply, Michelle stated that the instant pertained to the moisture and depth of the water (turn 64), which appeared to be sufficient to allow Stuart to remember, as indicated by the surprise-marking interjection "Oh," followed by the repeated affirmation "Yea" (turn 65). Jennifer also connotes remembering, using the same interjection and adverb combination, and

beginning a statement about seeing how much plant life there was "in a certain amount of area" (turns 66 & 68) – though the formulation "or whatever" marks the plant life part as uncertain. Stuart not only states that he remembers what has been said but also the fact that it is coming back to him, thereby pointing to the emergent aspect of memory. It is not him who actively remembers, but there is an aspect of passivity in that the memories ("it") themselves return to him, who is but a host to them. The interviewer formulated what has happened as being "good memory for this [curriculum unit]," especially given the fact that what they had done specifically and the events sketched generally happened "last year" (turn 70).

Forgetting and remembering as topics may appear in ways that it are not immediately evident if something had been forgotten or not. In the following fragment, there is a turn sequence of the kind that resembles the *IRE*[6] sequence in schools, or the kind of question that an adult uses (as in other interviews in this database), where she knows the answer but asks the question for the purpose of assisting the young person to remember. Here, the sequence from turns 37 to the beginning of turn 39, when Stuart said "Good" and "We did that," which would be the evaluative turn, does indeed – without any additional information about intonation, body position, gestures, facial expressions, etc. – mark that an evaluative turn followed the initiation (turn 37) and the reply (turn 38). But then Stuart added, "I remember that" (turn 39), in which the preceding reply was marked as something that had been remembered rather than constituting a normative item already present in his mind and against he evaluated the students' replies. That is, whereas the first part of turn 39 allows hearing it as an evaluative statement pertaining to the correctness of the reply with respect to the turn-sequence initiating query, the latter part makes it an instance of a remembered item.

Fragment 11

	37	S:	What kind of samples did we take?
	38	M:	Well, we took coliform samples.
→	39	S:	Good. We did that; I remember that
	40	J:	Yea that was cool.
	41	M:	the chicken broth.
	42	S:	Yea, that's right.

Uncertainties in Remembering and Forgetting

As part of the work of reminiscing, participants not only formulate (not) remembering and (not) forgetting, but also degrees of the two. Thus, when Stuart said "I know all of the trees were ((*whooshing sounds*))" (turn 289), he marked the product of remembering as something that is certain. In a question such as, "You know where the gravel pit and that is" (turn 333), the verb "to know" functions in the same way as the verb "to remember." On the other hand, "I guess," "I think," and

[6] *IRE* stands for initiation, response, evaluation, which is turn taking sequence particular to schools, where teachers take the first and third turns and students the middle turn.

"or something like that" tend to be hedges, which attribute a level of uncertainty to the *what* of the remembering process, including the possibility that what was articulated did not exist or occur (Roth & Middleton, 2006). The phrase "I think" is a hedge that marks a certain level of uncertainty to something remembered. In Fragment 12, Stuart asked the two girls to remember that they had been to "the little swamps and the pond areas" (turn 118), but then added with a hedge that he "thinks" the teacher had driven them there, followed by another hedge "may be" that renders uncertain whether it in fact had been the teacher. The next turn confirmed and therefore increased certainty that the events had been as described, introduced by a marker that that aspect has just been remembered ("Oh") and repeated markers of affirmation ("Right," "Yea," turn 119).

Fragment 12

→ 118 S: Just up in the little swamps and the pond areas. Remember we visited that one day. I think Laurie drove us up there that, maybe.
119 J: Oh, right, yea. Yea.

Fragment 13

→ 126 S: So you guys also wanted to, do you remember, one day you wanted to do, I think was it, bird songs or something? You brought your ghetto blaster.

Fragment 14

→ 246 S: It was <u>like</u> three months <u>or something like</u> when did we start? In February or January?
→ 247 M: <u>I think</u> it was in January.
→ 248 J: Yea, in January. Well <u>like</u>
→ 249 M: Through till <u>like</u> March or April <u>or something like that</u>.
250 J: It was <u>like</u> the end of the year when were out there <u>like</u> we were out there on the last two weeks of school.
251 M: Yea, so till June.
252 S: Yea, cause when was the open house. The open house was on May twenty-nine.
253 M: That's five months.
254 S: Yea, <u>I guess</u> so.

Here, the memory work consisted in stating/accepting several possible starting points for the curriculum, one of which receives affirmation with a hedge, and then is confirmed by means of a double affirmation ("Yea" and the restatement of one option). In Fragment 13, there are two hedges, the "It think" preceding the uncertain memory whether bird songs had been the topic of the day, followed by an "or something" (turn 126). Another expression marking a certain level of uncertainty about the contents of memory is "or something like that." The hedges allow the formulation of a specific fact or date as a tentative one, without loss of face when the statement turns out to be incorrect. In Fragment 14, more specific dates for the

beginning, end, and length of the curriculum then emerge in and from multiple statements all marked by hedges (see underlined parts).

The dialectic of forgetting and remembering may play out in the very instant that the speaker is attempting to express or question something that s/he turns out to have difficulties in making present. In Fragment 15, Stuart began something that anticipated the coming of a question – in the grammatical structure of the "did you . . ." – but then articulated trying to remember what he kept mentioning and that the question presumably was to be about (turn 146). That is, the content was both absent, so that Stuart marks it as trying to remember it, and sufficiently present, in that Stuart knew there to be something to be remembered but that he did not right now.

Fragment 15

→ 146 S: So did you guys learn anything- one thing that I am trying to remember that I kept mentioning what was it now? Ummm learn anything about the landscape and the environment like the relationship?

147 M: Oh yea, there were lots of differences like in Centennial ((*Park*)), there was a big hill that was coming down. And by the roads it was more flat but by the road there were a lot more farms and stuff, so it was really gross.

Forgetting the Not-Having-Been-There

Another level in reminiscing is created when a speaker has forgotten whether s/he was present, or thinks that s/he has forgotten something neglecting that s/he had not been there to remember the event in the first place. In the following fragment, it turns out that the question whether there has been an instant of forgetting later is settled as one where person could not have remembered because he was not there at the time. Michelle and Jennifer talked about an instant where they had gone – accompanied by their teacher Mrs. Roche – onto a particular property along the creek to conduct their investigation. The point of the story was that the lady was angry about someone on her property even though she had previously given permission for the school students to conduct research from her property. Stuart initially said that he had forgotten about that incident, but then asked whether he had been with the party at the time (turn 179). Michelle affirmed negatively (turn 181), and Jennifer did so with a hedge ("I don't think so" turn 180). Also using a hedge ("I think") Stuart then suggested that he would have remembered that (i.e., the incident) – even though the case paralleled the one with the falling tree. In saying this, Stuart also affirmed the plot line as something sufficiently remarkable so that it would have stayed in his memory – as the falling tree should have been – rather than forgotten, as he initially assumed.

Fragment 16a

177 J: Well she knew we were there oh that was with Mrs. Roche cause she knew we were there. She came out. She thought we were like

178 M: She was like "What are you doing there?" We were like "Ahhh, you gave us permission," "Oh yea, go ahead."
→ 179 S: I had forgotten about that. Was I there at that time?
180 J: I don't think so.
181 M: No.
→ 182 S: I think I would have remembered that.
183 M: Yea she came out and went, "What are you doing here?" and her dog was behind her.
184 S: Who, where was that?
185 J: Mount Newton Crossroad, or something like that.
186 S: Oh, I know who that is. Oh, that happened, oh, I wasn't there, good thing.
187 ((*Jennifer & Michelle laugh*))

Here, the question whether something has been forgotten or not – because it had not been experienced in the first place – is at issue. At the same time, the turn sequence marked an event as remarkable enough so that it would or should not have been forgotten.

In this situation, the participants established that a member of the group had not been present and, therefore, could not have remembered what had happened – despite the dramatic nature of the incident. In a similar way, Stuart and Jennifer elaborated together a situation where they had seen bullrushes. In the end, Jennifer denoted it as not having been a very exciting aspect of their course, followed by Michelle, who commented that she would not have known – leaving unspecific the bullrushes or the not very exciting nature of the day – because she had not been present on that day (i.e., not attended school).

The subsequent turns then further elaborated the event in a way that it's nature as a sufficiently dramatic event to be remembered stood out. In fact, although Stuart had not been there, it turns out that he knew the lady from having done some work with another school and having had problems with her at that time. Perhaps even more interestingly, although his not remembering came to be attributed to his non-participation on that day, Stuart subsequently remarked that he actually knew about the event: he had "heard a different version of that story without the 'you said we could be here' part" (turn 190). That is, apparently was cognizant of the event, in some form, noted that he could not have known about it, but then acknowledges to have heard about it.

Fragment 16b

188 S: I know exactly who that is. So what were, you guys, you guys were wandering around in the creek area?
189 M: Yea and she comes out and she's like, "What are you doing here?" Ummm, and then we just kinda' all looked at Mrs. Roche. "You said we could."
190 S: Oh really that's interesting. That's very interesting. I heard a different version of that story without the "you said we could be here" part.
191 M: ((*Laughs*)) Yea when she came out.

192 S: Yea pretty upset. Yea we are trying to do some things around the creek in Saanichton School this year. A teacher asked me if I would do some stuff. So she is the mum of one of the kids in the class and she wants him not even involved with the whole thing at all.

Process of Forgetting / Remembering Become Topics

In the preceding subsections, I articulate how the members to the setting formulate remembering (forgetting) and, thereby, make it a topic of talk. But the processes of remembering (forgetting) can themselves become a topic of talk, that is, at a meta-level: participants talk about who had remembered/forgotten something earlier in the conversation. An example in the present interview occurs when the issue that Stuart had articulated having forgotten something is subsequently held up against his claim that he remembered a lot. In that instance, Stuart states that he cannot think of anything else that had happened a year earlier during their participation in the curriculum unit; Michelle affirmed that there is nothing else that she remembers (turn 282). Stuart then made a statement that describes his memory pertaining to the events as limited "I *just* remember," but then, contrastingly, stated that he did indeed remember "a lot of things" (turn 283). Frances then points to the fact he had not remembered the falling tree (turn 284). Stuart did not deny either the fact that he had not remembered or fact, but confirmed that he had forgotten and again marks the incident as a remarkable one that should have left a sufficient mark to be (easily) remembered (turn 285). He does so by employing a rhetorical questioning turn, "How could I forget?," which makes salient that even remarkable incidents can be forgotten. That the incident was indeed remarkable can also be heard from Frances' affirmation, here hearing of the contents of the interviewees' saying, that it had been one of the highlights of the curriculum unit.

Fragment 17

→ 281 S: Yea I guess that's all that I can think of.
→ 282 M: I can't remember anything else.
→ 283 S: I just remember you guys scrambling around. Well, I remember a lot of things
→ 284 F: But you didn't remember the tree falling.
→ 285 S: Well once she told me it, how could I forget.
286 ((*Everyone laughs.*))
→ 287 F: That was one of the highlights.
288 M: Well, that was like a really windy day and I had seen
289 S: I know all of the trees were ((*whooshing sounds*))

Chronotopes, Heroes, and Plots: On the Narrative Structures of Reminiscences

In the preceding section, we see many examples of the particular narrative structure that reminisced events have. There are characters (protagonists, heroes, patients), plots, chronotopes, and (rhetorical) genres. These features are integral to, because facilitating, the contents of the remembering work. These features are important, for memory may be linked to a theory of action and, therefore, implicitly, to the agential form in which language generally and text specifically is constructed: subject–verb–object (Ricœur, 1986, 1990). Narratives have the function to constitute history, as biography, and, therefore, play a key role in the reconstitution of things past (thus Proust's famous 7-novel masterpiece *À la recherche du temps perdu* [variously translated as *Rembrance of Things Past* and *In Search of Lost Time*]). Actors – the characters – are emplotted together with the story: characters (heroes, patients, anti-heroes) and plots are key features of the ways in which narratives unfold. It is to the construction of narratives with characteristic actors and plots that reminiscing in the group are oriented: who did or underwent what, who suffered and how, how did others react, what happened thereafter, and so on. To make sense, a story must recognizably (narratively) cohere.

The narrative – in its entwining of characters and plots – not only tells but also explains; it is not just a chronicle of past event but in fact a model of what has happened and why. For example, Michelle talked about almost falling into a puddle, and this was the result of having to jump over a barbed wire fence following the incident involving a falling tree in an area without a trail. That is, the plot actually provided an explanation for the hurried exit from the area, with the tragi-comical consequences of stumbling over the barbed wire fence and falling into the puddle. The plot – as the genre it belongs to – is a cultural, general, and generic feature. It therefore explains why what happened to whom and when, why someone acted in a particular way and how in the same way that the concept "force" or a physical law allow physicists to understand what is happening in any *particular* situation. This is why researchers need to attend to the rhetorical function of narratives. The plot has the function to highlight the contours of the narrative, pushing into the background other possible and distinct significations that there might be associated with the events. The plot has to role to highlight accents. Important and familiar genres are romance, tragedy, comedy, and satire.

An important organizing feature of a narrative is its locus in specific places and times, that is, the chronotopes it mobilizes to reach its effect. These do have rhetorical function such that Dostoyevsky's novels, concerned as these are with crises, take place in transitory spaces, hallways, stairways, landings, foyers, narrow rooms ("coffins"), squares, bridges, façades, and so on (Bakhtin, 1981). In the present interview, the overall chronotope is constituted by the creek and the work that the seventh-grade students had done the year before. Within this overall chronotope, there are particular times and places that stand out. For example, one important chronotope appears in the narrative of the falling tree, which scared Michelle to the extent that she "almost jumped out of her pants" and hid behind a tree. The area was without trails, so that the topology of the place lends itself to unforeseen events and happenings to which the (auto/biographical) tragi-comical heroes were subjected. The temporality of the situation was one of urgency, requiring quick action on the part of Michelle, and a hurried retreat over difficult-to-

manage terrain. The hurried retreat involved having to jump a barbed-wire fence, which then led to a near fall into a puddle. Readers familiar with slap-stick movies easily recognize the pattern in the way this plot unfolds with its (stereo-) typical slot for the anti-hero.

In another situation, Michelle, Jennifer, and the remainder of the group found themselves together with the teacher (Mrs. Roche) on the property of a woman, who initially appeared in the account in a witch-type fashion, angry about the intruders, and a (menacing?) dog being behind her. Trespassing here is opposed to the recalled antecedent permission to do some environmental research from the property. The moral of that story was the contradiction in which the lady was shown to be, initially having given permission for accessing her property and then insinuating an improper trespassing. The situation was overturned when the angry person apparently reverted in her position and recognizes her own fault (a typical bad-person reversal story).

In reminiscing work, the biographical and autobiographical are blurred, as one speaker may appear in the narrative account articulated by another, who also is taking about herself. In the present instance, the purpose of the meeting is not to re/constitute the entire life of the two main actors, to whom Stuart is joined because he had shared in the experiences, but to re/constitute key moments that are representative of their experience within this particular science-as-activism curriculum unit. The literary resources for autobiography and biography are the same in the two cases, for "every literary discourse more or less sharply senses its own listener, reader, critic, and reflects in itself their anticipated objections, evaluations, points of view" (Bakhtin, 1984, p. 196). That is, the logic internal to the two forms is identical. The two forms differ as to the author. Not only Bakhtin but also more recent sociological theories are adamant about not confusing the two or about the fact that actors themselves have no better way of capturing what has happened than outside observers (Bourdieu, 1980). Any narrative, also, is in the form of a language that has come from the other and is destined for the other, even if it is the other in the Self. The sole difference between the two literary forms lies in the author, who is present at the level of the second chronotope, the one in which the text is constituted. The two, the author has she figures in the text and the author figuring the text, must not be confused, because the former is subject to the narrative forms and associated chronotopes, whereas the second is subject to a different chronotope. Bakhtin (1981) therefore distinguishes the two chronotopes: the one that is internal to the narrative produced – the time space internal to the represented life – and the one external to it, that is, the chronotope of the actual telling of the auto/biography. In the case of a written novel, for example, the external chronotope is made to all but disappear. In the collective reminiscing, however, the external chronotope is one of the features that is maintained in and with the same talk that also sustains the narrative and represented chronotope. With respect to memory in memoires and autobiography, Bakhtin suggests that it is of a special type: "memory of one's own contemporaneity and of one's own self" (p. 24). Without further explanation, he describes it as a "de-heroizing" form of memory, with some mechanical, mere transcriptional, pattern that lacks a historical chronological *pattern*.

Reminiscence Work is Irreducibly Joint Work – Societal-Historical Perspectives

The present analyses show how collective memory of events and individual memories are intertwined – the latter have been referred to as "autobiographical memories" and the former, especially pertaining to groups as large as a nation, "historical memory" (Halbwachs, 1950). The autobiographical memory makes use of the historical memory, which transcends the former because of the contribution of all individual members of the group. In the present study, focusing as it does on inherently collective reminiscing practices, the jointly achieved account of past events can be considered the pertinent collective and "historical" dimension. In the fragments mobilized here, we can observe that collective memory has its own dynamics, though based on and enveloping individual memory. Specifically, a participant might initially suggest not remembering or having forgotten, and then actively contributing to the elaborative accounting of an episode. That is, the ultimate account is not simply the sum total of what individuals remember. As a narrative unfolds, new aspects of events are remembered and affirmed by others. As a result, the account has emergent qualities, where previous aspects can trigger the contingent elicitation of other aspects. The emergent account, unpredictable in its form or content, *stimulates* individuals' recall of past events. We might liken the relation between individual and collective memory as individual speech and language, style and language. Neither member of the pair can be confounded with or reduced to the other. They are manifestations of a more integrative movement – that of societal life itself and its constitutive activities. Individual memory is derived from collective memory (Ricœur, 2000) and exists only insofar as there are societal relations and, with these, societal-historical practices that sustain them.

Memory is through and through collective (social), even when an individual engages in remembering on his/her own. To show this, Halbwachs analyses two stories – one of of a child left in the forest as his parents abandoned him, the other an autobiographical account of a boy exploring an abandoned house. His feelings of abandonment cannot be reduced to some raw capacity of the child, but in the child's relation to the parents. Halbwachs suggests that both began to view their situations through their relations with their parents. That is, even though these two boys were completely alone and in the absence of their parents, what they experienced and how they behaved was mediated by the *relations* that they have had with their parents, made present again in the situation of the experience. But he also shows that those remembrances that we have most difficulty to recall are those that we have been the only witness thereof. But, as they have escaped others, all the more they have escaped ourselves. But these memories are still involving others, often generalized rather than specific others, but these are more removed and more intermittent. This description allows us to relate reminiscing practices to societal-historical approaches in psychology.

Societal relations between people are the locus of all higher psychological functions; it is in and especially *as* societal relation that psychological functions first

appear (Vygotskij, 2005). In the fragments, reminiscing *is* a collective relation first before there are individual memories. Reminiscing, as any other higher function, therefore ought to be explained in terms of the societal relations. These are maintained through the exchange of individual material signs (e.g., words, diagrams) and characteristic sign complexes (i.e., genres, narrative forms, characters, plots). These signs are not natural but cultural. Signs tend to be used to control the behavior of others before they are used to control one's own behavior: for "man controls the activity of the brain from without, through stimuli" and "I control the most internal processes by acting from the outside" (Vygotskij, 2005, p. 1024). Because it is impossible to relate to oneself other than through mediation, a sign is that which mediates between the person and the object, and it is only subsequently that it "is placed between me and my memory" (p. 1025). The narrative as a whole, and individual statements and words are those external inherently social stimuli that allow individual members of the interview setting to remember. Self-stimulation, such as in individual remembering, "always is a social action upon oneself, by means of social communication, and is fully disclosed in the relation between two people" (Vygotskij, 2005, p. 1026). Such relations exist in and through the use of language, which not only is a tool for talking about some topic but also serves to maintain the societal relation itself. This can be seen, for example, in *formulating*, that is, the practice whereby what is being done with talking is itself made the topic of talk. In the course of child development, mechanical forms of memory change to logical forms based on signification of words (Vygotskij, 2005). Here the logical forms are not independent of the words, not surprising perhaps given the two significations of the ancient Greek concept of logos [*λόγος*]: reason and language. In a similar line of analysis from a different cultural context also situates remembering in the relations that people have entertained (Halbwachs, 1950). In this early and seminal articulation of a theory of collective memory, individuals are held to remember only by situating themselves within one or more groups and the associated lines of collective thinking.

A major feature of the fragments listed above are the narrative *forms*. We tend to learn the most fundamental narrative forms – story lines, emplotment, characters, heroes – while participating in societal life. Even small children animate dolls to tell stories, about relations between parents and themselves, between themselves and their siblings, etc. It is therefore not surprising that the participants do not require much explicit work in constituting the specific narrative forms employed – as the many instances of instantaneous *common* laughter show, a particular retold event is immediately understood *by all*. Other narrative forms are learned through participation in pertinent communities, such as the process of becoming a fully-fledged member in Alcoholics Anonymous that is associated with the capacity to tell one's own life drawing on characteristic plots and characters (Lave & Wenger, 1991). It is in and through participation in regular AA meetings that members come to tell their own lives in "polished, hour-long stories – months and years in the making – of their lives as alcoholics" (p. 80). That is, not just any story line does the trick, only particular story lines will be recognized and accepted as those going with being a member of the AA community. The (societal) practice of telling develop over

long periods of time. Here, the personal stories provide a means for establishing and increasing a collective model of alcoholism and the lives of drinkers.

Coda

In the present chapter, I focus on the specific work of remembering that is accomplished in (inherently collective) reminiscing practice. A more symmetrical account would have also given space to the second part of the phenomenon, is active forgetting an important dimension of trauma work (e.g., post-traumatic stress disorder), in inter/national reconciliation (e.g., violation of human rights), and forgiveness. This is so because "In the way anticipation is possible only on the basis of awaiting, *remembrance* [*Erinnerung*] is possible only on the basis of forgetting *and not the reverse*; for in the mode of forgotteness having-been primarily 'discloses' the horizon in which Dasein . . . can remember" (Heidegger, 1977, p. 339, original emphasis). Related to this idea is the image of writing, which leaves the traces that are remembered, and this writing always goes with erasing (i.e., un-writing or re-writing) (Derrida, 1967). Any individual dimensions of remembering and forgetting have to be set not only in a cultural-historical, collective setting but in terms of history as a whole (e.g., Middleton & Brown, 2005), for, from a cultural historical perspective, there is a dialectical relation between individual concretizations of collective possibilities (Halbwachs, 1950; Ricœur, 2000). A more complete account of remembering requires a focus on the intersections created in a matrix that has passive and active aspects as one dimension and remembering and forgetting as the other. This is important, because a person who cannot forget – e.g., Luria's mnemonist – is in as much trouble as a person who forgets everything or large parts of what s/he knew before (e.g., apraxia, aphasia). For a person who cannot forget, the past is as present as the present, which tends to lead to confusions between the two and a very confused and disorganized life (Luria, 1968). On the other hand, there are things that better disappear in forgetting to remain unremembered, such as life-debilitating (psychological) trauma. Some things require to live in the dialectic of forgetting and remembering, such as the holocaust and other forms of persecutions, which need to be forgotten to the extent that other traumas have to allow healing, but need to be remembered to the extent that they serve as monumental warning signs to prevent recurrence. On the other hand, we have to "rule out the specter of a memory that would never forget anything. We even hold it to be monstrous" (Ricœur, 2000, p. 537).

References

Bakhtin, M. (1981). *The dialogic imagination*. Austin, TX: University of Texas.

Bergson, H. (1929). *Matière et mémoire* (26e éd.) [Matter and memory]. Paris, France: Felix Alcan.

Bourdieu, P. (1980). *Le sens pratique* [Logic of practice]. Paris, France: Les Éditions de Minuit.

Changeux, J. P., & Ricœur, P. (2000). *Ce qui nous fait penser: La nature et la règle* [What makes us think?: Nature and law]. Paris, France: Odile Jacob.
Deleuze, G. (2004). *Le Bergsonisme* (3e éd) [Bergsonism]. Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France. (First published in 1966)
Derrida, J. (1967). *L'écriture et la différence* [Writing and difference]. Paris, France: Éditions du Seuil.
Derrida, J. (1972). *La dissemination* [Dissemination]. Paris, France: Éditions du Seuil.
Edwards, D., & Potter, J. (1992). *Discursive psychology*. London, England: Sage.
Garfinkel, H., & Sacks, H. (1986). On formal structures of practical action. In H. Garfinkel (Ed.), *Ethnomethodological studies of work* (pp. 160–193). London, England: Routledge.
Halbwachs, M. (1950). *La mémoire collective* [The collective memory]. Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France.
Heidegger, M. (1977). *Sein und Zeit* [Being and time]. Tübingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer.
Heidegger, M. (1985). *Gesamtausgabe. 1. Abteilung: Veröffentlichte Schriften 1910–1976 Band 12: Unterwegs zur Sprache* [Complete works. Section 1: Published writings 1910–1976 vol. 12: On the way to language]. Frankfurt/M, Germany: Vittorio Klostermann.
Husserl, E. (1980). Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins [Lectures on the phenomenology of internal time consciousness]. Tübingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer. (First published in 1928)
Lave, J., & Wenger, E. (1991). *Situated learning: Legitimate peripheral participation*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Luria, A. R. (1968). *The mind of a mnemonist*. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Luria, A. R. (1973). *The working brain*. Harmondsworth, England: Penguin Books.
Middleton, D., & Edwards, D. (Eds.). (1990). *Collective remembering*. London, England: Sage.
Middleton, D., & Brown, S. D. (2005). *The social psychology of experience: Studies in remembering and forgetting*. London, England: Sage.
Proust, M. (1919). *À la recherche du temps perdu: Du côté de chez Swann* [Remembrance of things past/In search of lost time: Swann's way]. Paris, France: Gallimard.
Ricœur, P. (1984). *Time and narrative* (vol. 1). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ricœur, P. (1985). *Time and narrative* (vol. 2). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ricœur, P. (1986). *Du texte à l'action: Essais d'herméneutique II* [From text to action: Essays in hermeneutics, II). Paris, France: Éditions du Seuil.
Ricœur, P. (1988). *Time and narrative* (vol. 3). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Ricœur, P. (1990). *Soi-même comme un autre* [Oneself as another]. Paris, France: Éditions du Seuil.
Ricœur, P. (2000). *La mémoire, l'histoire, l'oublie* [Memory, history, forgetting]. Paris, France: Seuil.

Ricœur, P. (2005). *The course of recognition*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Roth, W.-M., & Barton, A. C. (2004). *Rethinking scientific literacy*. New York, NY: Routledge.
Roth, W.-M., & Middleton, D. (2006). The making of asymmetries of knowing, identity, and accountability in the sequential organization of graph interpretation. *Cultural Studies of Science Education, 1*, 11–81.
Sheets-Johnstone, M. (2011). *The primacy of movement (expanded 2nd ed.)*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins.
Vološinov, V. N. (1930). *Marksizm i folosofija jazyka: osnovye problemy sociologičeskogo metoda b nauke o jazyke* [Marxism and the philosophy of language: Main problems of the sociological method in linguistics]. Leningrad, USSR: Priboj.
Vygotskij, L. S. (2005). *Psyxhologija razvitija čeloveka* [Psychology of human development]. Moscow, Russia: Eksmo.