# Fairness and Machine Learning

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Lecture 31

#### nature machine intelligence


Article

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
# Large language models that replace human participants can harmfully misportray and flatten identity groups

© Check for updates propelling their application in new domains—including as replacement human participants in computational social science, user testing, and tasks and so on. In many settings, researchers seek to distribute their surveys to a sample of participants that are representative of the und human population of interest. This means that to be a suitable replace LLMs will need to be able to capture the influence of positionality (that the relevance of social identities like gender and race). However, we see that there are two inherent limitations in the way current LLMs are trat that prevent this. We argue analytically for why LLMs are likely to bot misportray and flatten the representations of demographic groups, at then empirically show this on four LLMs through a series of human st with 3,200 participants across 16 demographic identities. We also dise a third limitation about how identity prompts can essentialize identities that must be against the value of lived experiences that explains why replies harmful for marginalized demographic groups. Overall, we urge can use cases in which LLMs are intended to replace human participants with barmful for marginalized demographic groups. Overall, we urge can use cases in which LLMs are intended to replace human participants with barmful for marginalized demographic groups. Overall, we urge can use cases in which LLMs are intended to replace human participants with barmful for marginalized demographic groups. Overall, we urge can use cases in which LLMs are intended to replace human participants with the benefits of LLM replacement are determined to outweigh the harman participants with the barman participants with the participant are determined to outweigh the harman participants with the barman partic	Received: 12 February 2024	Angelina Wang 🕲 <sup>1</sup> 🖂, Jamie Morgenstern <sup>2</sup> & John P. Dickerson <sup>3,4</sup>
© Check for updates propelling their application in new domains—including as replacement human participants in computational social science, user testing, and tasks and so on. In many settings, researchers seek to distribute their surveys to a sample of participants that are representative of the und human population of interest. This means that to be a suitable replace LLMs will need to be able to capture the influence of positionality (that the relevance of social identities like gender and race). However, we se that there are two inherent limitations in the way current LLMs are trace that prevent this. We argue analytically for why LLMs are likely to bot misportray and flatten the representations of demographic groups, a then empirically show this on four LLMs through a series of human st with 3,200 participants across 16 demographic identities. We also dis a third limitation about how identity prompts can essentialize identities Throughout, we connect each limitation to a pernicious history of ep injustice against the value of lived experiences that explains why replies is harmful for marginalized demographic groups. Overall, we urge can use cases in which LLMs are intended to replace human participants identities are relevant to the task at hand. At the same time, in cases with the benefits of LLM replacement are determined to outweigh the har	Accepted: 7 January 2025	
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		propelling their application in new domains—including as replacements for human participants in computational social science, user testing, annotation tasks and so on. In many settings, researchers seek to distribute their surveys to a sample of participants that are representative of the underlying human population of interest. This means that to be a suitable replacement, LLMs will need to be able to capture the influence of positionality (that is, the relevance of social identities like gender and race). However, we show that there are two inherent limitations in the way current LLMs are trained that prevent this. We argue analytically for why LLMs are likely to both misportray and flatten the representations of demographic groups, and then empirically show this on four LLMs through a series of human studies with 3,200 participants across 16 demographic identities. We also discuss a third limitation about how identity prompts can essentialize identities. Throughout, we connect each limitation to a pernicious history of epistemic injustice against the value of lived experiences that explains why replacement is harmful for marginalized demographic groups. Overall, we urge caution in use cases in which LLMs are intended to replace human participants whose identities are relevant to the task at hand. At the same time, in cases where
		example, engaging human participants may cause them harm, or the goal is to supplement rather than fully replace), we empirically demonstrate that

#### Can an algorithm be unethical?













#### Machine learning model class



**Ehe New York Eimes** 

#### Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You're a White Guy

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By Steve Lohr

Feb. 9, 2018

Facial recognition technology is improving by leaps and bounds. Some commercial software can now tell the gender of a person in a photograph.

When the person in the photo is a white man, the software is right 99 percent of the time.

But the darker the skin, the more errors arise — up to nearly 35 percent for images of darker skinned women, according to a new study that breaks fresh ground by measuring how the technology works on people of different races and gender.

These disparate results, calculated by Joy Buolamwini, a researcher at the M.I.T. Media Lab, show how some of the biases in



Gender was misidentified in **up to 1 percent of lighter-skinned males** in a set of 385 photos.



Gender was misidentified in **up to 7 percent of lighter-skinned females** in a set of 296 photos.



Gender was misidentified in **up to 12 percent of darker-skinned males** in a set of 318 photos.



Gender was misidentified in **35 percent of darker-skinned females** in a set of 271 photos.

If societal harms aren't always intentional, then what's the solution?

### Fairness



Bernard Parker, left, was rated high risk; Dylan Fugett was rated low risk. (Josh Ritchie for ProPublica)


### **Machine Bias**

There's software used across the country to predict future criminals. And it's biased against blacks.

by Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, ProPublica May 23, 2016




Credit score



Credit score

Two groups: blue people and orange people Is this is still a good choice of threshold?




Credit score

#### Maximin Principle: Minimize the maximum risk


 $\square$ 

# Select threshold such that the worst-off group (group with maximum risk) has as small risk as possible



Credit score

#### Or use separate thresholds, one per group



### Fairness through unawareness?

OK, so it looks like having separate thresholds for blue and orange people boosts accuracy for both groups... but is this fair? Can a fair classifier use someone's color as input?

"Fairness is unawareness" - a fair predictor should not use protected attributes (like color)


This is problematic though, due to *redundant encoding problem* 

### Redlining

But does the redundant encoding occur in the real world?

"Redlining is the practice of arbitrarily denying or limiting financial services to specific neighborhoods, generally because its residents are people of color or are poor."

-D. Bradford Hunt (Redlining. Encyclopedia of Chicago, 2005)



### Fairness is awareness

Much recent research has converged onto the point that *fairness is awareness*:

If you want to avoid discrimination, you actually may need to form risk scores or classifications in a way that considers the group to which a person belongs.

# Equality of opportunity

#### Positive label

Will repay loan *(approved for a loan)* Will not reoffend *(granted parole)* 

Positive predictions benefit person

#### Negative label

Will default on loan (denied for a loan) Will reoffend (rejected for parole)


Negative predictions harm person

- False negative rate: among those individuals who belong to the positive class, what fraction of them do we label as negative (and so deprive them of opportunity)
- Equality of opportunity strive to equalize the false negative rate across groups

### How can we achieve equality of opportunity?

In many cases, we first compute risk scores for each group (probability of defaulting on loan, probability of reoffending)

We can then use separate thresholds for each group to equalize the false negative rate



### Considering how a classification will be used

What happens when the perception of a prediction is different for different groups?

Example:

Among blue people that are predicted to reoffend, 70% of them actually reoffend. Among green people that are predicted to reoffend, 90% of them actually reoffend.

If you are a judge and see two people, a blue person and a green person, both predicted to reoffend, who will you be more lenient towards?

Solution: equalize negative predictive value (above, these were 70% and 90%), so that the same prediction has the same meaning to the user, regardless of group identity

### Impossibility

Unless either perfect prediction is possible or groups have the same base rate, it is impossible to satisfy all 3 of the below fairness conditions:

#### (1) Equalized <u>Positive Predictive Value</u>

Among people to whom you gave loans, what proportion will repay the loan?

#### (2) Equalized False Positive Rate

Think of this as equality of "bank error in your favor." Among people that would default on a loan, to what proportion do you give a loan?

#### (3) Equalized False Negative Rate

Think of this as equality of opportunity. Among people that would repay a loan, to what proportion do you not give a loan?

Further reading: Miconi. 2017. The impossibility of "fairness": a generalized impossibility result for decisions.

### Inherent trade-offs

Often, achieving fairness requires that predictions are intentionally made *less accurate* for one group if its labels are easier to predict than another group's labels

### Fair Recidivism Prediction

- **Goal:** Release individuals if and only if, were they released, they will not commit a crime in the next 2 years
- Fairness constraint: Strive for
  - Similar false positive rates across the groups (released a reoffender)
  - Similar false negative rates across the groups (did not release a non-reoffender)

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### Fair Recidivism Prediction

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### Key Difficulty: Decisions made by the algorithm affect what it learns!

#### (did not release a non-reoffender)

But... unreleased individuals won't reveal their true label!

If we do not even know the false negative rates, how can we balance them across the groups?!

This type of feedback is already captured by an old framework, known as **Apple Tasting** 

You encounter a sequence of apples; each apple can be good or bad

When an apple arrives, you decide whether or not to taste the apple.



Mistakes involve either tasting a bad apple or not tasting a good apple (releasing a reoffender) (not releasing a non-reoffender)

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
label: good

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### Feedback loops

#### **Predictive Policing**

Given historical crime incident data for a collection of regions, decide how to allocate patrol officers to areas to detect crime.

- Police predict more crime will happen in Area X
- $\rightarrow \bullet$  So they put more police in Area X
  - They measure more crime in Area X
  - So they predict more crime will happen in Area X