

Pricing Challenges in the Live Events industry: A Tale of Two Industries

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Ticket pricing is about selling the right seat to the right individual at the right time. The decreasing costs of data analytics and ticket distribution, together with the general frustration from the large gains captured by professional resellers in highly visible online secondary markets, have stimulated a wave of pricing innovation by event organizers, ticket distributors and online marketplaces for the sport and entertainment industries. Event organizers can keep track in real time of the top selling seats and respond with price changes and targeted promotions. Online resale markets also give cues to event organizers for how much money could be captured by more actively managing ticket inventories.

The way tickets for live events are being sold in primary markets and resold in secondary markets is changing. Event organizers have experimented with variable and dynamic pricing. Some event organizers are starting to adjust prices for each seat continuously in response to demand. Ticketmaster uses auctions to sell the best seats in a venue.

Still, selling tickets remains an uncertain, high-stake and challenging task that often resembles art more than science. Although there is no unique way to price an event, small changes in the environment may call for very different ticketing strategies. This may explain variations in the use of tier, variable, and dynamic pricing across sport and entertainment events. Part of these differences may also be due to the fact that we still do not know a lot about the impact of some pricing strategies on profits and brand reputation. In my interactions with revenue managers I am often reminded that even the most fundamental questions in ticket pricing are still debated: What are the gains from dynamic pricing? Are season tickets outdated? Should prices decrease when an event does not sell well? Does resale in secondary markets increase revenue in the primary market?

In this paper, I will discuss five challenges common to pricing live events that highlight the questions above. Although this list does not cover everything there is to say about ticket pricing, it brings together a wide range of issues within a coherent framework. I also discuss the relevance of these principles in light of recent developments in the two largest event industries: major sport leagues and concerts for popular music. In 2012, total revenue across the four major leagues was \$25.3 billion (Brown, 2013).² According to Billboard, the global touring industry was worth \$20 billion in 2013, and this number is likely to grow, as the revenue model in the music industry has shifted from an industry that made its money off recording sales (and used touring for promotional reasons), to an industry that is now making its' money of touring (and

¹ I would like to thank the Editor and Associate Editor for many useful suggestions. I also thank Jeffrey Cisyk for excellent research assistance.

² Ticket sales represents between 22 and 41 percent of revenue depending on the league (www.rodneymfort.com).

uses recording sales as promotion). Yet, as these two different segments of entertainment are vastly different, interesting lessons can be drawn through a comparison of the evolution process of ticket pricing in these different environments.

When pricing event tickets one has to take several issues into account. To start, no two seats in a venue are the same. Event organizers must sell tickets to consumers who are not certain they will attend the event although they may have very specific preferences for the seat they want. Some fans want to commit early and secure a ticket. Others prefer to delay purchasing a ticket and take the risk to pay a large premium in resale markets for a seat that is not their preferred one. The simplest way to sell tickets is to open a box office for general admission (no assigned seating) just before the event. This is how movie theaters and small events still sell tickets. This solution has problems. For instance, it is often not possible to distribute a large number of tickets in a short time and some consumers are denied access when the pre-announced price is too low. As a consequence, many consumers may not bother unless they can secure a certain type of seat in advance. That's why most large events use assigned seating and release tickets in advance.

For the purpose of this review, I will limit myself to direct sales and leave complementary sales (on the premise, through television rights, or other ways) for another day. For the sake of conciseness, I also do not dwell on the interaction between the different parties involved in setting prices. In team sports, the sport organization has typically much control over ticket prices although it can be subject to league's constraints. For concerts, top acts work together with promoters generally to set ticket prices (Connolly and Krueger, 2006; Waddell et al., 2007). Ticket distributors (e.g. Ticketmaster), online marketplaces (e.g. StubHub) and pricing consultants (e.g. Qcue) are innovators who offer new solutions to price and distribute tickets.

INSERT TABLE 1

Challenge 1: Address the three pillars of ticket pricing

Pillar One: -Tier Pricing

Live events bring together many patrons in large venues. Since no two seats in a venue offer the same experience to the event, the seller offers highly differentiated products. Although these differences may not matter much in a small venue, for large venues seating assignments do matter. Consumers largely agree on which seats are better. Venues have seating charts that capture seat location preferences. Ticketmaster offers interactive seating maps to determine the 'best available' seat in each seating section. Leslie and Sorensen (forthcoming) show that the prices in resale markets capture the quality differences that are not accounted for when the price is constant within a given seating section. The best seats in a section sell faster in the primary market and are four times more likely to be resold in resale markets. Thus, some of the transactions in secondary markets occur because quality is not priced in primary markets.

When all seats cost the same, all consumers want the best seats. But if better seats cost more, some consumers will prefer to purchase the best seats while others purchase what's remaining. Tier pricing, also known as 'scaling the house', is used to increase profits by pricing seating

quality. When should an event organizer charge more for better seats? How many tiers should there be? What is the return from using tier pricing?³

Before tackling the last two questions, it should be noted that tier pricing does not necessarily increase profits. One problem is the enforcement of seat assignment. It is not always operationally possible or economically viable. Cheung (1974) argued that the best way to deter fans from buying a low tier seat in the hope of upgrading once the event starts, is to make sure the high tier seats are occupied. This justifies selling out the high tier seats by setting a low price that generates excess demand. This brings up another issue with tier pricing. The revenue under tier pricing should be compared with the revenue under general admission. Under general admission, the consumers do not know which seat they will get if seats are not pre-assigned or know only at the time of payment under assigned seating. Either way, it's not necessary for tier pricing to dominate general admission. In some of my previous work (i.e., Courty, 2011) I show that tier pricing is not profitable if the consumers with low valuation end up with the best seats under general admission. It is also important to get the tier prices right. Take the example of Madison Square Garden, which has a capacity of about 20,000 seats for the typical concert and assume an act can charge \$100 for the entire venue under general admission, or \$200 for the 2K that are part of what is known as the 'golden circle' and \$90 for the remaining 18K seats under tier pricing. With these numbers, tier pricing increases revenue by only one percent. If instead the price of the worst seats would be \$88, general admission would dominate tier pricing.

Major sports leagues make extensive use of tier pricing although different teams use tier pricing to different extents. Tables 2 and 3 present pricing information for the NHL and NFL leagues in the 2014-15 season. The number of sections in both NHL and NFL vary from 5 to more than 28 across teams and this is despite the fact that stadium capacity varies little across teams. Touring artists also use tier pricing but to a lesser extent. Using a sample of 20K concerts given by the top 100 grossing acts over the period 92-05, my colleague Pagliero and I (i.e., Courty & Pagliero, 2012) found that 75 percent of the concerts used multiple seating categories: 56 percent used two, 15 percent three and the remaining four. Interestingly, older (i.e., veteran) acts are more likely to use tier pricing. They also use a wider range of price across seating tiers. This could be because older acts cater to a more diverse range of publics. Interestingly, Ticketmaster has recently started to offer bands the option to have more sections (Savitz, 2011).

INSERT TABLE 2 HERE

What is the return organizers get from price discrimination? According to my work (i.e., Courty & Pagliero, 2012), tier pricing increases revenue by about 5 percent over single price ticketing. Leslie (2004) found a similar figure using data from a Broadway show. Each additional seating category increases revenue but by a decreasing percentage: the fourth seating category increases revenue by 2.1 percent relative to having three seating categories. The return to introducing tier pricing is also higher in markets with higher demographic diversity associated with greater differences in willingness to pay for seat quality.

³ These questions fall within the broader literature on price discrimination. Event pricing is distinct because the set of quality classes is largely outside the control of the event organizer (Rosen and Rosenfield, 1997). See also Courty (2000) for a review of the economic literature on ticket pricing.

INSERT TABLE 3 HERE

Pillar Two: Variable Pricing

When using this approach, the event organizer must assess how much the public is willing to pay for the event and this depends on the attractiveness of the event (e.g., the demand for a sports game depends on the opponent team) and on the public (e.g., the demand for a given concert is not the same in New York City and Rochester). Dealing with differences in demand is key because most event organizers face a capacity constraint. Concerts tours have some control over quantity through the choice of venue and number of shows although this is often limited, and most sport teams have no flexibility in this regard.

Thus, event organizers vary prices across events based on the differences in demand. This is known as variable pricing. In sports, variable pricing sorts games into price levels based on anticipated demand which could depend on day of the week, month, holiday, opponent team, team record, league standing, injuries, historic rivalry, presence of a star player and so on... Some teams use up to 20 variables to determine price (Paul & Weinbach, 2013). Baseball was already using variable pricing in the 90's and the NFL was the last major league to introduce variable pricing in 2014. Tables 1 and 2 report that teams in the NHL and NFL use up to 6 price levels. Using MLB 1996 season attendance data, Rascher et al. (2007) found that variable pricing can increase price by about 2.8 percent.

For concerts, variable pricing consists in charging different prices in different cities or for different days when a band offers multiple concerts in a given city. Courty and Pagliero (2014) documented the use of variable pricing by top artists. There is much variation in the extent to which artists use variable pricing. Surprisingly, a significant fraction of bands make very limited use of variable pricing.⁴

Pillar 3: Dynamic Pricing

Sometimes the factors that influence the demand change between the time tickets are released and the event date. Then, the event organizer can change the price in response to new circumstances. This is known as dynamic pricing or real time pricing (Paul & Weinbach, 2013). Under variable pricing the price of a ticket for a given seat in two events may differ.⁵ Under dynamic pricing the price for a given seat in a given event may differ at two points in time. This distinction, however, is not always clear in the literature. Dynamic pricing was not possible with traditional ticketing systems. That's because it used to take days to make a price change. To be effective, price updates have to be done simultaneously for many sections in a venue and for many events at the same time (games in a season or concerts in a tour).

Dynamic demand uncertainty implies that the market clearing price changes in response to news regarding the event attractiveness. Such shocks prevail in the sports industry. They include weather forecast, team standing, game stake, injury and so on. Sometimes the demand shocks

⁴ 22 percent of the concerts in a sample of 20K concerts use the most used pricing policy in the tour. The range of price difference across cities in some tours is also very small.

⁵ This definition implies that the price of a ticket for a given seat cannot change over time.

are not known to anyone. In the ultimate form of dynamic pricing, the price responds to comparisons of current sale rates relative to historical sales rates in similar circumstances. A small ticket inventory relative to historical inventory is interpreted as a positive shock to demand. Consequently, prices are increased above historical levels. Doing dynamic pricing requires a detailed knowledge of how prices and ticket inventory should change as one gets closer to the event date.

The San Francisco Giants was one of the first team to introduce dynamic pricing in baseball around 2005 (Lemire, 2009). As of 2014, about two third of MBL teams are using dynamic pricing (Shea, 2014). Other leagues have also experimented with dynamic pricing. The Dallas Stars were the first NHL team to introduce dynamic pricing in 2009. In season 2014-15, 6 teams report using dynamic pricing (Table 1). Some bands have also started using dynamic pricing. Ticketmaster started to auction some of the best seats for top concerts in 2005 (Farber, 2006).

Sweeting (2012) computed the gains from dynamic pricing in secondary ticket markets for MLB tickets. In his sample, prices decrease on average by 40 percent toward the event date.

Dynamic pricing can increase sellers' expected revenue by about 16 percent. The Giants report an increase in revenue of 7 percent from introducing dynamic pricing (Hunt and O'Neill, 2013). The firm Qcue manages a dynamic pricing software for about two thirds of the MLB teams and works with the NHL and NBA as well. The company claims that dynamic pricing can increase revenue by 30% in high demand situations and 5-10% in low demand situation (Rishe, 2012). Others sources report lower increases in revenue.

Challenge 2: How to deal with the buying frenzy and ensure ticket availability?

Some concerts are sold out in a matter of minutes but this is not always the case. Courty and Pagliero (2014) find that only 41 percent of the concerts in their sample are sold out.

Ticketmaster reports that in 2010, about 40 percent of event tickets did not sell (Savitz, 2011). The same hold for sports events. Tickets are typically available for baseball games but rarely so for football games. Sport economists have debated whether the NFL underprices tickets (Fenn, 2012).

Not all tickets are offered in the primary market at face value. Some tickets, and in particular those for the best seats, are sometimes diverted from the general public. The event is typically 'officially' sold out in a buying frenzy and the withheld tickets are resold at much higher prices than face value typically by brokers (Cortes-Vazquez, 2010). This suggests that there is no unique way to manage ticket supply.

An instant sellout can reveal something about the popularity of the event. Slow sales negatively impact the reputation of the act or the team; consequently, some event organizers attempt to create a sense of scarcity for the sake of advertising. An event is worth attending only if there is excess demand and the more excess demand the better it is. The argument cuts both ways. When there is excess supply, lowering the price may send negative signals regarding the event. Even if it generates short-term revenues discounting may end up damaging the brand's long-term reputation.

For concerts, there is a lot of uncertainty before the tour begins. There is much speculation about whether a new tour will be as good as previous ones. This uncertainty also exists in sports competition but there is less scope for subjective speculations: the attractiveness of a game depends on objectively observable variables such as the two opponents, competition standing, winning stake, and so on... Concerts are more subject to demand herding and buying frenzies.

Some artists manage ticket availability differently. They set a price and vary the quantity supplied to serve the market. At the given price, it is possible to add or cancel concerts. Waddell et al. (2007) illustrate this arguing that ‘Garth Brooks, arguably the hottest act on the planet in the mid-1990s, put together country music’s first \$100-millions tour by charging about \$20 a ticket when he probably could have charged several times that. The strategy of Brooks and his team was to attract as many people as possible and not let ticket prices determine whether or not someone came to the show. Brooks, stayed in a market until demand was filled.’ (p.30)

Challenge 3: How to manage resale?⁶

Secondary markets exist for multiple reasons including some related to the themes discussed above: (a) tier pricing is nonexistent or incomplete, (b) the event organizer does not use variable or dynamic pricing, and (c) the event organizer sells tickets in a buying frenzy. In these cases, resale is motivated by profit-seeking intermediaries (e.g. brokers or scalpers) who exploit arbitrage opportunities. If it were only for these reasons, most event organizers would oppose resale on the ground that it takes surplus away from consumers. In fact, resale is regulated or banned in many jurisdictions (Happel & Jennings, 2010).

Another important reason for resale is that many fans cannot plan in advance. Leslie and Sorensen (forthcoming) study a sample of 56 rock concerts that were mostly sold out. They found that about half of the tickets resold in StubHub and eBay were from individual consumers. Assuming that these consumers initially intended to attend the event, one concludes that half of resale transactions are due to consumers changing their plans.

Resale is not that important relative to primary sales in Leslie and Sorensen’s sample: it represents about 5 percent of total capacity on average. Ticket prices in the resale market are 41 percent above face value although there is much variability in the profitability of reselling tickets. More than one fifth of tickets are resold below face value. According to their model, resale increases consumer surplus by 5 percent relative to a situation where resale is prohibited.

Many factors influence consumers’ ability and willingness to attend an event, ranging from change in personal circumstances, travelling plans, and interest in the event. Consumers finalize their plans at various points before the event date. The event organizer can sell to more consumers by making tickets available long in advance for the patrons who need to commit ahead of time. At the same time, it’s not possible to sell all tickets in advance because many consumers cannot commit early. Thus, ticket exchange will typically happen until the event date. If the event organizer runs out of tickets, because the initial price was too low or because the demand changed, a patron will buy from resellers in secondary markets. Courty (2003)

⁶ Non-transferable tickets are almost never used for event tickets (Cui et al., 2014).

argues that when the consumers who want the best seats find out only in the last minute that they can attend the event, resellers have an advantage over the event organizer in making available some of the best tickets to last minute patrons. Some event organizers address this problem by auctioning off the best seats in a venue.

When discussing resales strategies, refund and transfer policies matter. A consumer who cannot transfer her ticket will be reluctant to purchase early. Event organizers recognize this problem. Stubhub is an online marketplace dedicated to ticket resale that was founded in 2000. It has partnered with many sport organizations as the official secondary reseller. Such partnerships eliminate many frictions inherent with secondary markets and in particular the need to physically transfer tickets. Fans have a secure, simple and reasonably cheap way to minimize loses when they change their mind. StubHub typically takes 25 percent of the transaction price which is split about equally between the buyer and seller. Ticketmaster offers similar services on Ticketexchange and some professional sports also offer their own Internet resale services. Supporting resale adds value to consumers and possibly increases the price charged in the primary market. Resale also reduces the number of no-shows and the associated decrease in the sales of ancillary products. In the long run, it is conceivable that primary and secondary ticket markets will eventually merge.

Challenge 4: How to segment the market?

The event organizer can benefit from segmenting consumers into tightly confined groups. Under market segmentation, the event organizer makes available some tickets at a low price only to some fans. Because these tickets are not available to regular fans, the event organizer can increase the price of regular tickets. One application of market segmentation is to charge a lower price to students, families or senior citizens.

Another application in the sports industry is season tickets. By bundling tickets, sport leagues can sell a large fraction of capacity without cannibalizing the demand for regular tickets. Sports leagues offer a variety of ticket packages. These could be season tickets that include all regular games, half-season, or packages for a given number of games that could be fixed or flexible. Table 1 reports that teams in the NHL offer up to 6 different types of packages. Package pricing is similar to bundle-size pricing studied by Chu et al. (2011) in the context of theater plays. Bundle-size pricing charges consumers for the number of events purchased (instead of pricing each individual event). In the concert industry, some bands try to make targeted offers to registered fans. Others offer VIP concert packages that include a T-shirt, an autograph and a CD for example.

Market segmentation can be very profitable when demand is weak: selling all seats may require greatly lowering prices with a negative impact on revenue. Instead, the event organizer can increase revenue by segmenting the market. The idea is to sell tickets to buyers who would not have attended the event otherwise. In the case of season tickets, some fans would attend only a couple of games a year at the regular price but are willing to spend more to attend the entire season.

Challenge 5: How can you ensure your fans are getting a fair deal?

“When Babs tried to charge up to Euro 900 for a Rome gig, Italian fans rebelled and urged the city’s government to refuse the singer use of a stadium. After the public outcry, Streisand cancelled the concert.” (Maguire, 2008) Top acts carry enormous market power and can command astronomical prices. In contrast to Barbara Streisand, other acts do not exploit market power. They claim that it is not fair to do so. For example, Bruce Springsteen, Pearl Jam, and the Dave Matthews Band charge prices such that the demand for their tickets is always greater than the number of tickets available for sales. There are also examples in sports. When asked why it would not increase price for the Super Bowl, the NFL answered that “the league tries to set ‘a fair reasonable price’ because it wants to maintain an ‘ongoing relationship with fans and business associates’” (Krueger, 2001). Another example from sports is that leagues treat season ticket holders as long term customers: The prices of season tickets typically vary little from year to year and certainly responds much less to demand than the price of regular tickets.

Some acts argue that it is not fair that money should determine who attends an event. A true fan, who is committed to an act, should not be excluded for financial reasons. Kid Rock, for example, cares to have genuine fans in front of him. For some of his concerts he does not put the first two rows for sale because, he reports, “I’m tired of seeing the old, rich guy in the front row with the hot girlfriend. And the hot girlfriend, you know, with her boobs hanging out, with her beer in the air, just screaming the whole time. And the old, rich guy standing there like he could care less.”⁷ The Barbara Streisand anecdote also suggests that consumers can be antagonized when they feel exploited. If unfair pricing antagonizes consumers, suppliers may also want to appear fair for strategic motives. There is mixed evidence that aggressive pricing, that leverages market power, necessarily antagonizes consumers (Courty & Pagliero, 2010).

What is clear is that event organizers take fairness concerns seriously when they introduce new pricing schemes. The firm CQue, which has brought much pricing innovation in sports, reports: “In the initial stages, we had both technical and emotional barriers to overcome. We were changing the way things had been done for so many years, moving from pricing ticket 9 months out and keeping them static, to allowing the price to flex right up until the first pitch. That meant educating those in charge of ticketing operations as well as the fans” (Rishe, 2012). The MLB team St. Louis Cardinals reported that: “The biggest challenge was communicating the new pricing structure to our fans and overcoming the concern of season ticket holders that we would be undercutting their prices.” Most teams guarantee season ticket holders that they would never sell individual tickets below the value of a season ticket.

A tale of two industries: Major Sports Leagues versus Live Concerts

Information technology has been of tremendous value in finding solutions for the above challenges. It impacted the ticket pricing industry in two different ways over the past 20 years. First, it has greatly reduced the cost of data analytics and ticket distribution. Event organizers can collect much information on which seats sell well at what price and on the external circumstances that influence sales. Information technology also allows event organizer to keep track of inventory and adjust prices in real time. Sports leagues, for example, have accumulated a

⁷ <http://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=196277836>

large amount of information on how ticket sales depend on a wide variety of variables that influence demand. This information is used to adjust ticket prices in real time and to set the prices of future events.

Second, information technology allowed event organizers to deal with the third challenge (resale market), and get a foothold in the secondary market. Resale used to be an underground activity plagued with frictions and repugnance. This has changed. For many events, ticket holders are now given the option to resell tickets in a safe and simple way in sponsored online markets. Many event organizers have endorsed secondary markets because resale increases the value to consumers, decreases no-shows and boosts ancillary sales. The widely available information on secondary market prices has increased consumer familiarity with and acceptance of the fact that a ticket does not have a fixed value. And this information also gives event organizers clear reminders when they under-price some tickets. Posted prices in secondary markets may have little to do with the face value on the ticket, differ widely from seat to seat, and respond to change in demand. There is no question that this rich source of information influences pricing in the primary market.

There has been some innovation in pricing in both sports and concerts. That being said, the extent and breadth of pricing innovation varies greatly across these two industries. The most dramatic change in the sports' industry is the introduction of variable and dynamic pricing. Dynamic pricing addresses the unique feature that the attractiveness of a sport event depends on objective variables, such as game stakes, that typically change till the event date. Variable pricing is also extensively used. Sport event organizers know the general level of demand for an event fairly well because they offer similar events on a regular schedule. Data analytics goes a long way toward guessing future demands. It is not easy for concert managers to emulate this approach in the touring industry as they are faced with an entirely different market each night. Hence, they need to find the right price for a unique show in a unique city every single night. Data analytics is limited to the extent that acts are differentiated along dimensions that are difficult to objectively grasp and because most bands do not tour on a regular schedule the same venues. Dynamic pricing is less helpful because there are few objective demand shifters that vary systematically before the show. But bands have the option, which is not available in sports, to adjust quantity up and down by adding or withdrawing concerts. Tier pricing is also more complicated because a touring act gives concerts in various venues with scaling options that depends on the interaction between venue characteristics and the tour-specific stage. While splitting the venue in two tiers used to be common, top acts are slowly increasing the range of prices in a venue and the number of pricing tiers.

An important question is whether access to data analytics and the decreasing cost of ticketing are forces that will push toward convergence in the choice of pricing strategies. After all, one would expect that adoption of pricing innovations should reduce idiosyncratic choices of pricing policies. This does not seem to be the case. There is still much variation within leagues in how teams price tickets and across leagues as well (see Tables 2 and 3). Courty and Pagliero (2014) documented the existence of 'artist pricing styles' that capture systematic differences across artists in the use of variable pricing and in the degree of exploitation of market power. These

observed differences could be because (a) there is no unique way to set prices, (b) frictions and inefficiencies prevent events from being optimally priced, possibly because some acts and team owners take other considerations into account than just profits when they set prices.

To sum up, event pricing is rapidly changing as professional revenue managers have joined the pricing game bringing along new tools and resources to analyze demand and dynamically adjust prices. At the same time fans understand that uniform pricing is on its way to extinction, at least for major events. We are seeing the beginning of a new age in ticket pricing where much gains can be captured by making tickets available to individual fans for the right seat in the right event. Doing so requires very flexible inventory systems that respond to unanticipated and sudden changes in event popularity and that also accommodate the changing personal circumstances of individual consumers.

About the Author: Pascal Courty is an Associate Professor at the University of Victoria. His research expertise is on price discrimination and industrial organization. He has conducted research on ticket pricing, dynamic pricing, secondary resale markets, and tier pricing in a number of industries including concerts for popular music and sports leagues. He has helped several companies designing and improving their revenue management systems.

Table 1. Challenges to pricing in the live performance industry

Challenges to pricing in the live performance industry

Challenge 1: Address the three pillars of ticket pricing

Challenge 2: How to deal with the buying frenzy and ensure ticket availability?

Challenge 3: How to manage resale?

Challenge 4: How to segment the market?

Challenge 5: How can you ensure your fans are getting a fair deal?

Table 2: Pricing in the National Hockey League, 2014-2015

Team	Tier Pricing: Section Count	Variable Pricing ¹	Dynamic Pricing	Packages Available ²	Total Capacity	Year Built	Average Ticket Price ³
Anaheim Ducks	7 ⁴	3	Yes	5	17,610	1993	45.10
Arizona Coyotes	14 ⁵	4		6	17,746	2003	44.68
Boston Bruins	***	***		4	17,565	1995	88.70
Buffalo Sabres	13 ⁶	5		4	19,070	1996	49.72
Calgary Flames	16	3		4	19,289	1983	63.07
Carolina Hurricanes	23 ⁷	2		4	19,016	1999	61.04
Chicago Blackhawks	9 ⁸	***		3	22,428	1994	78.80
Colorado Avalanche	13	5		4	18,646	1999	47.56
Col. Blue Jackets	15	4	Yes	5	19,219	2000	48.90
Dallas Stars	6	3	Yes	4	19,120	2001	37.28
Detroit Red Wings	11	-	Yes	5	20,027	1979	49.16
Edmonton Oilers	8 ⁸	***		4	16,839	1974	72.63
Florida Panthers	***	***		4	20,741	1998	33.39
Los Angeles Kings	***	***		4	18,867	1999	66.25
Minnesota Wild	11	4		4	19,893	2000	67.06
Montreal Canadiens	18 ⁹	2		5	21,287	1996	73.67
Nashville Predators	15 ¹⁰	***		5	17,355	1996	62.16
New Jersey Devils	17	***		5	17,625	2007	77.87
New York Islanders	21	***		5	16,170	1972	47.71
New York Rangers	***	***		5	18,006	1968	49.21
Ottawa Senators	16 ⁸	-	Yes	5	20,510	1996	51.76
Philadelphia Flyers	21	***		4	20,327	1996	74.65
Pittsburgh Penguins	9	***		4	18,673	2010	73.59
San Jose Sharks	19 ¹¹	4		4	17,562	1993	54.68
St. Louis Blues	18	4	Yes	5	20,082	1994	53.33
Tampa Bay Lightning	22	***		4	19,204	1996	44.50
Toronto Maple Leafs	***	***		2	19,746	1999	113.66
Vancouver Canucks	17	3		3	18,910	1995	84.87
Washington Capitals	32	***		5	18,506	1997	70.98
Winnipeg Jets	7	3		3	15,016	2004	79.28

Notes: The information was collected from the teams' websites.

*** indicates no information available.

¹ The values indicate the number of different pricing levels applied to a given seat across different events.

² Packages Include: Full-season and half-season tickets, Fixed and semi-flex plans (consumer chooses a set amount of games possibly from a list of predetermined games), Single tickets.

³ In USD (converted at \$1CAD=\$.89 USD where applicable).

⁴ Based on single game tickets only; 20 for all other types of packages offered.

⁵ Based on full-season tickets only; 13 sections for half-season tickets, 10 sections for 13-game semi-flex tickets, 5 for 10-game semi-flex tickets, 10 sections for 5-game flex tickets,

⁶ Based on full season tickets only; 10 for all other types of packages offered.

⁷ Based on full season tickets only; 14 sections for half-season tickets, 10 sections for 12-game plan tickets, 11 sections for single-game tickets.

⁸ Includes standing room section.

⁹ Includes children and family zone section.

¹⁰ Includes sections bundled with food/services.

¹¹ Information based on full season tickets only.

Table 3: Pricing in the National Football League, 2014

Team	Tier Pricing: Section Count	Variable Pricing ¹	Seating Capacity	Total Capacity	Year Built	Average Ticket Price
Arizona Cardinals	12	-	63,400	142,000	2006	82.15
Atlanta Falcons	4 ¹	2	71,228	146,852	1992	78.58
Baltimore Ravens	9	-	71,008	145,328	1998	100.19
Buffalo Bills	5	3	73,089	144,946	1973	62.01
Carolina Panthers	15	-	73,779	147,892	1996	72.44
Chicago Bears	15	-	61,500	124,371	1924	108.44
Cincinnati Bengals	10	-	65,484	131,019	2000	71.26
Cleveland Browns	6	2	73,204	140,611	1999	54.20
Dallas Cowboys	***	***	80,000	185,121	2009	110.20
Denver Broncos	***	-	76,125	153,285	2001	87.96
Detroit Lions	9	2	65,000	135,000	2002	72.98
Green Bay Packers	10	-	80,735	161,470	1957	95.61
Houston Texans	14	-	71,054	142,792	2002	88.98
Indianapolis Colts	10	-	63,024	133,024	2008	86.32
Jacksonville Jaguars	21	3 ²	67,246	144,113	1995	57.65
Kansas City Chiefs	16	4	76,416	152,832	1972	68.38
Miami Dolphins	14	-	75,540	155,660	1987	65.16
Minnesota Vikings	9	2	50,000	102,525	2009	88.53
N.E. Patriots	7	2	68,756	137,512	2002	122.00
New Orleans Saints	12	-	73,208	149,676	1975	111.69
New York Giants	7	-	82,566	165,132	2010	105.66
New York Jets	25	-	82,566	165,132	2010	94.87
Oakland Raiders	9	-	63,132	127,332	1966	64.80
Philadelphia Eagles	8	-	68,532	137,676	2003	98.69
Pittsburgh Steelers	10	2	65,050	131,712	2001	83.97
San Diego Chargers	6	4	71,283	141,844	1967	117.00
San Francisco 49ers	8	2	68,500	143,500	2014	94.55
Seattle Seahawks	13	-	67,135	139,135	2002	80.77
St. Louis Rams	12	-	65,309	131,309	1995	73.86
T.B. Buccaneers	28	-	65,890	140,890	1998	63.59
Tennessee Titans	18	-	69,143	138,286	1999	67.15
Wash. Redskins	12	-	91,673	170,673	1997	102.00

Notes: The information was collected from the teams' websites.

*** indicates no information available.

¹ The values indicate the number of different pricing levels applied to a given seat across different events.

² 4 section used for "regular" games, 5 sections used for "premium" games.

³ Additional premium if ticket purchased on game day.

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