Instructor:
Dr. Daniel Rondeau
BEC 342
rondeau@uvic.ca

Syllabus

BACKGROUND FROM NOBEL PRIZES IN ECONOMICS AWARDED IN RELATION TO GAME THEORY

John Nash, John Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten (Nobel Prize, 1994) "for their pioneering analysis of equilibria in the theory of non-cooperative games."

Vernon Smith (Nobel Prize, 2002) "for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis, especially in the study of alternative market mechanisms."

Daniel Kanheman (Nobel Prize, 2002) "for having integrated insights from psychological research into economic science, especially concerning human judgment and decision-making under uncertainty”

LECTURE NOTES

I. Introduction

- Introduction

II. Static Games of Complete Information

-Normal Form of Static Games of Complete Information

-Dominance

-Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies for Finite Strategy Spaces

-Nash Equilibrium in Pure Strategies for Continuous Strategy Spaces - Cournot

-Mixed Strategies (1)

-Mixed Strategies (2)

-Common Pool Resources

-Coase Theorem and Property Rights

-Voting

III. Dynamic Games of Complete Information

-Intro - Subgame Perfection

-Infinite Strategy Space - Stackelberg

-Nash Bargaining

-Dynamic Games of Complete but Imperfect Information

-Repeated Games

-Evolutionary Games

IV. Static Games of Incomplete Information

-Intro; MSNE Revisited; Cournot Revisited.

-Auctions

V. Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information

-Bayes Rule

-Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

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VI. Other Material

LAB DATA AND INSTRUCTIONS

Lab 1 (Matrix) instructions	Lab 1 (Matrix) data (2009)	Lab 1 (Matrix) data (2011)
Lab 2 (Cournot) instructions	Lab 2 (Cournot) data (2009)	Lab 2 (Cournot) data (2011)
Lab 3 (Common Pool) instructions	Lab 3 (Common Pool) data (2009)	Lab 3 (Common Pool) data (2011)
Lab 4 (Bargaining) instructions	Lab 4 (Bargaining) data (2009)	Lab 4 (Bargaining) data (2011)
Lab 5 (Reciprocity) instructions	Lab 5 (Reciprocity) data (2009)	Lab 5 (Reciprocity) data (2011)
Lab 6 (Centipede) instructions	Lab 6 (Centipede) data (2009)	Lab 6 (Centipede) data (2011)
Lab 7 (Trust) instructions		Lab 7 (Trust) data (2011)

PROBLEMS AND ANSWERS

- Answers to B&F Chapter 1 Exercises

- Answers to B&F Chapter 2 Exercises
    note: the inverse demand function in problem 2.1 should be ... [P = 200 - 0.5 (Sa+Sf)]   (instead of 0.1)

- Additional Problems with Answers - Static Games of Complete Info - Pure Strategies

- Additional Problems with Answers - Static Games of Complete Info - Mixed Strategies

- Questions and Answers to B&F Chapter 4 Exercises

- Mid-Term Fall 2003

- Mid-Term Fall 2004

- Mid-Term 1 S2007 and Answer Key

- Mid-term 1 S2008 and Answer Key

- Mid-term 1 F2011 and Answer Key

- Mid-term 2 F2011 and Answer Key

- Mid-Term 2 S2007 Answer Key (S2007)

- Mid-term 2 S2008 and Answer Key

- Answers to B&F Chapter 5 Exercises

- Answers to B&F Chapter 6 Exercises

- Answers to B&F Chapter 7 Exercises

- Additional Problems - Sequential Games

- Additional Problems - Bargaining

- B&F Chapter 9 Exercises

- B&F Chapter 13 Exercises

- B&F Chapter 14 Exercises

- B&F Chapter 15 Exercises

- 2000 Assignment 4

- A couple of auction problems

- Evolutionary Games (Problems)

- Assignment 3 f2004

- Final Exam S2003

- Final Exam f2001

- Final Exam f2003

- Final Exam S2007

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