Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation

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Abstract. Past field validity tests of contingent valuation have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and may overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding in the actual contributions. This paper argues that provision point mechanisms are a preferred alternative for field validity tests of contingent valuation because they increase the proportion of demand revealed in cases in which public goods can be provided in a step function. The results of a contingent valuation validity study of participation in a green electricity pricing program that uses a provision point mechanism are reported, and hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses are compared to actual participation. Calibration of hypothetical responses is also explored.

Key words: contingent valuation, experimental economics, provision point mechanism, validity

JEL classification: Q20, Q26

1. Introduction

A critical issue in environmental economics and public policy is the ability of contingent valuation (CV) to measure "actual" willingness to pay (WTP) for environmental commodities (Arrow et al. 1993). Early field validity research compared hypothetical CV responses with values obtained from auctions and other actual market transactions for familiar private (e.g., strawberries, Dickie et al. 1987) and quasi-public goods (e.g., hunting permits, Bishop and Heberlein 1979). Although subsequent analyses of this data have provided mixed interpretations, this early validity research led some prominent CV researchers to conclude that "the overwhelming weight from simulated market experiments favors the use of contingent valuation for estimating willingness to pay" (Bishop and Heberlein 1990).[1] More recent efforts have sought to extend the CV/actual market comparisons to less familiar public goods with large nonuse components: Duffield and Patterson (1992) conducted such comparisons for leasing water rights for threatened trout

streams, Seip and Strand (1992) evaluated hypothetical and actual sign-ups for an environmental organization, Brown et al. (1996) and Champ et al. (1997) compared hypothetical and real donations for the removal of roads on the north rim of the Grand Canyon, Navrud and Veisten (1997) compared hypothetical and actual payments for old growth forest parcels, and Champ and Bishop (2001) compared hypothetical and actual contributions for a wind energy project. Together, these studies have suggested that there are considerable differences between hypothetical and actual contributions, which have largely been attributed to biases associated with the hypothetical nature of CV. For example, Brown et al. (1996, p. 164) argue that "Hypothetical questions, especially about donations to generally desirable environmental goods seem to engender overestimates of actual WTP." Such conclusions have lent some support to efforts to discredit CV as a public decision tool. They have also led to efforts to "calibrate" hypothetical CV responses to better approximate measures of actual WTP (Diamond and Hausman 1994; Mansfield 1998; Champ and Bishop 2001).

Relying on these past field comparisons to reject the use of CV in public policy applications, or to use these studies to calibrate CV values, is inappropriate, since each of these comparisons relies on a voluntary market contributions mechanism (VCM) as a criterion for conducting the validity test. Theoretical developments following Samuelson (1954) and decades of experimental economics research indicate that these mechanisms are neither incentive compatible in theory nor demand revealing in practice (see Ledyard 1995, for a comprehensive review of the literature). Free riding is the expected norm. In VCM experiments involving real money, individuals typically contribute 40 to 60 percent of the Pareto optimum level (Davis and Holt 1993). This tendency of the VCM to reveal only a small portion of the demand for public goods confirms its ineffectiveness as a public good funding mechanism, and makes it a particularly inappropriate market criterion to use as a base for assessing the validity of CV in field tests. Indeed, it remains possible that the previously observed difference between hypothetical WTP and actual contributions to public goods could largely be explained by free riding rather than be a reflection of upward bias in hypothetical answers.[2]

Building on recent experimental economics research, this paper presents the first field study in which a provision point mechanism is used to test hypothetical bias and possible calibration alternatives in CV. Such a mechanism has been shown to reduce free-riding in large group, single-shot settings (Rondeau et al. 1999; Rose et al. 2002). This paper should be viewed as part of an emerging paradigmatic thrust that brings experimental economics and laboratory contributions to bear on the validity testing of hypothetical values for private (e.g., Cummings et al. 1995; Frykblom 1997; List and Shogren 1998; Balistreri et al. 2001) and public goods (e.g., Brookshire and Coursey 1987; Brookshire et al. 1990; Cummings et al. 1997; Spencer et al. 1998; Cummings and Taylor 1999). However there is a critical distinction between this and previous research. Past research on public goods has largely focused on conducting validity testing completely within an experimental

laboratory setting (e.g. Brookshire et al. Spencer et al. Cummings and Taylor). Other research has compared hypothetical field values with those obtained from a recruited laboratory sub-sample drawn from the same underlying population (e.g., Brookshire and Coursey), in what some authors have dubbed "CVM-X" (Fox et al. 1998). Here, we follow a third option of bringing an improved elicitation mechanism to the field.

This paper is organized as follows. The following section provides comparisons of provision point mechanisms with parallel VCM studies in a single shot, large group situation that mimics the VCM format of the Champ et al. (1997) CV field validity test. This evidence demonstrates that past CV field validity tests are likely to be misleading, and identifies provision point mechanisms as an alternative criterion for validity testing. The third section reports the results from a field test in which hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice CV responses for "green" electricity are compared to actual participation levels. Importantly, the actual and hypothetical values were collected using a provision point mechanism. Section 4 explores possible calibration tools for these CV responses. Conclusions and implications are provided in the final section.

2. Provision Point Mechanisms (PPM): An Improvement on the VCM

An important finding from decades of experimental economics research is that no public goods elicitation mechanism, even if it is theoretically incentive compatible, is perfectly demand revealing in practice (Smith 1979, 1980; Harstead and Marrese 1982; Davis and Holt 1993).[3] Public goods mechanisms that increase incentives towards perfect revelation of demand have been developed over the years (e.g., Groves and Ledyard 1977; Smith 1980; Falkinger et al. 2000), and some have been shown to approach aggregate demand revelation in laboratory experiments. Unfortunately, extending these mechanisms to CV field research is problematic because they often involve extremely complex incentive structures, are compulsory (e.g., involve a tax), or require unanimity and necessitate an interactive small-group situation. Moreover, these mechanisms typically require multiple rounds before they approximate group demand revelation, and are therefore not readily applicable in one-shot CV-like field situations. In this context, it is understandable that prior CV public goods field validity studies have relied on the VCM despite its poor performance at eliciting actual payments that are comparable to public good values.

Experimental economics research conducted over the last three decades suggests that provision point modifications to the VCM can greatly reduce free-riding in public goods experiments (Brubaker 1976, 1982; Dawes et al. 1986; Isaac et al. 1989; Bagnoli and McKee 1991; Suleiman and Rapoport 1992; Mysker et al. 1996; Marks and Croson 1998, 1999; Cadsby and Maynes 1998, 1999a, b; Rondeau et al. 1999; Rose et al. 2002). A provision point (PP) is a minimum level of aggregate contributions below which the public good is not provided.[4] A money-back guarantee (MBG) can be added to a provision point mechanism (PPM) so

that individual contributions are refunded if the PP is not reached by the group. A rebate rule for disposing of contributions in excess of the PP is a second form of assurance against the potential loss of contributions. As discussed in Marks and Croson (1998) this may take the form of a proportional rebate (PR) rule, in which all excess contributions are returned to contributors in proportion to the weight of each subject's contribution to the group fund. Extending benefits (EB) by using the excess money to increase production of the public good is alternative rebate rule more commonly utilized by fund raisers.

Of particular interest to CV research, Rondeau et al. (1999) and Rose et al. (2001) demonstrate that, even though these mechanisms are not incentive compatible, a PPM with a MBG and either a PR or EB can greatly reduce free riding and increase the proportion of demand revealed in large group, single-shot environments.[5] Here we extend the Rondeau et al. analysis, and compare PPM/MBG/PR results to those obtained in a laboratory VCM context mimicking the conditions underlying the well-known Champ et al. (1997) validity study. The research presented in this paper differs from previous research on PPMs in two important ways. First, we develop an experimental design that allows direct experimental economics comparison between PPM and VCM methods. Second, we employ a PPM in a field validity test of alternative CV elicitation methods.

The Champ et al. (1997) field study (also reported in Brown et al. 1996) elicited WTP values for road removal on the North Rim of the Grand Canyon, an area targeted for designation as wilderness. To "establish a clear tie between individual payments and provision" (Brown et al. p. 155), the public good (road removal) was made divisible by assigning a cost (C) per foot of road removal (X). In both hypothetical and actual elicitations, respondents of the open-ended (OE) format were asked "What is the most you would be willing to pay to provide food and supplies for volunteer crews. Each \$1 you contribute would result in the removal of 8 feet of road . . .". In the actual and hypothetical dichotomous choice (DC) treatments the following question was posed "Are you willing to pay \$___ to provide food and supplies for volunteer crews? Your \$___ would lead to the removal of ___ feet of road . . ." (Brown et al. p. 155).[6] Despite this divisibility, the essential elements of a public good are retained. The benefits of the road removal are non-rival. Individuals receive value from the road removal project regardless of their level of contribution. Contributions provide a non-exclusionary benefit to others. As such, the dominant Nash equilibrium is for each individual to free ride.

Making a transformation between dollars and foot of road removal, this value elicitation field experiment can be framed in a standard induced value laboratory setting as follows: each individual (i) is assigned an induced value (V_i) for each dollar contributed to a public account and must choose to allocate his or her personal endowment (ω_i) between bids to public (B_i) and private ($\omega_i - B_i$) accounts. Consistent with the Champ et al. framework, the payoff per dollar contributed to the public account is assumed to be a linear function of road removal up to the point where all possible roads could be removed.[7] This is equivalent to the

sum of individual bids to the public good (ΣB_i) equaling total cost of the project (TC). The Champ et al. questionnaire failed to identify how the dollars would be used if total contributions exceeded total cost, and we adopt a default assumption that no additional value accrues to the group when contributions exceed total cost.[8]

Letting TV_i equal the total value of the complete project to individual i (i.e., $TV_i = V_i * TC$), the laboratory parallel to the Champ et al. collection mechanism can be characterized as follows:

$$\Sigma B_i < TC \quad i \text{ receives } V_i \text{ for each dollar contributed, pays } B_i. \qquad (1\text{-}1)$$

$$\Sigma B_i = TC \quad i \text{ receives } TV_i, \text{ pays } B_i. \qquad (1\text{-}2)$$

$$\Sigma B_i > TC \quad i \text{ receives } TV_i, \text{ pays } B_i. \qquad (1\text{-}3)$$

The fact that the last two outcomes differ only in ΣB_i reflects the discontinuous first order relationship between V_i and ΣB_i at the threshold of the complete project. For total contributions below this threshold, individual returns are a linear function of ΣB_i with a slope of V_i. Beyond $\Sigma B_i = TC$, additional contributions do not provide additional value: all roads have been removed. From an experimental economics perspective, this kink in the payoff function at ΣB_i avoids the standard VCM laboratory result that the welfare maximizing outcome is for all participants to give their entire endowment.

Using this notation, a PP/MBG/PR can be described as follows.

$$\Sigma B_i < TC \quad \text{Money back guarantee, no one pays, no benefits.} \qquad (2\text{-}4)$$

$$\Sigma B_i = TC \quad i \text{ receives } TV_i, \text{ pays } B_i. \qquad (2\text{-}5)$$

$$\Sigma B_i > TC \quad i \text{ receives } TV_i, \text{ pays } B_i \text{ less proportional rebate.} \qquad (2\text{-}6)$$

Where, TC is identical to the PP in this instance.

With this framework, we conducted a series of induced value experiments. All experiments reported here involve pen and paper experiments conducted in large introductory economics classrooms. Participation was voluntary and confidential, it was stressed that only money was involved and participation was not related to grade. The experiment was conducted by "guest" faculty members not teaching the class. Instructions were distributed and a brief presentation followed an individual reading period. Questions were answered individually. Appendix A provides a summary of the endowments, values, and participation data for the experiments reported below. Experimental instructions are available from the authors.

Figure 1 and Figure 2 provides distributions of central tendencies for classroom experiments in which PP was known and n was unknown, and thus the dominant cost-share Nash equilibria describe in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) could not be calculated. The principal features of these experiments are described in Appendix

Figure 1. CDF, percent aggregate demand revelation, PPM and VCM experiments.


Figure 2. CDF, Median Bi/Vi, PPM and VCM experiments.

A. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of percent demand revelation across experiments, which is of obvious interest from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective. Figure 2 focuses on the median of the bid to value ratio, B_i/V_i, which is relevant to a majority-rule voting framework. This ratio also minimizes the effect of extreme bids such as those associated with full endowment bidding.

As suggested in these Figures and reiterated in Appendix A, the percent of demand revealed in the PPM was substantially higher than that in the VCM, with

PPM values ranging from 63.9% to 135.3% and VCM values ranging from 41.2% to 79.3%. Treating the mean percent demand revealed as the unit of observation, paired t-tests and the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Rank Tests indicate that these distributions of values are significantly different ($t = 5.99$, $p < 0.010$, $n = 6$; $z = 2.20$, $p = 0.028$, $n = 6$).[9] Similarly, the median B_i/V_i ratio ranges from 60.0% to 100.0% for the PPM and 28.6% to 42.9% for the VCM. These mean and median distributions are significantly different when evaluated using either a paired t-test or the Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Rank Test, respectively ($t = 6.98$, $p < 0.010$, $n = 6$; $z = 2.20$, $p = 0.028$). Thus, even though the percent of demand revelation varied across experiments, the fraction of value reported is consistently and significantly higher in the PPM. To date, such direct comparisons have not been provided in the experimental economics literature.

Nevertheless, individual behavior in each of these experiments is noisy inconsistent with individual demand revelation. A portion of individuals in each mechanism adopt a strong free-rider approach of zero (or $0.01) contributions. Others provide bids equal to their induced values.[10] And still others contribute bids exceeding their values. Importantly, as demonstrated in Appendix A the percentage of free riders in the PPM is about half that of the VCM (VCM = 29.8%, PPM = 15.6%) while the percentage of bids equal to value more than doubles across mechanisms (VCM = 8.0%, PPM = 17.7%). A point of concern in comparing the mechanisms may be the high percentage of apparently irrational bids exceeding values and full endowment bids in the PPM – indicating that some respondents may be erroneously trying to capture some portion of the rebate. However, recent experimental economics research demonstrates that warm glow, altruism and other-regarding behavior may play a confounding role in induced value public goods experiment (e.g., Andreoni 1995; Palfrey and Prisbey 1997; Ferraro et al. 2002). Regardless of cause, it should be noted that the percentage of endowment bidding across the PPM experiments (4.9%) is lower than the 6.5% reported by Smith (1980) in the final round of the incentive-compatible, unanimity-rule Smith auction. Moreover, the level of over contribution (16.7%) relative to induced value is of the same order of magnitude as the first round reported in Bagnoli and McKee (12.5%). Thus, the distribution of bids in these experiments is consistent with other research in experimental economics.

In sum, the results of these experiments are suggestive and confirm previous research and conjectures. Notably, even though it is not theoretically incentive-compatible, the PPM performs substantially better than the VCM in eliciting contributions. We now turn to a field test that compares actual participation with hypothetical contributions in a provision point setting.

3. The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) Field Validity Test

3.1. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

The mechanism adopted by NMPC employed three of the features discussed previously. First, it contained a PP of $864,000 to be raised through customer contributions. This minimum level of funding would provide for the construction of a renewable energy facility to serve 1,200 homes, and for the planting of 50,000 tress in the NMPC service area. Second, NMPC's funding mechanism offered a MBG to customers which assured them that, if contributions failed to reach the threshold, all money collected would be refunded. Third, the mechanism offered the possibility of EB. Money collected in excess of the provision point would be used to increase the number of homes served with renewable energy or to plant more trees. However, for NMPC's GreenChoice^{TM} program to legally qualify as a rate offering, it could only be offered at a single posted price, rather than a continuous contribution setting of the previous experiments. Thus, customers could only choose to contribute a fixed amount $6.00 per month or not participate at all, rather than contribute a value that more closely reflects their preferences. Note that, despite the posted price, the mechanism does not reduce to a referendum, because the only individuals to pay are those who choose to participate.

We applied such a mechanism in a telephone survey comparison of hypothetical and real commitments of NMPC's GreenChoice^{TM} program. Hypothetical CV responses were collected using two telephone formats. The first was a DC version directly paralleling the actual solicitation. The second was an OE version asking respondents the most they would be willing to pay for the program. These two survey formats offer extremes on the continuum of continuous to discrete choice CV. Past experimental economics and CV research have demonstrated that substantial procedural variance exists between these formats (see summaries in Brown et al. 1996, and Schulze et al. 1996). A critical question from a policy standpoint is which format most closely approximates actual preferences. We will examine this question in the case of a public good offered at a single price.

All survey instruments followed the Dillman Total Design Method adapted to telephone surveys (Dillman 1978). The program description paralleled the actual NMPC solicitation materials distributed to the public, despite the fact that these materials provided substantially less information than state of the art in CV research. In order to control for awareness, phone, rather than mail, surveys were employed.

Successive pretests of the survey were administered by phone to ensure that respondents clearly understood the instrument. The final phone survey was administered by Hagler Bailly Consulting, Inc., using a random sample of households in the Buffalo, NY area. Households in the sample were sent a hand-signed cover letter on Cornell University letterhead announcing the survey. The letter informed them that they had been selected as one of a small sample of customers to participate in the study of a new type of environmental program. The study's sponsors

were identified as the National Science Foundation and the Environmental Protection Agency, together with NMPC. A two dollar bill was enclosed as a token of appreciation for participation.

The phone survey itself ran as follows. Both actual and hypothetical versions began by reaching the person in the household who usually paid the NMPC electric bill. Speaking to that person, the interviewer described the survey's purpose and sponsors. The individual was then asked to rate NMPC's service. Next, customer awareness of the program was obtained, and the goals of the program were described. Using a one ("not at all interested") to 10 ("very interested") scale respondents were then asked to indicate their interest in *"the goal of replacing fossil energy with renewable energy sources"* and *"the goal of planting trees on public lands in upstate New York"*. Depending on the version, the funding plan was then described as follows:

> The GreenChoice program would be funded voluntarily. Customers who decide to join the program would pay an additional fixed fee <u>of $6</u> per month on their NMPC bill. This fee would not be tax deductible. Customers could sign up or cancel at any time. While customers sign up, NMPC would ask for bids on renewable energy projects. Enough customers would have to become GreenChoice partners to pay for the program. For example if 12,000 customers joined the first year, they would invest $864,000, which would allow Niagara Mohawk to plant 50,000 trees and fund a landfill gas project. The gas project could replace all fossil fuel electricity in 1,200 homes. However, if after one year, participation were insufficient to fund GreenChoice activities, Niagara Mohawk would cancel the program and refund all the money that was collected.

For the OE format, the underlined section "of $6" was removed. The exact dollar amount of the provision point was hedged somewhat by NMPC so that the renewable energy project could be sent for competitive bid while the program was underway.

The survey then asked respondents whether the program's funding mechanism made them more or less interested in the program, again using the one to 10 scale of interest. After this, respondents in the actual version were faced with the participation question:

> So far I've described the GreenChoice program, **as well as the $6 per month cost it would add to your household's electrical bill, if you were to join**. You may need a moment to consider the next couple of questions. Given your household's income and expenses, I'd like you to think about whether or not you would be interested in the GreenChoice program. <u>If you decide to sign up, we will send your name to Niagara Mohawk, and get you enrolled in the program. All your other answers to this survey will remain confidential. Does your household want to sign up for the program at a cost of $6.00 per month?</u>

In the hypothetical DC version, the underlined portions were replaced by: "Would your household sign up for the program if it cost you $6 per month?". In the hypo-

thetical OE version, the bold portions were removed and the underlined section was replaced with "What is the highest amount, if anything, that your household would pay each month and still sign up for the program?" All surveys ended with debriefing and socio-economic questions useful for modeling demand.[11] With actual and hypothetical measures of participation identified, we turn next to the results of the surveys.

3.2. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

A random sample of 1250 households in the Buffalo, NY area, based on zip code delineation, was purchased from Geneysis, Inc., a marketing research firm. As adjusted sample of 985 households remained after removing bad addresses, unlisted numbers, non-NMPC customers, language barriers, and three respondents who had previously heard of the GreenChoice[TM] program. Among these 985 households, 206 were in the actual mechanism sample, 393 were in the hypothetical OE sample, and 386 were in the hypothetical DC sample.[12] Using these adjusted sample values as a base, conditional response rates were 70.7 percent for actual mechanism sample (145 completed surveys), 71.8 percent for the hypothetical DC sample (294 completed surveys) and 75.8 percent for the hypothetical OE sample (275 completed surveys).

Of the actual mechanism sample of 206,179 were reached by phone.[13] Of these, 34 refused to be surveyed, 2 chose not to answer the participation question, and 1 contact had a language barrier. For the remaining 145 respondents in the "actual" sample, 29 signed up for the program, resulting in a participation rate of 20.4 percent. Participation would fall to 16.2 percent if we assume that the 37 people contacted who did not complete the survey would have declined the program. Note also, only three people from our entire sample recalled having heard about the program, reflecting NMPC's decision not to market the program. As such, these data indicate strong potential support for the GreeenChoice[TM] program amongst NMPC customers, and suggest that the program could have been funded if marketing had been successful in increasing awareness. Rose et al. (2002) provide additional information on these issues.

The estimated participation rate of 16.2 to 20.4 percent is also substantially higher than that observed in the majority of other green pricing programs reported in the literature (Baugh et al. 1995; Brynes et al. 1999; Holt 1997; Farhar and Houston 1996). There are, however, substantial differences between this and most previous programs. First, program awareness was fully controlled for. In previous programs, participation rates have typically been defined over the broader base of total customers or customers targeted with direct mailings. Yet, as our finding suggest, customer inserts and direct mailings do not guarantee even minimal awareness among customers. Secondly, as noted, previous participation program have mostly relied upon voluntary contributions, rather than the PPM used here.

We use the 16.2 and 20.4 percent sign-up rates as benchmarks for testing the hypothetical bias associated with OE and DC CV questions among survey respondents. We do so using two methods of analysis. First we compare participation rates across actual and hypothetical versions using simple contingency table analyses (Conover 1980). Second, we model the participation decision and, controlling for socio-economic and other factors, test the hypothesis that participation rates differ between actual and hypothetical treatments. To conduct the analysis, OE responses are converted to participation rates based on whether the values given exceed the $6 threshold.[14]

The estimated participation rate from the OE responses is 24.3 percent ($n = 284$), or 19 to 50 percent higher than the actual participation rates. The 30.6 percent participation rate ($n = 258$) from the DC responses is 50 to 89 percent higher than the actual participation rates. These results contrast with the NOAA panel recommendation that DC values offer conservative, and thus preferable, estimates of value (Arrow et al. 1993). At the same time, they are consistent with previous comparisons in CV and laboratory experiments (see Brown et al. 1996 and Schulze et al. 1996 for reviews). A Chi-Squared contingency table analysis, in which T indicates the calculated test statistic (Conover, p. 145), cannot reject the hypothesis that actual and hypothetical OE participation levels are the same at any standard level of significance (T = 0.80 < $\chi_{1,0.10}$ = 2.71) when 20.4 percent is used as a reference participation rate. A significant T value of 4.81 is estimated when the 16.2 percent is used as the criterion. In contrast, the DC sign-up rate of 30.6 percent is significantly higher than the actual value 16.2 percent (T = 11.81) and 20.4 percent (T = 4.83).

Following established DC valuation techniques, we next assume a logistic distribution function to model an individual's participation decision as a function of covariates elicited in the questionnaire. Using actual, unadjusted responses as a base, we include binary variables to test whether each of the hypothetical patterns is significantly different from the actual response pattern. While other researchers have used regression analyses as a means of calibrating individual values (e.g. Mansfield 1998), our intent here is to simply incorporate individual specific variables as control variables in a test of intercept shifts across survey groups. As such, our objective is to assess the conditional proportion (and significance of the proportion) rather than predict which individual would or would not participate.

Three categories of covariates are included when modeling participation. The first concerns respondents' interest in the particular objectives of the program: replacing fossil fuels and planting trees in upstate New York. Both one to 10 scale responses are expected to be positively correlated with participation. The second category of covariates includes demographics, such as gender (male = 1), age (in years), and education (college graduate or higher = 1). Also included here are recent financial support of environmental groups (Yes = 1), and impression of the overall service received from NMPC on a one ("very poor") to 10 ("very poor") to 10 ("very good") scale. These types of variables are widely used as

explanatory covariates in the literature modeling environmental valuation.[15] From this literature we expected age to be negatively correlated with participation, and education, impression of NMPC service, and participation in environmental groups to be positively correlated with participation. No sign expectation was formed for gender.

The final category of covariates concerns respondents' views of the program's funding mechanism. These variables are unconventional, in the sense that they do not proxy for the value of the program itself. When told of the PP and MBG, respondents were asked whether the fact "that a minimum level of customer participation is required for GreenChoice to operate" (the PP) made the program of less interest or more interest. And they were asked if their interest in the program is affected by "the fact that Niagara Mohawk would refund all the money it collects – if support is insufficient" (the MBG). The PP itself did not arouse greater interest in the program. Over 55 percent responded that its inclusion did not affect their interest. Only 17 percent indicated that it increased their interest. In contrast, the MBG increased interest in the program for 47 percent of respondents. Only 9 percent said that it reduced their interest. Both questions were recoded as binary variables (indicated by a D) for estimation, assigned '1' for "more interest," and '0' otherwise. We expected their coefficients to be positive.

Joint and individually estimated logit models of program participation are reported in Table I, together with sample means, standard deviations, and expected signs. The first column of coefficient estimates provides a joint model of participation with binary shifts for hypothetical OE and DC responses. Actual contribution decisions serve as the baseline. The last three columns of the table provide separate estimation results for the actual, OE hypothetical, and DC hypothetical participation decisions.

In general, when significant, the sign of the coefficients reflects prior expectations, and the overall models are highly significant. Favorable impressions of program characteristics (Renewables, Trees) tend to be positively correlated with program enrollment, although the coefficient on trees is not significant in any of the individual equations. Consistent with our expectations from the experimental provision point literature, interest in the PP and the MBG are positively correlated with, and each is a significant explanatory variable of, participation in both the joint and most individual models. Such a result is consistent with the finding of Champ et al. (2001), that PPMs increase the credibility of hypothetical CV scenarios. The demographic characteristics are also largely consistent with prior environmental valuation research. Participation is negatively correlated with age and positively correlated with being male or a member of an environmental organization. Neither education nor rating of service is significant in any of the regressions. Overall, the significance of each of the equations and individual explanatory variables demonstrates that responses to the questions vary in a systematic fashion. After accounting for these covariates, the binary variables for hypothetical responses in the joint model tell a tale similar to the simple Chi-Squared test of independence:

Table I. Estimated logit models by response category.

Variable [description]	Exp. sign	Mean (s.d.)	Estimated coefficients (s.e.)			
			Joint	Actual	OE hypo	DC hypo
Constant			–4.024 (0.856)***	–4.386 (2.184)**	–2.471 (1.167)**	–5.145 (1.602)***
D-DC Hypo [DC Hypo = 1]	?	0.38 (0.49)	0.574 (0.299)*			
D-OE Hypo [OE Hypo = 1]	?	0.41 (0.49)	0.142 (0.298)			
Renewables [1 to 10 scale]	+	6.38 (2.71)	0.150 (0.047)***	0.233 (0.118)**	0.119 (0.099)	0.297 (0.085)***
Trees [1 to 10 scale]	+	8.44 (2.23)	0.116 (0.065)*	0.216 (0.186)	–0.012 (0.073)	0.154 (0.116)
D-Prov. Pt. [Interest = 1]	+	0.17 (0.38)	1.353 (0.259)***	1.416 (0.588)**	0.925 (0.411)**	1.868 (0.479)***
D-MBGuar [Interest = 1]	+	0.48 (0.50)	0.626 (0.220)***	–0.098 (0.550)	0.734 (0.329)**	0.758 (0.425)*
Age	–	51.9 (16.3)	–0.023 (0.007)***	–0.040 (0.019)**	–0.039 (0.011)***	–0.003 (0.013)
D-Gender [Male = 1]	?	0.46 (0.50)	0.463 (0.213)**	0.954 (0.517)*	0.432 (0.323)	0.224 (0.388)
D-Cgrad [Cgrad = 1]	+	0.36 (0.48)	0.181 (0.223)	0.002 (0.997)	0.300 (0.321)	0.275 (0.450)
D-Enviro [Contribute = 1]	+	0.24 (0.43)	1.108 (0.233)***	0.666 (0.624)	0.461 (0.346)	2.474 (0.451)***
Rate Service [1 to 10 scale]	+	8.45 (1.65)	0.074 (0.069)	0.082 (0.178)	0.154 (0.102)	–0.087 (0.134)
Chi Sq			148.93	31.10	35.99	117.11
n		620	620	128	255	237

*,**, and *** indicate 10, 5 and 1 percent significance, respectively. Note the number of observations deviates from those in Tables 2 and 4 because of item non-response to individual covariates. See also footnote 17. The results for the actual contributions model are also reported in Rose et al. (2002).

the coefficient on the hypothetical OE responses (D-OE Hypo) was not significant at any level ($t = 0.48$) while that on the hypothetical DC responses (D-DC Hypo) was significant at the 10 percent level ($t = 1.91$).[16] These results suggest that OE CV provides a more accurate prediction of participation than does DC. This result is also in keeping with Brown et al. (1996), who find, in comparing CV to VCM results, that DC values exceeded OE values, which in turn exceed actual contributions. Our results, however, suggest that free-riding may explain some of the difference between OE willingness to pay and actual contributions found in the Brown et al. (1996) study.[17]

In assessing CV, Mitchell and Carson (1989) adapt the sociological concepts of criterion validity and construct validity. Criterion validity refers to the goodness of fit of CV estimates to benchmark values, such as market prices. Construct validity refers to whether CV estimates are related to explanatory variables as expected according to economic theory. Applying these measures here, OE responses appear to have a higher criterion validity than do DC responses. At the same time, the logistic analysis suggests that DC responses perform better in terms of construct validity. That is, the DC regression exhibits a substantially better fit (as measured by the likelihood ratio) than the OE response function. This suggests that OE responses do not vary as systematically with socio-economic characteristics as do DC responses, a result that has been supported elsewhere (e.g., Bohara et al. 1998).

4. Calibration of Hypothetical Responses

The results of our research suggest that hypothetical contributions exceed actual contribution rates, especially in the case of hypothetical DC responses. This result is consistent with the CV validity literature, motivating policy analysts and researchers to suggest that a correction factor should be applied to adjust hypothetical contribution rates down to better predict actual participation or true public good values.

Whether or nor calibration of hypothetical answers should be applied is an inherently difficult question to address since the underlying benefits cannot be observed. Thus, our aim is not to suggest a precise approach to calibration or to provide a universal adjustment factor. Rather, we wish to reinterpret the results of our study in light of the current calibration debate and contribute to it by providing words of caution.

On the one hand, it could be argued that no correction of the DC responses is required in order to make them approximate "true" values. Even though the PPM represents an improvement in demand revealed relative to the VCM, it is probable that actual PPM contributions still under reveal demand because of free or cheap riding. The mean demand revelation of the six PPM experiments discussed in Section 2 is 87.93 percent (s.e. = 10.31 percent) while the corresponding figure for the median bid to value ratio is 79.02 percent (s.e. = 7.41 percent). Based on these highly conditional results, the 95 percent confidence interval for the mean

value of demand revelation is 67.72 to 108.31 percent. Similarly, the 95 percent confidence interval for the median bid to value ratios is 64.49 to 93.34 percent. Considering the lower bounds of these ranges, the data admits the possibility that the mechanism underestimate true values[18] by perhaps as much as much as 35 percent, a figure that would likely bring the real sign-up rate much closer to the sign-up rates of 30.6 percent obtained from the DC responses. Viewed in this light, our results would seem favorable to CV's ability to measure true values, but much in the way of additional research needs to be conducted before such a positive result can be accepted.

On the other hand, it is also possible, based on the experiments reported here and elsewhere (Rondeau et al. 1999; Rose et al. 2001), that demand revelation with the PPM approximates 100 percent. If such is the case, it appears sensible to argue in favor of calibrating CV responses to adjust hypothetical responses to best predict actual contributions. Whereas we maintain that from a public policy perspective it would be preferable to seek better estimates of values rather than to adjust hypothetical responses to predicted contribution levels, it is useful to analyze our data in the context of the recent arguments in support of the view that actual contributions represent a desirable lower bound measure of willingness to pay (e.g. see Champ et al. 1997 and Champ and Bishop 2001).[19]

Two different calibration methods have appeared in the CV literature. We investigate these methods in turn using the actual sign up rate (20.4 percent) as our upper bound estimate of participation. As before, a lower bound estimate (16.2 percent), generated by treating those who refused to participate in the telephone survey as "No's", is used as an alternative criterion.

For OE responses, Schulze et al. (1998) argue that a "disembedding" question following the OE question may reduce hypothetical bias by reminding respondents to only state values for the specific good in question rather than including other "embedded" values such as moral satisfaction. In the NMPC survey, this measurement of the level of embedding was accomplished as follows. First, individual were asked to answer an OE willingness to pay question as previously described. The following issue is then raised:

> Some people say that it's hard to think about the amount you would pay for a specific program like GreenChoice, rather than for environmental programs or other good causes in general . . .

and individuals were asked if their bid on the OE question was just for the GreenChoice[TM] program or if the stated WTP included values for a wider range of environmental or public causes. If the respondent indicates that, "Yes, may stated value included other causes," then they are asked to estimate the proportion of their stated value that was for the GreenChoice[TM] program. This "disembedded" portion is then multiplied by the original OE value to isolate the value attributed to the program. Several studies have used this approach, with self-reported embedding ranging from 20 percent (clean up local groundwater, McClelland et al. 1992) to 50 percent (medium size oil spills, Rowe et al. 1991).[20]

Champ et al. (1997, 2001) have suggested an alternative debriefing method appropriate to DC CV. Reflecting evidence that individual respondents have some uncertainty in their WTP values (Gregory et al. 1995; Ready et al. 1995; Welsh and Poe 1998), this approach asks those who responded "Yes" to the C question the following debriefing question:

> So you think that you would sign up. I'd like to know how sure you are of that. On a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 is "very uncertain" and 10 is "very certain," how sure are you that you would sign up and pay the extra $6 a month?

Using similar wording in their CV field validity study of donations for road removal on the north rim of the Grand Canyon (Champ et al. 1997) found that estimating model, in which only the "yes" respondents who had a certainty level of 10 were coded as "yes" responses, was not significantly different from actual contributions. Champ and Bishop (2001) report that a certainty level of "8 or higher" provides the best approximation of actual donations for a wind power program. Both studies relied on a VCM for actual contributions. Similar certainty correction approaches and degrees of correction have also been used with data from laboratory experiments (Blumenschein et al. 1998; Johannesson et al. 1998, 1999).

The results of applying these two calibration approaches in the NMPC study are reported in Table II. On average, the OE respondents reported that 23 percent of their values were embedded (i.e. that their value for the program was 77 percent of their original OE response). This lowered the entire OE WTP distribution, and reduced the estimated percentage of those who would have signed up at $6 to 16.4 percent. This value is not significantly lower than the actual contribution level of 20.4 percent, and is almost identical to the lower bound estimate of actual participation rates. DC respondents reported a wide range of certainty levels. Only a small percent of "yes" respondents reported that they had a certainty level of 10, with the mode being at 7. Sign-up proportions accounting for different certainty level of 10, with the mode being at 7. Sign-up proportions accounting for different certainty level thresholds are provided in Table II. Proportions associated with treating yes responses with subsequent certainty levels of "greater than or equal to 6" and "greater than or equal to 7" as "true" yes responses, are not significantly different from the actual sign-up rate. However, a certainty level of greater than or equal to 7 most closely corresponds to the actual sign up rate. This degree of correction is less than the Champ et al. (1997) and the Champ and Bishop (2001) findings, a result that is consistent with our basic premise that the VCM used in these studies provides a smaller fraction of true demand. Alternatively, certainty levels of "greater than or equal to 7" and "greater than or equal to 8" correspond most closely with the lower bound estimate of actual contributions.

Calibrating CV responses is fraught with perils. For the purpose of policy making, calibration will truly matter only in cases where the benefit-cost ratio of a project or policy is relatively close to one. Failure to sufficiently deflate CV responses would result in the funding of policies that produce a net loss to society,

Table II. Significance tests of the equality between actual sign-ups, hypothetical sign-ups and calibrated hypothetical sign-ups.

Response type			Percent participation (observations)	T value[a] using actual participation = 20.4% (n = 142)	T value[a] using actual participation = 16.2% (n = 179)
Hypothetical open ended			24.3 (n = 284)	0.80	4.31**
Hypothetical open ended, revised for embedding			16.4 (n = 280)	0.94	0.00
Hypothetical dichotomous choice			30.6 (n = 258)	4.83**	11.81***
Hypothetical dichotomous choice, revised for certainty					
Certainty	≥	5	29.1 (n = 258)	3.56*	9.65***
	≥	6	24.8 (n = 258)	0.99	4.67**
	≥	7	20.9 (n = 258)	0.01	1.54
	≥	8	14.0 (n = 258)	2.82*	0.42
	≥	9	8.5 (n = 258)	11.65***	6.04**
	=	10	6.6 (n = 258)	17.22***	10.37***

*,**, and *** indicate that the proportions are significantly different from the "actual" value at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively, using a two-tailed test.
[a]Calculated using chi-squared test for difference in probabilities (Conover 1980, p. 145). Note that making an adjustment for continuity as suggested in Snedecor and Cochrane (1989), but rejected as being overly conservative in Conover, impacts the significance assessment of only the DC ≥ 8 v. 20.4 percent participation measure, leading it to not be significantly different at any of the significance levels identified.

while over calibration runs the risk of preventing the implementation of socially desirable initiatives. Regardless of the position one wishes to take on the degree of demand revelation elicited by the PPM, the results presented above strongly suggest that calibration levels (if any) should be lower than those previously advocated.

5. Summary and Discussion

In recent years there has been substantial effort to link experimental economics with validity testing in contingent valuation. Whereas much of the previous research in this area has focused on bringing hypothetical versus actual comparisons into the laboratory or has centered on using improved auction mechanisms for private goods, this paper extends these efforts to bring improved mechanism to field validity testing of contingent values for public goods. In particular, building on previous experimental economics literature as well as a series of new large group experiments, we argue that provision point mechanisms can be readily adopted for improved validity testing in the field in cases where a discrete project is to be valued.

As we show, provision point mechanisms are superior to voluntary contribution mechanisms at providing aggregate contributions that more closely approximate induced values in single shot, large group, laboratory experiments. Based on this observation, we argue that the provision point mechanism offers a much improved reference criteria for contingent valuation field validity tests.

In a field comparison using provision point mechanism with a money back guarantee and extended benefits, we found that hypothetical values overstated actual contribution levels. Whereas the difference between open-ended hypothetical responses and actual responses are equivocal, depending on how actual sign-up rates were measured, actual contributions and hypothetical dichotomous choice participation rates are significantly different. Given this disparity, we explore alternative levels of calibration. Consistent with the laboratory research that the voluntary contributions mechanism reveals a smaller portion of demand than the provision point mechanism, the calibration levels determined in this study for the dichotomous choice mechanism are smaller than those used in previous contingent valuation validity comparisons. However, because of the likelihood that actual contributions under-reveal demand even when a provision point mechanism is used, it is entirely possible that the calibration of hypothetical responses introduces an undesirable bias.

This research is intended to complement other research being conducted in the contingent valuation/experimental economics interface. For contingent valuation researchers, it serves as a reminder that voluntary contribution mechanisms for actual collections are likely to lead to over calibration, and offers the provision point mechanism as an alternative reference point for contingent valuation validity test wherein the discontinuity in provision is appropriate for the good

being valued. This research also raises a challenges experimental economists to explore the characteristics of single-shot value elicitation mechanism as a means of better understanding the characteristics of alternative mechanisms for funding public goods.

Acknowledgements

Notes

  * Experimental instructions are available from the authors.

  1. The quote used here is an attempt to capture the early optimism prevalent among CV researchers at the time of the 1989 *State of Ohio v. U. S. Department of Interior* ruling supporting the use of contingent valuation as a "best available procedure" for reliably assessing monetary damages for injury to public trust resources (see Cummings and Harrison 1994, footnote 17, p. 4). Subsequent reestimation of these early field experiment data provide more mixed assessments: as Smith (1997, p. 176) notes, the conclusions derived from this "research to date depend on the 'eyes of the beholder.'" For example, with respect to the Dickie et al. (1987) strawberry experiments, J. A. Hausman and D. K. Leonard concluded that, using a non-parametric approach, "the hypothetical CV responses significantly overstate the actual market responses, both in terms of consumer demand and in terms of consumer surplus" (as cited in Smith 1997, p. 195). Using different econometric assumptions, Smith (1994) supported the Dickie et al. conclusion that the hypothetical and actual demand functions were derived from the same behavioral processes. Other reevaluations of this early survey research, with mixed results, can be found in Cummings and Harrison (1994), Carson et al. (1996) and Mansfield (1998). In addition, a body of experimental economics literature has recently emerged demonstrating that hypothetical bias remains a problem even in private goods (e.g., Fox et al. 1998; List and Shogren 1998; Balistreri et al. 2001).

  2. To their credit, each of the aforementioned authors are apparently aware of the possible biases associated with using a VCM as a reference criterion for willingness to pay. For example, Seip

and Strand note, "We may have significant free rider problems in voluntary payment" (p. 103). Brown et al. similarly note that "A voluntary payment towards a public good allows for free-riding ... to the extent that free-riding occurs, it depresses actual payments" (p. 154). Yet, the explicit or implicit justification (e.g., Champ et al. 1997, 2001) in these studies that such a contribution provides a lower bound of value belies the critical point that such "lower bound" measures do not provide the Hicksian measures appropriate for welfare economic analyses (see Chilton and Hutchinson 1999).

3. We make a clear distinction between the theoretical property of "incentive compatibility" and empirical demand revelation. Neither the PPM nor the VCM provide an incentive structure that would lead the theoretician to predict that the mechanisms are conductive to a revelation of true value by contributors. They are simply not incentive compatible. However, as we discuss in this paper, we find that the empirical performance of the PPM is closer to the standard of demand revelation than the VCM.

4. Theoretically, as shown in Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991), the addition of a discontinuous PP to a standard VCM adds a large number of dominant Nash equilibria wherein the sum of the contributions exactly equals the costs in symmetric, complete information games in which the aggregate benefits exceed the PP.

5. Note that using induced demand as the efficiency measure differs from the conventional focus in the PPM literature of defining efficiency in terms of the theoretical Pareto dominant loci of aggregate bids that exactly equal costs (see for example, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and Bagnoli and McKee (1991)). Along these lines the experimental economics literature has focused on the frequency of correct funding decisions when aggregate induced values exceed the costs of the project. Our research shifts the orientation towards the proportion of demand revealed in situations wherein the symmetric Nash prediction of Bagnoli and Lipman does not hold, i.e. one-shot situations in which complete information and prior group interactions are not available.

6. Although the dollar amount varied across DC surveys in the Champ et al./Brown et al. research, the cost per mile was not varied. Thus there is a direct proportionality between the DC dollar value and feet of road removed.

7. The actual curvature of the aggregate benefits function across percent of roads removed is, of course, an open question that cannot be answered from the Champ et al. data because of the direct linkage between dollars and feet of road removed. Lacking specific information, a linear function is adopted here, explicitly assuming that individuals accrue the same incremental value for each foot of road removed (dollar contributed). Alternatively, small amounts of road removal (dollars contributed) might not be highly valued relative to the total value of the complete project, implying a convex benefits function. Or benefits might be a concave function of road removal (dollars contributed).

8. This characterization of the funding mechanism was confirmed in personal conversations with Patricia A. Champ (1999).

9. Here the term "pair" refers to the matched PPM and VCM experiments in which values, endowment, n, and the provision point/kink were held constant across samples and were conducted in the same classroom. The only remaining difference is the mechanism and, in the split sample cases, the subject pool, which was randomly assigned to a mechanism within each class. As noted in Appendix A, experiments a, b, c, and f were split sample designs, while d and e involves a within sample experiment. If we examine the difference between PPM and VCM values within rows, we find that the average difference between the six PPM and six VCM percent of demand revealed observations is 39.66 (s.e. = 6.17) and the corresponding average difference in median values for Bi/Vi is 42.48 (s.e. = 6.09). For the within sample differences, the mean difference in percent demand revealed was 21.35 (s.e. = 2.95) and the corresponding value for the split sample experiments was 44.78 (s.e. = 5.73). The values for the difference in median

Bi/Vi were 29.10 (s.e. = 2.30) and 49.18 (s.e. = 6.85). One-way ANOVA tests for the percent of demand revealed indicates that the null hypothesis of equality between the estimated PPM VCM difference between the split sample designs and the within sample designs is marginally significantly different, with $p = 0.056$ (F = 7.11). A similar test on the Bi/Vi data indicates that the null hypothesis of equality between the split sample and within sample differences cannot be rejected ($p = 0.125$, F = 3.74). On the basis of these results we would conclude that, if anything, the addition of the within sample experiments reduced the average difference between related PPM and VCM values. Yet, even when these additional experiments are included, the distribution of the two PPM and VCM measures of central tendency remain significantly, and substantially, different.

10. We argue that the relatively high proportion of individuals in the PPM who exactly revealed their demand is supportive of the idea that the PPM engenders greater demand revelation. However, as pointed out by an anonymous reviewer, this may also reflect an anchoring effect by suggesting a value for individuals who are uncertain of their values or how to play the game. Unfortunately, out experiments do not allow us to distinguish between revelation and confusion.

11. As it turned out, contributions in the actual version were never collected from this sample, because the GreenChoice^{TM} program itself was canceled. NMPC developed severe financial difficulties, and, having failed to pay dividends to stockholders, was unable to advertise the GreenChoice^{TM} program. Consistent with the MBG, those who elected to participate as a result of our phone survey were sent a cancellation notice, and the funds contributed by the 123 households outside our sample who signed up for the program were returned by NMPC. It is, of course, possible that the customers that we signed up might have reneged by leaving the program during the 12 month payment period. However, there is indirect evidence that this is not a large issue in other sign-up-no-pay-later green electricity programs. For example, 95 percent of the residents who signed up for the Traverse City Wind Power project continued to pay their committed level more than one year after the program started. Similarly, about 97 percent of the households that originally signed up for a recent Wisconsin Power and Light green electricity program remained in the program after 6 months (Personal conversation, Richard C. Bishop (1999)). Note that these participation rates do not distinguish between those households that were disappointed with the program and respondents who moved, died, etc.

12. A modified, shortened "Cheap Talk" warning (Cummings and Taylor 1999) was used on a sub sample of each of the hypothetical surveys in an effort to "push down" any hypothetical bias. Specifically, the following wording was added to the paragraph preceding the hypothetical valuation question *"I have one caution though. For programs like this it's often the case that more people say they would sign up than actually do sign-up. Utilities in other parts of the country have found that eight times as many people say yes to similar programs as actually take part in them. With this in mind ..."* This warning apparently did not influence participation decisions, which corresponds with the findings reported by Cummings and Taylor (1999) (in their research a lengthy version of "Cheap Talk" did, however, lower stated values). The percentage of yes responses to the DC with warning (30.2 percent, $n = 136$) was not significantly different from the DC without warning (30.8 percent, $n = 123$). Similarly, neither the mean open-ended ($4.94, $n = 153$) nor the estimated percent of OE responses that would sign up at $6 (25.5 percent, $n = 153$) with the warning was significantly different from the mean ($4.95, $n = 131$) and the estimated percent of OE responses (22.9 percent, $n = 131$) within the warning. As a result to this lack of significance across warning groups, our "Cheap Talk" versions were pooled with responses from surveys without this warning in the analyses in the text.

13. The remainder were classified as unable to contact after a minimum of eight telephone attempts.

14. For reference, the mean OE response was $4.94 (s.e. = 0.60), with the following distributions for the raw and the unembedded (see discussion in paper) responses (mean = 3.63, s.e. = 0.50):

Values	0	$0 < \$ < 1$	$1 \leq \$ < 2$	$2 \leq \$ < 3$	$3 \leq \$ < 4$	$4 \leq \$ < 5$	$5 \leq \$ < 6$
Raw percent	44.0	0	7.4	5.3	3.2	0.7	15.1
Unembed. percent	44.6	5.8	8.2	7.8	2.9	3.2	11.1

Values	$6 \leq \$ < 7$	$7 \leq \$ < 8$	$8 \leq \$ < 9$	$9 \leq \$ < 10$	$10 \leq \$ < 20$	$20 \leq \$$
Raw percent	3.5	1.1	1.4	0	12.0	6.3
Unembed. percent	3.2	1.1	0.7	0	7.8	3.6

15. The estimation procedure was motivated by a linear random utility difference model. Thus income is not included in the estimation (Hanemann 1984). Similarly, in contrast to standard DC CV models, price is not included as an explanatory variable of participation, because it is constant at $6 across all participants.

16. Letting LL denote the log likelihood, a likelihood ration test LR = -2(LL$_{\text{Resticted}}$ $- LL_{\text{Unrestricted}}$) was used to test the null hypothesis of equality of all coefficients across equations (with the exception of a binary shift variable for each equation). The test across all three survey versions is rejected at the 10 percent level of significance (LR = $40.79 > 25.99 = \chi^2_{0.10,18}$). Pair wise pooling of the data indicates that the null hypothesis of equality between actual and OE responses (LR = $12.13 < 14.68 = \chi^2_{0.10,9}$) and actual and DC responses (LR = $7.42 < 14.68 = \chi^2_{0.10,9}$) cannot, however, be rejected. As such, rejection of a joint model polling all response functions appears to be driven by the inequality of OE and DC response functions (LR = $35.24 > 14.68 = \chi^2_{0.10,9}$). Moving to paired actual-hypothetical pooled regressions, the significance of the binary shifters reflects the significance levels reported in Table II. However, the number of observations in this data are slightly reduced from that reported in Table II, reflecting the fact that only those respondents who completed all the covariates used in the logit analyses. Using these data, the actual percent enrolled (21.9 percent) is not significantly different from the hypothetical OE (25.9 percent, $\chi^2 = 1.06 < 2.71 = \chi^2_{0.10,1}$). The actual participation levels remain significantly different from the hypothetical DC participation (32.4 percent $\chi^2 = 5.30 > 2.71 = \chi^2_{0.10,1}$).

17. Identifying the source of this convergence between the PPM actual and the OE hypothetical suffers from confounding influences: i.e., the collection mechanisms differ in two factors, hypothetical vs. actual and continuous vs. discrete. Unfortunately, state regulators required a fixed fee for all individual, thus preempting an actual continuous contributions mechanism that would allow an isolation of hypothetical and elicitation effects.

18. Such a result has been demonstrated for some data sets for WTP to avoid a private risk in Balistreri et al. (2001) and a related paper by Poe and Vossler (2002).

19. Again, it should be noted that this lower bound interpretation of donations has been challenged by Chilton and Hutchinson (1999).

20. In addition to the notion that individuals are embedding their specific values within a broader stated value, two other interpretations of these self-reported adjustments have been offered. First, experimental economists have found that in repeated rounds, values tend to fall after the first bid. In other words values tend to be overstated on the first round and tend to approach induced or actual values in subsequent rounds (Davis and Holt 1993). The disembedding question thus allows individuals to at as if they are in a more experienced, second round situation. Second, the disembedding question might act as a reminder that individuals may want to spend their money in other ways, thus providing an additional opportunity to consider budget constraints and substitutes. The need for emphasizing these constraints in CV questions was highlighted in Arrow et al. (1993).

APPENDIX A: Summary Statistics: Paired PPM VCM Experiments, Incomplete Information

| | Experimental Conditions | | | | PPM | | | | | | | VCM | | | | | | | |
| | Information (Yes = 1) | | End. | Values | n in sample | Percent n where Bid | | | | % Dem. Rev. | Med. B_i/V_i | n sample | Percent n where Bid | | | | % Dem. Rev. | Med. B_i/V_i |
Exp ID	n Known	PP Known	ω ($)	V ($)		= 0	$= V_i$	$> V_i$	$= \omega$				= 0	$= V_i$	$> V_i$	$= \omega$		
a	0	1	10	5	27	7.41	37.04	18.52	3.70	92.0	100.0	26	30.77	3.85	3.85	0.00	41.2	40.0
b	0	1	15	6, 10, 12, 14	32	9.38	21.88	12.50	12.50	71.1	68.3	39	20.51	2.56	25.64	0.00	41.4	38.7
c	0	1	20	6, 8, 10, 12, 14	40	5.00	10.00	17.50	10.00	85.0	83.3	39	25.64	7.69	7.69	2.56	42.4	33.3
d*	0	1	20	6, 8, 10, 12, 14	185	14.05	16.76	11.89	2.16	63.9	62.5	183	26.78	9.84	8.74	0.55	45.5	35.7
e*	0	1	20	1, 3, 5, 7, 9	185	25.40	17.29	15.14	3.24	80.3	60.0	183	40.44	9.84	15.30	1.63	56.0	28.6
f	0	1	18	1, 3, 5, 7, 9	40	2.50	17.50	37.50	10.00	135.3	100.0	25	16.00	0.00	8.00	0.00	79.3	42.9
Total, Avg					509	15.91	18.66	16.69	4.52			495	30.91	8.28	12.12	1.01		

Terms: n = number of participants, PP = provision point, ω = endowment, and V = induced value.
*The PPM and VCM experiments D and E are within sample experiments. In this set of experiments respondents answered two PPM and two VCM questions for a total of four contribution situations. One of the four situations was chosen as binding in front of the class. The other four experiments (a, b, c, and f) each involved split samples.

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