Meaning, Communication, and the Mental

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1. Introduction

Thomas Reid (1710-1796) is perhaps best known for his rejection of ‘the theory of ideas’. According to the latter, one is directly acquainted only with one’s own ideas; from there, the task is (for the individual) to recover and (for the theorist) to explain engagement with the familiar public world of things and persons. As to language, on this approach meaning is ideational, with language enabling us to communicate thoughts, to which others would otherwise have no access. As Locke states the view, “words, in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them”; and we invent language so as to have some “external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas…might be made known to others” (1690/1959 III.2.2; Vol. 2, 8-9).

Much of the recent interest in Reid centers on the alternative he offers to the theory of ideas and its implications. Reid defends perceptual direct realism and a fallibilist foundationalism, according to which our contact with the common and public extra-mental world is as much a part of our natural psychological and epistemological starting point as whatever special type of relation we have to the contents of our own minds. Like the general perceptual and epistemological views Reid was countering, an individualistic, idea-centered approach to language and communication continues to have a grip on theorists. But Reid’s heterodox counter to the latter is much less well known than his response to the former, even though it marks a complementary and equally clear departure from the views of his contemporaries. As we’ll see below (Section 2), Reid holds that while mental phenomena are indeed implicated in language, the meaning of a term is the typically public object to which it directly refers. Further (Section 3), Reid argues that for linguistic communication to be possible, we must already have some measure of access to others’ intentional states. While we each might enjoy a special kind of access to our thoughts, they are not ‘private’ in any epistemologically troubling sense: the fact that we have language shows that we already have communicative abilities and an epistemological toehold with regard to others’ mental states.

2. Linguistic Meaning: Reference and the Role of Conception

Reid uses ‘language’ to refer to “all those signs which mankind use in order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their purposes and desires” (IHM IV.2 117b, 51). He distinguishes between artificial language (and signs), and natural

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1 Reid holds that the “chief and proper” source of information about the mind is “accurate reflection upon the operations of our own minds” (EIP I.5 238b, 56; IHM I.1 97a-98b, 11-12). This ‘method of reflection’ has its difficulties, including the fact that it is only the operations of one’s own mind that one can examine in this way (EIP I.6, IHM I.2). But there are other sources of knowledge about the mind – namely, general features of language, and the actions and conduct of others (EIP I.5). On the relevance of the former to the study of the mind, as Reid sees it, see Rysiew 2015. About the latter, we’ll see below how it gives us information about the thoughts of others, according to Reid.

2 In-text references to Reid indicate the relevant work and passage (essay, chapter, section, etc.), followed by page numbers in both the Hamilton and Edinburgh editions of Reid. Thus, the above
language (and signs). What we nowadays call ‘natural language(s)’ (English, Korean, etc.), Reid terms ‘artificial language’, the latter’s essential feature being that it is conventional -- the signs therein “have no meaning, but what is affixed to them by compact or agreement” (ibid.). What makes them signs is that, thanks to convention, the occurrence of a word or phrase prompts the competent language-user to have an appropriate conception – to think of the thing meant.3,4

The next point is that, while artificial signs owe their signifying power – their power to give rise to an understanding, the occurrence of a thought, in the hearer -- to human psychology, individuals’ communicative intentions are answerable to ordinary usage. “Custom” or “use” is “the arbiter of language” (EIP IV.1 361a, 296; EIP I.1 226b, 32). Communication requires that speaker and hearer “affix the same meaning or notion” to words, and “[t]he common meaning is the standard by which such conceptions are formed” (EIP IV.1 364a, 303; emphasis added; cf. EIP V.2 391b, 359):

“The meaning of the word is the thing conceived; and that meaning is the conception affixed to it by those who best understand the language.” (EIP IV.1 364b, 303)5

Notice: the meaning of the word is the thing conceived – the thought-object, as Cummins (1976, 66) puts it. Conceptions and intentions are directly implicated in linguistic meaning -- first, because we are talking about signs, and understanding them (in the linguistic case) as things that express or “are the signs of” (EIP VI.8 474a, 538) our thoughts, and that prompt understanding or conceptions in others (see n. 3); and second, because the source of artificial signs’ signifying power, and their having the particular meanings that they do, is explained by “some compact or agreement” among, and so the intentions of, language-users (IHM IV.2 117b, 51). However, except when we are talking about the mind, thoughts are not what terms signify; they signify whatever is the object of the conception expressed by the speaker and understood by the hearer. So “[m]eaning is not in the mind” for Reid (Castagnetto 1992, 42); and when he says that individuals are “expressed in language,” he means just that (EIP IV.1 364b, 303).

A straightforward referential theory of meaning seems fine, perhaps, in the case of proper names, which “are intended to signify one individual only” (EIP V.1 389a, 354). But

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3 Reid’s use of ‘sign’ fits comfortably Aristotle’s (1984) view of signification as generating an understanding – as putting something in the mind (de Interpretatione 16b19-21), an idea that was retained in Augustine (“a sign is a thing which, over and above the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as a consequence of itself”; 397/1992, Book II). Reid appears too to accept Hobbes’s view that “Understanding [is] nothing else, but conception caused by speech” (1651/1991, Chapter 5, 30).

4 Having a conception of x, in Reid’s sense, should not be understood as subsuming x under a concept, or entertaining a proposition about x; to conceive of x is, rather, to apprehend it, to have it in mind, which needn’t involve conceptualization (see Wolterstorff 2001, 9-12).

5 In the case of common terms, those who best understand the language are ordinary speakers; and so, as above, “[t]he common meaning is the standard by which such conceptions are formed.”
Reid says that “[a]ll other words of language are general words, not appropriated to signify any one individual thing, but equally related to many” (ibid.; emphasis added). Yet, he also agrees with his empiricist predecessors that everything that exists “is an individual” (e.g., EIP V.1 389a-b, 355). So, what do general terms – hence, most words in language – signify, according to Reid?

Might they signify universals? Qua non-particular things, those don’t by Reid’s lights exist. Neither, obviously, can they signify ‘ideas’ in the sense intended by Descartes, Locke, Berkeley, or any other proponent of ‘the theory of ideas’ – i.e., specifically mental entities, taken to be the immediate object of all thought; for Reid thinks ‘ideas’ taken in that sense are “a mere fiction of philosophers” (EIP I.1 226b, 31). However, Reid grants the existence of ‘ideas’ in the ordinary sense of the term -- that is, he (of course!) grants the existence of thoughts or conceptions (ibid.); and it’s not clear what else general terms could refer to for Reid, if not these. Indeed, there are passages in Reid which suggest that they do just that:

“…every attribute, common to several individuals, may be expressed by a general term, which is the sign of the general conception.” (EIP V.3 395b, 368; cf. EIP IV.1 364b, 304)

“That… general words may answer their intention all that is necessary is, that those who use them should affix the same meaning or notion, that is, the same conception to them.” (EIP IV.1 364a, 303)

So Reid appears to endorse an ideational theory of meaning after all. And now a further and familiar concern arises, about the epistemological consequences of such a view: “if conceptions are introspectible mental acts, then how can we know that the introspected content is the same when different people use the same words?” (Jensen 1979, 373).

Jensen raises a legitimate concern about ideational views of meaning. But Reid does not in fact endorse the latter. While he does sometimes say that general terms are signs of general conceptions, Reid most often says that they signify attributes (EIP V.1 389b, 355; EIP V.3 396b, 370) or classes (genera and species (EIP V.1 390a, 356). One could hold that the latter just are (general) conceptions. But this is clearly not Reid’s view. A term is “called a general word,” he says, only “because that which it signifies is general”; but any given conception is “an individual act” (EIP V.2 391b, 360; emphasis added). Why then would Reid say in the passages above that the meaning of a general term is a (general) conception? The answer is that, like our other terms for various mental operations, ‘conception’ suffers from an act/object ambiguity:

“We must here beware of the ambiguity of the word conception, which sometimes signifies the act of the mind in conceiving, sometimes the thing conceived, which is the object of that act. If the word be taken in the first sense, I acknowledge that every act of the mind is an individual act; the universality, therefore, is not in the act of the mind, but in the object or thing conceived. The thing conceived is an
attribute common to many subjects, or it is a genus or species common to many individuals.” (EIP V.2 393b-394a, 364)

“The words notion and conception, in their proper and most common sense, signify the act or operation of the mind in conceiving an object. In a figurative sense, they are sometimes put for the object conceived. I think they are rarely, if ever, used in this figurative sense, except when we speak of what we call general notions or general conceptions.” (EIP V.5 403b, 385)

So, when Reid says that “every attribute, common to several individuals, may be expressed by a general term, which is the sign of the general conception” (EIP V.3 395b, 368), he is speaking figuratively. His real view is that general terms signify the non-mental items that are the objects of such acts.

But how is that possible, if everything that exists is an individual – hence, if there are no general objects (universals, attributes, genera or species) to serve as the objects of our general conceptions, and so the meanings of general terms? Reid’s answer is simple: “we have power to conceive things which neither do nor ever did exist. We have power to conceive attributes without regards to their existence” (EIP V.5 403b, 385). The common error is to suppose that attributes or kinds must exist – as mind-independent ‘forms’, or as abstract ideas – in order for us to be able to conceive of them.6

Of course, these non-existing things are not publicly available in the same way as is the typical bearer of a proper name (a particular city or person, e.g.); they are not concreta. But they’re not private objects either: in principle, they are equally accessible to all -- there is no barrier to multiple people thinking of them, and so having the same general conceptions. This is especially clear when we consider how the relevant conceptions are typically acquired.

Reid says there are three operations “by which we are enabled to form general conceptions”: analyzing a subject into its known attributes, and giving a name to each; observing one or more of these attributes to be common to many subjects; and combining into a whole several of these attributes and giving that combination a name (EIP V.2 394a-b, 365-366). (The first two underlie our capacity to think of universals; the third enables us to think of genera and species.) There is no special training required for the performance of such operations – “the invention and use of general words…is not a subtile invention of philosophers, but an operation which all men perform by the light of common sense” (EIP V.1 390b, 357). Just as importantly, however, one does not typically perform the relevant operations oneself. Rather, one most often forms the

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6 Is most of our talk false then, according to Reid, since most terms are general and so involve reference to non-existent things? No. When I say that there is a red apple on the table, for example, I do indeed refer to redness and (the kind) apples. But I do not (falsely) assert the existence of these things. Rather, I assert/imply the existence of an individual thing which has features shared by -- i.e., that is similar to -- both certain other fruits and other red things, where ‘fruits’ and ‘red things’ (etc.) need have no reality beyond various individuals grouped according to similarity relationships.
conceptions in question by acquiring the relevant terms: “The labour of forming abstract notions, is the labour of learning to speak, and to understand what is spoken” (EIP V.6 409b, 398). In some cases, we learn the meaning of a general term by being presented with a definition. Most often, however, we do so “by a kind of induction, by observing to what individuals they are applied by those who understand the language. We learn by habit to use them as we see others do, even when we have not a precise meaning annexed to them” (EIP V.2 393a, 363; cf. V.6 409b, 398 and IV.1 365a, 304).7

As Castagnetto (1992, 55-56) observes, then, Reid’s remarks on the acquisition of general conceptions depict it as typically a decidedly public and social process: we do not start with our own private ideas, abstract away some of their features, and arrive at a general conception which may or may not match those that others’ associate with a given term; rather, we start with public language and public objects, and learn by ‘habit’ and ‘a kind of induction’ that some of these things’ shared features, but not others, are what’s signified by the word in question.

3. Natural Language and Communication
Our discussion to this point has concerned artificial language, as Reid calls it. We have found Reid making points which depict meaning, and language, as an importantly public phenomenon – not just in his rejection of the ideational theory of meaning, but also in his emphasis upon ordinary use as authoritative and his description of the essentially public and social process by which we come to have most of the words, indeed most of the conceptions, that we do. We find a similar rejection of any essentially introverted approach to understanding language when we turn to Reid’s views on the origin and basis of artificial language.

Once again, by ‘language’ Reid means “all those signs which mankind use in order to communicate to others their thoughts and intentions, their purposes and desires” (IHM IV.2 117b, 51). In artificial language, as we’ve seen, the sign-signified relation is conventional; with natural signs, the “connection with the thing signified is established by nature” (IHM V.3 121bff., 58ff.). Such natural signs fall into three classes: first, those whose connection to the thing signified is discovered only by experience; second, those whose connection to the thing signified “is discovered to us by a natural principle,

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7 Reid says that a precise definition “at once conveys a distinct and accurate general conception”, whereas when we acquire a term by seeing how others use it “our conception is often less distinct, and in different persons is perhaps not perfectly the same” (EIP V.6 409b, 398). As we’ve seen, however, for Reid it is common use and not the latter conceptions that are determinative of the relevant term’s meaning. When the common use is such that it doesn’t suggest a fully determinate conception, this just shows that there is some vagueness in the term, as there is in most of our words outside of proper names (cf. EIP V.2 393a-b, 362-364). Contrast this with Locke, for whom the meaning of a term just is the idea in the mind of the speaker to which it refers: “To make words serviceable to the end of communication, it is necessary…that they excite in the hearer exactly the same idea they stand for in the mind of the speaker. Without this, men fill one another’s heads with noise and sounds; but convey not thereby their thoughts, and lay not before one another their ideas, which is the end of discourse and language” (Essay III.9.6; Vol. 2, 106).
without reasoning or experience”; and third, those which, “though we never before had any notion or conception of the thing signified, do suggest it, or conjure it up, as it were, by a natural kind of magic, and at once give us a conception, and create in us a belief in it” (ibid.). It’s the business of science to investigate the first class of natural signs – e.g., to discover through experience that certain spots on the skin are a sign of measles. To the third, belong the sensations that figure in perception – a given tactile sensation is a sign of hardness, for instance. For our purposes here, it is the second class of natural signs that is of interest: it comprises what Reid calls “the natural language of mankind” (IHM V.3 121b, 59).

The signs that make up this natural language are certain “modulations of voice, gestures, and features” (ibid. 118a, 52); these, Reid says, “have a meaning which every man understands by the principles of his nature” (ibid. 117a, 51): “we understand the signification of these signs, by the constitution of our nature, by a kind of natural perception similar to the perceptions of sense” (EIP VI.5 449a, 484);9 when we see/hear them, without reasoning or reflection the mind immediately passes to a conception and belief of certain of another’s thoughts and intentions. Thus, an infant hears an angry voice and, perceiving it as threatening, immediately begins to cry; a certain gesture is naturally read as ostensive, another as indicating assent; and so on (ibid.; cf. EAP V.6 664b-665a, 330-331).

Crucially, Reid claims that the natural language of mankind, though “scanty” (IHM IV.2 118a, 52), is “the seed of [artificial] language” (Lett 71a, 192); it provides the necessary basis for the invention and deployment of artificial signs:

“I think it is demonstrable, that, if mankind had not a natural language, they could never have invented an artificial one by their reason and ingenuity. For all artificial language supposes some compact or agreement to affix a certain meaning to certain signs; therefore there must be compacts or agreements before the use of artificial signs; but there can be no compact or agreement without signs, nor without language; and therefore there must be a natural language before any artificial language can be invented.” (IHM IV.2 117b-118a, 51)10

As Todd (1987) notes, one obvious target of Reid’s argument here is Locke, who held that language was purely an invention of men. According to Locke, to enable the “communication of thoughts”, humans, by a mutual and “voluntary imposition”, invented words to serve as “sensible marks of ideas” (1690/1959 III.2.1-2; Vol. 2, 8-9). As we’ve

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8 More specifically, in ‘original’ perception. In ‘acquired’ perception, the original sign or something originally perceived comes, through experience, to serve as the sign of some further objectual quality or state of affairs (see IHM VI.20-23 and EIP II.21-22).
9 That such knowledge is mediated by signs does not, for Reid, mean that it is epistemically indirect. Our perceptual beliefs are mediated by signs as well, but “[t]he warrant they have for a subject does not derive from the warrant of any other propositions that subject believes” (Van Cleve 2004, 112).
10 Reid has another argument: “Had language in general been a human invention, as much as writing or printing, we should find whole nations as mute as the brutes” (IHM IV.2 118a, 51).
seen, Reid rejects the latter view of linguistic meaning. But he also thinks that people cannot have invented language so as to “bring out their ideas, and lay them before the view of others” (ibid., p. 9). Artificial language *hones* and *extends* our communicative powers, 

but if some of our thoughts, intentions, purposes, and so on, were not already to some degree public or ‘out in the open’ – if others had no prior means of knowing them – we would be unable to undertake the necessary compact. So if, previous to (artificial) language, one’s ideas really were altogether “invisible” (Locke 1690/1959 III.2.2; Vol. 2, p. 8), that’s how they would remain. But they are not: ‘the natural language of mankind’ affords us a prereflective, preconventional means of communicating, and of grasping each other’s intentional states.

One might wonder whether Reid’s argument here is too quick. According to Condillac, for example, while natural signs (such as a “natural cry”) are produced instinctively, and without any explicit communicative intention, but we must *learn* their signification through being exposed to their characteristic association with what they signify (Condillac 1746/2001 I.2.4 and II.1.1 §§1-4; Falkenstein 2010 Section 6).

To such a suggestion, Reid has two objections. First, he claims, it “contradict[s] all experience”: we observe that children *learn* that flames will burn and knives will cut, and they do so at different rates and at different points in their lives; whereas “we know that an angry countenance will fright a child in the cradle” immediately, before they’ve had exposure to repetitions of the relevant pattern (EIP VI.5 449b, 485). Second, when we experience both a sign and the thing signified, experience can instruct us how the sign is to be interpreted – this is what happens with the first class of natural signs (see above); but in the case at hand, we see the signs only, and so cannot learn of their connection to others’ “thoughts and passions” by experience; “there must be some earlier source of this knowledge” (ibid. 449b–450a, 485-486). The “social intercourse of human minds, by which their thoughts and sentiments are exchanged,…is common to the whole species from infancy,” and so must be “natural, and a part of our constitution” (EAP V.6 665a, 332-333).

Turri too has raised concerns about the Reidian argument for the priority of natural language. Among other things, Turri doubts that even the witting invention of artificial language 

12 requires prior agreement via natural language. Here is his case:

“We do not, by a principle of our nature, understand the cry ‘owoow’ to mean anything. The cry ‘owoow’ is not a sign in natural human language. And yet it certainly seems possible that a human with some experience with wolves, call him ‘Howie’, might decide to use the cry ‘owoow’ in order to communicate to others his thought that wolves lurk nearby…. Suppose Howie is exiting the forest along the main path at dusk, having just escaped a ravenous wolf pack, when he notices a Stranger entering the forest.

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11 As well, it shapes and facilitates thought: e.g., EIP VI.8 474a, 539; EIP I.8 245a, 69.
12 As opposed to examples, such as some Turri gives, that “rel[y] on possible but highly peculiar cases, some involving coincidences that we wouldn’t reasonably expect to frequently occur” (2014, 221).
Howie knows that wolves lurk nearby, and howls ‘owooo’ at the Stranger, in order to communicate this thought. Moreover, Howie knows that any human adult around these parts knows what a wolf howl sounds like. So it stands to reason that the Stranger would interpret Howie as referring to wolves. And the Stranger interprets him precisely that way. This certainly seems to qualify as a witting and effective interpersonal use of artificial language. But it wasn’t preceded by any agreement, using natural signs or otherwise, between Howie and the Stranger.”

(2014, 220)

In response, two things should be noted. First, while ‘owooo’ is not a sign in natural human language, it’s not an artificial sign either. It does have meaning prior to Howie’s use of it: it is a natural sign of the presence of wolves— that’s why it so nicely suits Howie’s communicative purpose. Second, and just as important, the success of Howie’s communicative act seems to presume that each of the two parties has some prior means of grasping certain features of the other’s psychology – that the Stranger is able to read Howie’s intention as informative, as opposed to playful, for example; or that Howie, “having just escaped a ravenous wolf pack,” would display obvious signs of exertion and panic; and so on. Plausibly, it is the presumed availability of such information, as much as features of the sign itself (its naturally indicating the presence wolves), that makes it natural to suppose that Howie’s attempt at communication would succeed. If that’s correct, however, then in addition to not showing that one can successfully deploy an artificial sign prior to some “compact or agreement”, the example actually suggests the more general moral that a reliance upon the natural language of mankind is crucial, not just at the initial stage of inventing an artificial language, but in communicative situations more generally.

This last point is one that has been emphasized by a number of recent theorists. Consider the learning of language, for example. Locke once again provides the natural foil:

“…if we observe how children learn languages, we shall find that, to make them understand what the names of simple ideas or substances stand for, people ordinarily show them the thing whereof they would have them have the idea; and then repeat to them the name that stands for it; as white, sweet, milk, sugar, cat, dog.” (1690/1959 III.9.9; Vol. 2, 108).

So, as Condillac held with regard to our understanding of natural signs (see above), Locke thinks that the acquisition of (artificial) language is a matter of associative learning. In his recent work, Paul Bloom has argued against this picture of language-acquisition, and in favor of the competing Augustinian theory – so called, because of the latter’s well-known description of how he learned language; namely, by attending to what his elders intended as they spoke and gestured:

“And that they meant this thing and no other was plain from the motion of their body, the natural language, as it were, of all nations, expressed by the countenance, glances of the eye, gestures of the limbs, and tones of the voice,

13 In Reid’s terms, it belongs to Reid’s first class of natural sign described above.
indicating the affections of the mind, as it pursues, possesses, rejects, or shuns.”
(Augustine 398/1961; quoted in Bloom 2001, 1095)

According to Bloom, it’s Augustine and not the associationist who has it right: “there is a rich body of research suggesting that young children are exceptionally good at using mentalistic cues – such as eye gaze and emotional expression – to learn nouns and verbs, and can do so even when these cues conflict with information provided by the statistics in the scene” (2001, 1100). More generally, Bloom argues, only the Augustinian theory is able to explain the remarkable speed and facility with which children learn the meanings of words.\textsuperscript{14}

As stated by Papafagou, “[t]he main objection to any associationist account of learning how to speak and communicate is that such an account ignores the fact that utterance interpretation is crucially an attempt to establish what the speaker meant” (2002, 58). In other words, the associationist account fails to recognize that language learning is itself a communicative enterprise. And once we see this, the point naturally carries us beyond issues of what’s required for \textit{inventing or learning} a language, and back to the more general moral suggested by our consideration of Turri’s putative counter-example to Reid: namely, that, natural language aside, the use of a given sign will not suffice for successful communication, since such a use is an intentional act which itself needs to be interpreted and understood.\textsuperscript{15}

4. Conclusion

Words mean what they do because of how we use them; their meaning is conventional, and so ultimately dependent upon psychology. So too, we use language to express our thoughts and to communicate them to others. According to Reid, however, except when we’re talking about our thoughts, our words do not refer to (signify, mean) anything mental; the objects to which they do refer are public, and are ‘in the mind’ only insofar as, and only in the sense that, we have thoughts of them (see EIP I.1 221b-222a, 22). Further, while each of us might have special access to our own thoughts (conceptions), the latter have been formed through the public and social process of acquiring our shared language. Finally, it is a mistake to think of (artificial) language as the medium by which we disclose our thoughts to others. This is not just because, without some prior means of interpreting it, the mere existence of some public code would not suffice for communication, but because we already have ‘natural language’ -- a system of public

\textsuperscript{14} It’s worth noting that infants don’t just rely upon Augustine and Reid’s ‘natural language’ in learning (artificial) language; they naturally exploit it in their prelinguistic communicative endeavors. Papafragou, for instance, recounts a representative case (from Lock 1980, 95-96), in which a fourteen-month-old “uses a repertory of ostensive devices (vestigial crying, pointing, lipsmacking) to attract attention and request a desirable object” (2002, 60).

\textsuperscript{15} It’s for this reason that pragmatics – the study of how the information arising from people’s saying things (as opposed to that encoded in what they say) is generated and recovered – is crucial to understanding linguistic communication generally, and why ‘the code model of communication’, as Sperber & Wilson (1986) call it, cannot be correct. See Rysiew 2007 for some general discussion and sources. (On Reid’s sensitivity to the relevance of pragmatics to communication, and to philosophy, see Rysiew (2015, 226-227).)
signs of which we have a natural grasp, and upon which already we rely, not just in inventing or acquiring (artificial) language, but in communicative situations generally.

References


