time; and memories from infancy, birth, or even during gestation. Cults who worship Satan; sexually abuse young girls; and breed, kill, and eat babies appear in repressed memories with astounding frequency. Is the memory of a woman, married for a number of years, who recalls during therapy that she was abused by her father from childhood to a few weeks before her marriage appreciably more believable? Other repressed and recovered memories are not as bizarre, but the difference is only one of degree.

Dogmatic activists in the women's movement seem not to realize what they are doing in their support for recovery of repressed memories of sexual abuse. These activists are supported by the all too many poorly trained and scientifically naive psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers who instigate or encourage the recovery and vouch for the veracity of the product. One also wonders whether these helpers realize what they are doing.

These two overlapping groups are doing is recreating the 19th-century stereotype of women as the hysterical sex. Male physicians derived the name hysteria from a Greek word meaning uterus. Women have been struggling to discard that stereotype for the last century with substantial success and with the help of many male medical and psychological scientists. Trumpeting bizarre claims and exaggerating the incidence of childhood sexual abuse on the basis of recovery of repressed memories are indeed resurrecting the stereotype.

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Recovered Memories and Social Justice

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Laura Brown (April 1997) argued eloquently in favor of a psychology devoted to social justice. I agree with many of her arguments in this regard. I am dismayed, however, by Brown's discussion of concerns about iatrogenic false memories-beliefs of childhood sexual abuse. In my view, she treated such concerns in a dismissive and trivializing manner. Perhaps Brown's comments were not intended to apply to all expressions of concern about potentially suggestive forms of "memory-recovery work" in therapy but only to those she views as part of "the false memory movement." My perception, however, is that she depicted criticisms of memory-recovery work in medical and social terms, and I think that doing so obscures the issues at hand. This is not to deny that criticisms of memory-recovery work have sometimes smacked of reactionary antifeminist politics, that some critics have made unjustified claims, or that ideas about false memories have sometimes been misused. On the contrary, I think it is essential—both from a scientific point of view and from a social justice point of view—to separate reasonable concerns regarding iatrogenesis from popularized exaggerations and abuses of those concerns. In my view, Brown's article fails to do so.

For example, Brown (1997) claimed that the false memory movement describes "the bad therapist" as one who does things such as asking the client if he or she was ever sexually abused and if the client reports such abuse, believes the client. In fact, critics have focused on therapeutic approaches in which a constellation of suggestive influences arise in efforts to help clients "explore the possibility" that they have nonremembered histories of sexual abuse (e.g., suggesting to clients that they have symptoms of nonremembered abuse, that many survivors do not remember abuse, that remembering is important for healing, and that doubt may reflect denial; using techniques that enhance imagery and lower response criteria, such as hypnosis, sodium amytal, or guided imagery, to search for hidden abuse memories; recommending that clients with suspected nonremembered abuse read popular books on memory recovery, attend survivors' support groups, or both; e.g., Lindsay & Read, 1995; Loftus, 1993; for a feminist psychodynamic critique, see Haaken & Schlaps, 1991). There is compelling evidence that suggestive efforts to help clients recover memories of abuse, which need not be coercive, have been used by a minority of therapists of both sexes in recent years (e.g., Bottoms, Shaver, & Goodman, 1996; Polusny & Follette, 1996; Poole, Lindsay, Memon, & Bull, 1995), and there are solid grounds for concern about such approaches. Critics of suggestive memory-recovery work should not be exaggerated or misappropriated in ways that undermine support for victims of abuse, but the existence and risks of such approaches should not be denied or minimized.

Brown (1997) did say that some therapists deliberately lead clients to construct illusory incest narratives (typically, she said, men who also sexually abuse clients). Brown condemned such practices, and I trust that all agree that such behavior is utterly vile. While celebrating this point of agreement, I note that therapists who deliberately lead clients to develop false memories have not been the primary focus of critics of suggestive memory-recovery work. Concern has focused on more common practices in which a constellation of suggestive influences arise in well-intended efforts to help clients explore the possibility that they experienced nonremembered abuse. It is likely that most of the minority of therapists who use suggestive memory-recovery approaches do not perceive them as risky (Poole et al., 1995).

One symptom of the polarization of the controversy regarding memory-recovery work and recovered-memory experiences is the use of caricatures to depict "the other side." For example, some critics of suggestive memory-recovery work have used language that implies that all therapists who work with trauma issues use highly suggestive techniques in prolonged, heavy-handed searches for hidden memories. In fact, a great deal of trauma-oriented psychotherapy does not focus on helping clients look for new memories of trauma but rather on helping them heal from never-forgotten trauma. Even when trauma-oriented therapy does involve probing for possible new memories of trauma, approaches vary widely in suggestiveness. When critics of suggestive memory-recovery work fail to differentiate between high- and low-risk approaches, they inflame the controversy. Similarly, Brown's (1997) article depicts critics of memory-recovery work as reactionary misogynists striving to disempower and silence victims, shore up the patriarchy, and drive caring people into exile by purveying a "false justice narrative." Such damning characterizations exacerbate the contentiousness of the controversy. What is needed is respectful dialogue that acknowledges the valid concerns on both sides (Lindsay & Briere, 1997; Read & Lindsay, 1997).

Brown (1997) noted that some trauma-memory-oriented therapists have suffered harassment and that such actions are unacceptable. I agree. The accounts I have heard from trauma-oriented clinicians of physically invasive pickets, virulent hate mail, spurious threats of lawsuits, and similar forms of harassment are appalling, and I call on psychologists engaged in this controversy (in-
Including those on the False Memory Syndrome Foundation Scientific Advisory Board) to condemn harassment in unambiguous terms. It appears that harassment of therapists (often by distraught parents) has been more frequent and extreme, but some critics of memory-recovery work, too, have suffered pickets, ad hominem attacks, and other forms of harassment. Moreover, there are compelling reasons to believe that well-intended but suggestive forms of memory-recovery work have grievously harmed substantial numbers of clients and their families. Thus, it is inaccurate to depict one side of the recovered-memories controversy as scourge villains and the other as faultless seekers after truth and healing. My perception is that there have been excesses and violations of professional standards on both sides of the controversy and that many people on both sides have been deeply hurt in various ways (e.g., by sexual abuse, by false accusations of sexual abuse, by ad hominem attacks and misrepresentations), but that the vast majority of people on both sides have honorable motives.

My concern is that Brown's (1997) article may be read as glamorizing suggestive searches for nonremembered abuse as "subversion" and dismissing concerns about such approaches as misogynist backlash. This may not have been Brown's intent—her article does not advocate use of suggestive techniques, and she specifically condemned therapists who deliberately lead clients to develop recovered-memories controversy as scurrilous villains and the other as faultless seekers after truth and healing. My perception is that there have been excesses and violations of professional standards on both sides of the controversy and that many people on both sides have been deeply hurt in various ways (e.g., by sexual abuse, by false accusations of sexual abuse, by ad hominem attacks and misrepresentations), but that the vast majority of people on both sides have honorable motives.

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Sacred Cows and Straw Men

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In recent years, a shift has been occurring in which psychology is coming to be seen less and less as a science and to be presented as a religion replete with dogma and liturgical hierarchy. The principles of objectivity, rationality, reliability, and validity are being replaced with the values of subjectivity, emotionality, peer consensus, and client satisfaction. Whatever the reasons, and there may be several, it is undeniable that psychology is acquiring more and more of the characteristics of a religion. This transition is evidenced in the adoption of Eastern mystical and Native American approaches as healing techniques in psychotherapy; in the increasing number of books and workshops that meld religion and psychology; and in the acceptance of spiritual, transcendental, and supernatural concepts into the language of psychotherapy.

Some will argue that with this trend comes a healthy expansion of the scope and effectiveness of psychological practice (not to mention its market) as it moves to include issues of meaning, value, justice, and soulfulness. Although this defense deftly may be true, it is undeniably true that with this shift come all the bad things about a religion—its imposed morality, its bigotry, and its demand for conformity within the garb of justice and salvation. It creates its "sacred cows" that are immune to criticism and its "straw men" that are set up only to be easily confuted.

Nowhere is this religious righteousness more evident than in Laura Brown's (April 1997) award address entitled "The Private Practice of Subversion: Psychology as Tikkan Olam," and nowhere is there a more disturbing example in that this address serves as part of her platform in her campaign for election as the American Psychological Association president and leader of the flock. In Brown's address, she argued implicitly for a secular religion of psychology in which psychological practice and psychotherapy would serve as a means to enact judgment ("undermine the oppressive cultural status quo"); p. 453) and to bring about salvation ("the act of saving another human life"); p. 453).

To Brown's (1997) credit, she did not hide her religious and revolutionary intentions as she asserted to "the underlying sacred and revolutionary goals" (p. 452) of psychologists. She was quick to identify two of her archenemies in this crusade: "managed care" and "false memories." However, in doing so, she was equally quick to create her sacred cows and straw men from both issues.

With regard to managed care, the former are the "needs" and wishes of clients, as perceived by therapists, and the unquestionable value of long-term therapy, whereas the latter are the cruel procedures that "strip away power from clients at the very onset of therapy" (Brown, 1997, p. 455). In Brown's view, "the narrative of managed care thus begins with the assumption that clients must be protected from their own decisions about who is the best therapist for them" (p. 454). As for the topic of false memory, it is the story "authored" by the client that must never be questioned. It is not that it must be heard along with the response of the accused but rather that it must be heard over and above the other, for as a "victim," the client must be given unequal status. To complement this position is her construction of straw men out of those who seek to defend the

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