

DYNAMICAL ANALYSIS OF A REPEATED GAME WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

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ABSTRACT. We study a two player repeated zero-sum game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault in which the underlying state of the game undergoes Markov evolution (parameterized by a transition probability $\frac{1}{2} \leq p \leq 1$). Hörner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille identified an optimal strategy, σ^* for the informed player for p in the range $[\frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}]$. We extend the range on which σ^* is proved to be optimal to about $[\frac{1}{2}, 0.719]$ and prove that it fails to be optimal at a value around 0.7328. Our techniques make use of tools from dynamical systems, specifically the notion of pressure, introduced by D. Ruelle.

We study a simple two player dynamic zero-sum game with asymmetric information introduced by Renault in [7] and studied by Hörner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille in [4]. The system is in a state unknown to one of the players. Unlike the Aumann–Maschler model [1], the state here undergoes Markov evolution independent of the actions of the players.

At each stage, the system is in one of two states S_0 and S_1 . The two players, Ian and Una (for informed and uninformed respectively), simultaneously make a choice of playing 0 or 1. If the symbols all coincide (that is the system is in state S_0 and both Ian and Una play 0; or the system is in state S_1 and Ian and Una both play 1) then Una gives Ian \$1. Otherwise no money is transferred.

A crucial aspect of the game is that Ian is aware of the state *before* choosing his move, whereas Una is never told of the state. Also, the money that Una pays Ian is not paid immediately, but only after a large number of rounds of the game have been played. Each player sees the moves of the other, but is not informed of the payoff at the time (although Ian can deduce this information from what is known to him, whereas Una cannot).

The state of the system is assumed to undergo Markov evolution, where the system stays in its current state between moves with fixed probability $p \geq \frac{1}{2}$, or switches with probability $1 - p$. The transition probability governing the switching is known to both players. We

assume that the system is initially in a random state with uniform probability.

Ian thus faces a tradeoff between short term (he has sufficient information to optimize his expected payoff in the current turn) versus long term (if he always plays so as to optimize his payoff in the current turn, then he reveals the current state of the system to Una, who can then use this information to minimize Ian's payoff).

The existence of a uniform value, its characterization and the existence of optimal strategies for Una was obtained by Renault [7]. Neyman [6] extended these results to the case of partial monitoring of the past moves, and established the existence of optimal strategies for both players. That is, strategies σ for Ian and τ for Una, such that whenever Una uses strategy τ , Ian's long-term average expected payoff is at most v ; whereas whenever Ian uses strategy σ , his long-term average expected payoff is at least v . Thus any strategy for Ian gives a lower bound for the value of the game (by taking the infimum of the expected long-term gain over all possible counter-strategies by Una). Similarly any strategy for Una gives an upper bound for the value of the game.

As usual in game theory, the best strategies are often mixed strategies. That is, given all of the information available to a player, his strategy returns a probability vector distributing mass to the available moves. Since we use dynamical systems theory, it is convenient to have a compact space describing past moves that is mapped *into itself* when it is updated by recording a new move. We therefore use the following spaces to describe the state prior to the current turn. Let $M_I = \{0, 1\}$, $M_U = \{0, 1\}$ and $\mathcal{S} = \{S_0, S_1\}$ represent Ian's possible moves, Una's possible moves and the system's state... A strategy for Ian can then be formally described as a map σ from $\bigcup_{n \geq 0} (M_I \times M_U \times \mathcal{S})^n$ to $[0, 1]^2$, where the vector $\sigma(x, y, z) = (p_0, p_1)$ describes Ian's probabilities of playing 1 if the current state is S_0 or S_1 respectively when Ian's past moves were x , Una's past moves were y and the sequence of past states is z . Similarly, a strategy for Una is a map τ from $\bigcup_{n \geq 0} (M_I \times M_U)^n$ to $[0, 1]$, where $\tau(x, y)$ gives the probability of playing 1 if Ian's past moves were x and Una's past moves were y .

Our goal, of course, is essentially to find v and the optimal strategies σ and τ . These, as one expects, depend significantly on p . The answer for $p = \frac{1}{2}$ is straightforward: Ian always plays as if he were facing a one-shot game and wins with probability $\frac{1}{2}$. The case $p = 1$ (so that the system always remains in the same state, which we assume to be randomized uniformly) was studied by Aumann and Maschler [1], where it shown that he cannot use his information and has to

play randomly as if he did not have any advantage (the *non-revealing strategy*) and wins only with probability $\frac{1}{4}$. In [4], the authors exhibit a strategy σ^* for Ian (defined properly in Section 2) and prove that it is optimal for all $\frac{1}{2} \leq p \leq \frac{2}{3}$. In this setting, they give a simple closed formula, $v_p = \frac{p}{4p-1}$, for the value v_p of the game and also provide an optimal strategy τ^* for Una (based on a two state automaton). They express the long-term payoff of the strategy σ^* as the sum of a series for all values of the parameter, hence providing a lower bound for the value of the game (an alternative lower bound that is better in some regimes is given by the trivial strategy with a bound of $\frac{1}{4}$), while an upper bound is given by the payoff of the strategy τ^* . They compute this lower bound explicitly for specific values of the parameter p larger than $\frac{2}{3}$. In the very special case $p = p^*$ solving $9x^3 - 13x^2 + 6x - 1 = 0$ ($p^* \simeq 0.7589$), they observe that σ^* is still optimal. In this case they also exhibit an optimal strategy for Una (more tricky but still based on a finite automaton). Finally, they raise the question of the optimality of σ^* for instance at $p = \frac{3}{4}$. We provide a negative answer and prove:

Theorem 1. *The strategy σ^* is optimal for $p < 0.719$ and not optimal for some $p < 0.733$.*

Defining $p_c = \sup\{t: \sigma^* \text{ is optimal for all } p \in [\frac{1}{2}, t]\}$, the theorem states that $0.719 \leq p_c < 0.733$. For both the upper and lower bounds, the proofs are based on checking that a certain finite set of inequalities is satisfied.

The fact that $p_c \geq \frac{2}{3}$ was established in [4]. Experimentation strongly suggests that $p_c > 0.732$, but we have not been able to show this rigorously. The methods in this article give, for each n , a family (C_n) of finitely checkable inequalities, such that if p satisfies (C_n) for some n , then σ^* is optimal for p . The proof that σ^* is optimal up to 0.719 proceeds by considering two intervals of parameters and showing that on both intervals, (C_9) is satisfied for all parameters in the interval. Further, if one picks values of p randomly in the range $[0.719, 0.732]$ and then tests (C_n) for $n = 50, n = 100, \dots, n = 500$, an experiment showed that for each of 10000 randomly selected p values, at least one of the collections of sufficient conditions for optimality of σ^* was satisfied. It seems likely that for any $p_0 < p_c$, there is an n such that $C(n)$ is satisfied by all $p \in [\frac{2}{3}, p_0]$. Unsurprisingly the first value of n for which the collection of inequalities is satisfied becomes larger as p approaches the conjectured $p_c \in (0.732, 0.733)$ and at the same time, the number of intervals of p into which the range must be sub-divided is expected to grow exponentially with n . We are confident that one can go beyond




FIGURE 1. Bounds on the value of the game as a function of the parameter p : The lower curve is the long-term payoff of σ^* . [4] proved this was the value of the game in the range $[\frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}]$. We prove this remains true up to 0.719 (grey), and give evidence that this hold up to 0.732 (light grey). We show σ^* is not optimal at $p = 0.73275300915$. Beyond 0.732, the upper bound for the value (top line) of the game was obtained in [4] based on a simple strategy for Una. They also found a particular value $p \approx 0.7589$ for which σ^* is optimal.

$p = 0.719$, but continuation requires an increasing amount of effort for a decreasing amount of improvement.

We conjecture that p_c is sharp in the sense that for $p > p_c$, σ^* would in general not be optimal. “In general”, because as already pointed out, [4] shows there are still special values beyond p_c at which σ^* is optimal. Quite surprisingly, we had to introduce tools from dynamical systems (thermodynamic formalism) to show the optimality of σ^* . The strategy of Una to which σ^* is the optimal response turns out to be a strategy that takes into account the past moves of Ian since the last ‘reset’ (time at which Ian’s move made it possible to deduce the current state with certainty). Since the time since the last reset may be unbounded, we control the behaviour of the orbit of a certain dynamical system. However, the result relies, above all, on standard tools of game theory.

The paper is laid out as follows: in Section 1, we introduce classical tools from game theory. In Section 2, we define the strategy σ^* , prove its basic properties and compute its payoff for all p . In Section 3, we search for an optimal strategy for Una. We give a system of equations

whose solutions yield potential strategies for Una in the range $p \leq 0.78$. Such a solution yields a desired strategy only if it satisfies a set of inequalities. In Section 4, we find a sufficient condition for these inequalities to hold in terms of the pressure of a potential. We show, in Section 5, that the pressure condition is satisfied for all p less than 0.719023. This ends the proof of the first part of Theorem 1. In Section 6 we exhibit a strategy for Ian with a larger long-term expected payoff than σ^* for certain values of p ; the smallest such value of p that we found is smaller than 0.733. This will finish the proof of Theorem 1. A final section addresses the question of which features of the game make it amenable to an analysis of this type.

1. TOOLS FROM GAME THEORY

The technical framework that we use to prove these statements is the study of Markov Decision Processes (MDP). A Markov decision process is one in which the system moves around a compact state space Ω , influenced by an agent who can, at each step, choose from one of a compact (in our case, finite) set of transition probabilities on the state space, each one with a given one-step payoff. The value of the process is the maximal long-term expected value of the gain.

More formally, given a repeated game, we let $\gamma_N(\sigma, \tau)$ be the expected payoff per round to Player 1 if Player 1 plays the strategy σ and Player 2 plays the strategy τ for N rounds. Suppose there exists a $v \in \mathbb{R}$ such that for each $\epsilon > 0$, there exists $N_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ and a pair of strategies σ^* and τ^* for Players 1 and 2 respectively such that for all $N \geq N_0$,

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma_N(\sigma^*, \tau) &> v - \epsilon \text{ for each strategy } \tau \text{ for Player 2;} \\ \gamma_N(\sigma, \tau^*) &< v + \epsilon \text{ for each strategy } \sigma \text{ for Player 1.}\end{aligned}$$

Then v is the *value* of the game.

If a game has value v and there exists a strategy σ^* such that $\liminf_{N \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_N(\sigma^*, \tau) \geq v$ for each strategy τ for Player 2, then σ^* is said to be an *optimal strategy* for Player 1. Similarly if τ^* is such that $\limsup_{N \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_N(\sigma, \tau^*) \leq v$ for each strategy σ for Player 1, then τ^* is optimal for Player 2.

We use the following theorem to characterize the value of a game and optimal strategies

Theorem 2 (Average Cost Optimality Equality [3]). *Suppose a Markov decision process has compact state space Ω , a compact action set \mathcal{A} , a continuous payoff function $r: \Omega \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ and a continuous transition*

rule $q: \Omega \times \mathcal{A} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}(\Omega)$ such that $q_{\omega,a}$ is a finitely supported probability measure on Ω for each $\omega \in \Omega$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}$.

Suppose there exist $v \in \mathbb{R}$ and a bounded function $V: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that the following equation is satisfied:

$$(1) \quad V(\omega) + v = \max_{a \in \mathcal{A}} \left(r(\omega, a) + \int V(\omega') dq_{\omega,a}(\omega') \right).$$

Then v is the value of the Markov decision process for each initial state ω . Further, a stationary strategy $\alpha: \Omega \mapsto \mathcal{A}$ is optimal if $\alpha(\omega)$ attains the maximum in the right side of (1) for each $\omega \in \Omega$.

We interpret $V(\omega)$ as the relative score of the position ω . This is there in order to take long-term effects into account. This can be thought of as answering the question *What is the long-term total difference between starting at some fixed ω_0 and starting at ω ?* This will be finite under suitable continuity and contractivity assumptions. The equation (1) informally says that if one chooses the action a achieving the maximum, then the expected gain plus difference in V values is v .

The way we use Theorem 2 is as follows. Suppose (for example) Una is looking for a best response to a strategy σ for Ian that is based upon the current state of the system as well as Una's current *belief* that the system is in state 1 (that is the conditional probability that the system is in state 1 given the information available to her). We let the state space be $\Omega = [0, 1]$, the space of beliefs. Una's belief is initially $\frac{1}{2}$ and is updated after each move.

Let us suppose that $v \in \mathbb{R}$ and $V: \Omega \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ satisfy (1). Una is then trying to decide between playing 0 and 1. Since she knows ω , she has computed the probability that the system is in state S_0 or S_1 , and can also compute the probability that Ian will play 0 or 1. Hence she can compute the expected one-round payoff to Ian if she plays either 0 or 1. An best response (there may be many) to σ is any strategy that always picks an option attaining the minimum expectation of (payoff + V).

We now turn to another frequently used idea in zero-sum games:

Principle 3. *Suppose that*

- (1) τ is a best response to σ ; and
- (2) σ is a best response to τ

Then σ is an optimal strategy for Ian. Similarly τ is an optimal strategy for Una.

See for example [4]. We exploit this principle repeatedly in the remainder of this article.

A symmetry argument explained in [4] shows that for $0 \leq p \leq \frac{1}{2}$, $v_p = v_{1-p}$. Hence, in what follows we consider the case $\frac{1}{2} \leq p \leq 1$. We will be looking mainly at the strategy σ^* introduced in [4].

In what follows, if Ian is assumed to be playing using the strategy σ^* (to be defined below), we frequently refer to Una's *belief* that the system is in state S_1 . Formally, this is just the conditional probability that the system is in the state S_1 given all the information available to Una (that is the sequence of past moves made by both players), given that Ian is using σ^* . Of course, Ian can calculate Una's belief that the system is in state S_1 .

2. THE STRATEGY σ^*

We now describe a strategy, σ^* , that we show to be optimal for Ian for a range of the parameter. This strategy was initially introduced in [4]. As pointed out below, it is characterized by being a greedy U-indifferent strategy.

We define two maps as follows:

$$f_0(\theta) = \begin{cases} p \frac{2\theta-1}{\theta} + (1-p) \frac{1-\theta}{\theta} & \text{if } \theta \geq \frac{1}{2}; \\ 1-p & \text{if } \theta \leq \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$

$$f_1(\theta) = \begin{cases} p & \text{if } \theta \geq \frac{1}{2}; \\ p \frac{\theta}{1-\theta} + (1-p) \frac{1-2\theta}{1-\theta} & \text{if } \theta \leq \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$

Notice that $f_0(\theta) = 1 - f_1(1-\theta)$. We define a function Φ by setting $\Phi(x)$ to be $f_0(x)$ if $x \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and $f_1(x)$ otherwise. We set $p_n = \Phi^n(p)$ for all $n \geq 0$.

The strategy σ^* is then defined as follows. Ian computes Una's belief, θ , that the system is in state 1. He then plays 1 with the following probabilities:

$$\mathbb{P}(\text{playing } 1) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if the system is in state } S_1 \text{ and } \theta \leq \frac{1}{2}; \\ \frac{1-2\theta}{1-\theta} & \text{if the system is in state } S_0 \text{ and } \theta \leq \frac{1}{2}; \\ \frac{1-\theta}{\theta} & \text{if the system is in state } S_1 \text{ and } \theta \geq \frac{1}{2}; \\ 0 & \text{if the system is in state } S_0 \text{ and } \theta \geq \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$

He plays 0 with the complementary probability.

As shown in [4], the maps f_0 and f_1 keep track of Una's belief that the system is in state S_1 if Una knows that Ian is playing σ^* by Bayesian updating. For example if Una's belief that the system is in state S_1 is $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$ then Una attaches probabilities $\theta \cdot \frac{1-\theta}{\theta} = 1-\theta$ to $(S_1, 1)$, $\theta \cdot \frac{2\theta-1}{\theta} = 2\theta-1$ to $(S_1, 0)$ and $1-\theta$ to $(S_0, 0)$, where (S_i, j) means the event that the system is in state S_i and Ian plays j . If Ian plays 0,




FIGURE 2. The graphs of $\theta \mapsto \Phi(\theta)$ and first points of the orbit of $1 - p$, for values of p ranging from $p = 0.66$ to $p = 0.72$ in steps of 0.02.

Una computes the probabilities of the system having been in S_1 to be $(2\theta - 1)/((2\theta - 1) + (1 - \theta)) = (2\theta - 1)/\theta$, so that her updated belief that the system is in state S_1 is $\frac{2\theta-1}{\theta}p + \frac{1-\theta}{\theta}(1-p) = f_0(\theta)$.

The critical feature of σ^* that we make use of is the fact that the expected long-term average gain for Ian if he plays σ^* is the same no matter which strategy is used by Una. We prove this in the lemma below. In view of this lemma and Principle 3, if one can find a strategy τ for Una, to which σ^* is a best response, then σ^* and τ are optimal strategies for Ian and Una respectively.

Lemma 4. *The expected long-term average gain for Ian when playing strategy σ^* is independent of the strategy played by Una. Hence any strategy τ for Una is a best response to σ^* .*

Proof. We consider the Markov decision process for Una. The state of the process will be just her belief, θ , that the system is in the state S_1 . Her action has no effect on the evolution of the state, and so her chosen move will just be the one with the lower expected one-stage payoff.

Suppose without loss of generality that $\theta \geq \frac{1}{2}$. Then if Una plays 0, then Ian gains if the system was in state S_0 (if $\theta \geq \frac{1}{2}$ then Ian always

plays 0 if the system is in state S_0). The expected one-step gain for Ian from this strategy is therefore $1 - \theta$. Similarly, if Una plays 1, then Ian gains if the system was in state S_1 and Ian chose to play 1. This happens with probability $\theta \times (1 - \theta)/\theta = 1 - \theta$.

Similarly, if $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$, the expected one-step gain for Ian is θ , independently of any move played by Una.

Hence the expected one-step gain from any position does not depend on Una's move. The next position attained by the system is also independent of Una's move. So the long-term average gain is also independent of Una's choice of moves and Ian's long-term average gain is independent of Una's strategy. \square

We call a strategy for Ian with the property in the lemma above *U-indifferent*. A strategy is U-indifferent if the probabilities (given Una's information) that the system is in state S_1 and Ian plays 1 and that the system is in state S_0 and Ian plays 0 are equal. This probability is then the expected one-step gain for Ian. In fact, σ^* is the greedy U-indifferent strategy: the expected one-step gain is $\min(\theta, 1 - \theta)$ as shown above. On the other hand, if Ian is playing any strategy and Una's belief that the system is in state S_1 is θ , then the minimum of the probabilities that the system is in state S_1 and Ian plays 1 and that the system is in state S_0 and Ian plays 0 is at most $\min(\theta, 1 - \theta)$. Hence Una can ensure that Ian's expected one-step gain is at most $\min(\theta, 1 - \theta)$. This quantity is maximized by σ^* .

Consider the evolution of Una's beliefs. In all stages after the first, these belong to the set $\bigcup_{n \geq 0} \Phi^n\{p, 1-p\}$. Notice that the values of $f_0(x)$ and $f_1(x)$ depend on p , but we suppress the dependence on p from the notation since p is fixed. Since for $x \geq \frac{1}{2}$, we have $f_0(1-x) = 1 - f_1(x)$, we have $\Phi^n(1-p) = 1 - \Phi^n(p)$ for all n .

When $\theta \geq \frac{1}{2}$, the belief returns to p when the system is in state S_1 and Ian plays 1. If $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$ and the system is in state S_0 (i.e. there is a mismatch between Una's belief and the state of the system), Ian never selects 1. When $\theta \leq \frac{1}{2}$, the belief returns to $1-p$ when the system is in state S_0 and Ian selects 0.

We view this as a ladder (see Figure 3) with base $\{p, 1-p\}$ and rungs $\{p_n, 1-p_n\}$, for $n \geq 1$, on which the belief follows a Markov chain: at each step, one either ascends one level, or falls down to the base. Falling off corresponds to making the choice that returns the state to p or $1-p$.

Lemma 5. *If Ian plays strategy σ^* , then his long-term expected gain is equal to the proportion of time spent at the base of the ladder, irrespective of the strategy played by Una.*




FIGURE 3. Una's belief that the system is in state S_1 can be modeled by a ladder: if Ian plays 0 while $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$; or 1 while $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$, then the belief becomes $1 - p$ or p respectively, corresponding to the bottom rung of the ladder. Note that the n th rung of the ladder corresponds both to $\Phi^n(p)$ and $\Phi^n(1 - p)$

We can therefore deduce an explicit lower bound (in the form of an infinite sum) for the value of the game as a function of the parameter p .

Proof. Consider the evolution of Una's beliefs. These always belong to the set $\bigcup_{n \geq 0} \Phi^n\{p, 1 - p\}$.

Recall from Lemma 4 that if Una's belief is θ , the one-step expected payoff for Ian is given by $\min(\theta, 1 - \theta)$ independently of the strategy played by Una.

On the other hand, the probability of returning to p or $1 - p$ from θ or $1 - \theta$ is also $\min(\theta, 1 - \theta)$. We verify this in the case $\theta \geq \frac{1}{2}$. The belief returns to p only if the system is in state S_1 and Ian selects 1. The probability of this is $1 - \theta = \min(\theta, 1 - \theta)$ as required.

Hence from the n th rung of the ladder, the probability of falling off is $\min(\Phi^n(p), 1 - \Phi^n(p))$. This is the same as the expected payoff from that state. That is, in any position, the expected payoff from the next turn is equal to the probability of falling off the ladder at the next turn. We let $u_n = \max(\Phi^n(p), 1 - \Phi^n(p))$ be the complementary probability: the probability of continuing up the ladder from the n th stage.

One can check that for this Markov chain, the stationary distribution gives level n probability

$$\pi_n = \frac{u_0 \dots u_{n-1}}{1 + u_0 + u_0 u_1 + u_0 u_1 u_2 + \dots}.$$

We do not specify any initial measure, but the renewal structure of the chain shows that on the long term the gain is described by the invariant measure, independently of the initial conditions: after a random but finite amount of time, Ian will play so that θ becomes p (or $1 - p$).

Since in any state, the expected gain is the same as the probability of ‘falling off the ladder’, we see that the expected gain per round for Ian if he plays σ^* is given by

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 + u_0 + u_0 u_1 + u_0 u_1 u_2 + \dots},$$

irrespective of Una’s strategy, where we recall that the quantities $(u_i)_{i \geq 0}$ are functions of p . We observe that this expression was already derived in [4]. \square

This Y is a lower bound for the value of the game. We give an alternative expression for Y in terms of a sum of matrix products. This is not strictly necessary for what follows, but it is here as we think it will help the reader gain a better understanding. This expression should be compared with the expression that arises later for $1/v$ (v being the value of the game in some ranges of p).

We will write $p_n = \Phi^n(p)$ as a quotient of two polynomials in p : $p_n = a_n/b_n$, so that $p_0 = p/1$. Also write $\epsilon_n = 1$ if $p_n \geq \frac{1}{2}$ and 0 otherwise.

If $\epsilon_n = 1$, we have $p_{n+1} = f_0(p_n)$, while if $\epsilon_n = 0$, we have $p_{n+1} = f_1(p_n)$.

If $\epsilon_n = 1$, we have $u_n = p_n = a_n/b_n$ and

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{a_{n+1}}{b_{n+1}} &= f_0(a_n/b_n) = \frac{p(2a_n - b_n)/b_n + (1 - p)(b_n - a_n)/b_n}{a_n/b_n} \\ &= \frac{a_n(3p - 1) - b_n(2p - 1)}{1a_n + 0b_n}. \end{aligned}$$

Similarly if $\epsilon_n = 0$, we have $u_n = 1 - p_n = (b_n - a_n)/b_n$ and

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{a_{n+1}}{b_{n+1}} &= f_1(a_n/b_n) = \frac{pa_n/b_n + (1 - p)(b_n - 2a_n)/b_n}{(b_n - a_n)/b_n} \\ &= \frac{(3p - 2)a_n + (1 - p)b_n}{-a_n + b_n}. \end{aligned}$$

In both cases, we see that $u_n = b_{n+1}/b_n$. Introducing matrices $U_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 3p-1 & -(2p-1) \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$ and $U_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 3p-2 & 1-p \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix}$, we have

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_{n+1} \\ b_{n+1} \end{pmatrix} = U_{\epsilon_n} \begin{pmatrix} a_n \\ b_n \end{pmatrix}.$$

Now, taking the product of the u_n 's, we obtain *par télescope* $u_0 \cdots u_n = b_{n+1}/b_0 = b_{n+1}$. Hence we get the expression

$$u_0 u_1 \cdots u_n = b_{n+1} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} U_{\epsilon_n} \cdots U_{\epsilon_0} \begin{pmatrix} p \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Summing over n , we obtain another expression for the average long-term gain that will accrue to Ian if he plays σ^* .

$$(2) \quad \frac{1}{Y} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \end{pmatrix} (I + U_{\epsilon_0} + U_{\epsilon_1} U_{\epsilon_0} + U_{\epsilon_2} U_{\epsilon_1} U_{\epsilon_0} + \cdots) \begin{pmatrix} p \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$$

3. STRATEGIES FOR UNA

In [4], the authors showed that σ^* is optimal for $p \in [\frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}]$ and for a specific $p^* \approx 0.7589$ that is the unique value of p for which $p_1 > \frac{1}{2}$ and $p_1 = 1 - p_2$. In both cases, they exhibit a strategy for Una based on a finite state automaton where transitions in the automaton are governed by actions of Ian and then show that σ^* is a best response to this strategy. For $p > \frac{2}{3}$, we are going to proceed along the same lines, except that strategies for Una will be based on a countable state automaton rather than a finite one. The states of the automaton are labeled by Una's belief that the system is in state 1 *under the assumption that Ian is playing σ^** . In this section, we identify strategies for Una that are candidates for this purpose. The proof that they have the correct property (that σ^* is a best response to the strategies τ_p that we construct) is in the next two sections.

As follows from Lemma 4, any strategy of Una is a best response to σ^* .

In the case $\frac{1}{2} \leq p \leq \frac{2}{3}$, one can check that the range of f_0 is in $[1-p, \frac{1}{2}]$, while the range of f_1 is in $[\frac{1}{2}, p]$. Thus if Ian is playing σ^* , his last move is sufficient to determine whether Una believes that it is more likely that the system is in state S_1 or S_0 . The strategy τ^* proposed for Una is a mixed strategy, playing 1 with probability $(2p-1)/(4p-1)$ and 0 with probability $2p/(4p-1)$ if $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$ and with the reverse probabilities otherwise (see Figure 4). In [4], it is proved that σ^* is a best response to τ^* hence (σ^*, τ^*) is a Nash equilibrium.




FIGURE 4. For $p < \frac{2}{3}$, Una's automaton has two states, capturing whether she believes it's more likely the system is in S_1 or S_0 . Whether $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$ or $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$ (but not the actual value of the belief) depends solely on Ian's last move.




FIGURE 5. For $p = p^*$, there are exactly 4 values of the Una's belief that may be attained starting from $\theta = \frac{1}{2}$. Una's automaton has 4 states, one for each value of the Una's belief. Transitions between states are completely determined by Ian's moves.

In the case $p = p^*$, if Ian is playing σ^* , it turns out there are only 4 possible values attained by Una's belief that the system is in state S_1 . Namely, we have $1 - p < f_1(1 - p) < f_0(p) < p$ and f_1 maps $1 - p$, $f_1(1 - p)$, $f_0(p)$ and p to $f_1(1 - p)$, $f_0(p)$, p and p respectively. Similarly f_0 maps $1 - p$, $f_1(1 - p)$, $f_0(p)$ and p to $1 - p$, $1 - p$, $f_1(1 - p)$ and $f_0(p)$ respectively. [4] shows that σ^* is a best response to a strategy τ^{**} (and hence an equilibrium strategy), given by a four state automaton corresponding to these four values of θ together with rules corresponding to the above: if Ian plays 1, then the automaton moves one step to the right; if Ian plays 0, then the automaton moves one step to the left (see Figure 5). In each state of the automaton, there is an associated probability distribution on Una's choice of 0 or 1, which they exhibit explicitly.

Our results are based on exhibiting strategies for Una for which she plays 0 and 1 with non-zero probabilities that depend solely on her belief that the system is in state S_1 (assuming that Ian is playing σ^*). Since Una's beliefs evolve in a manner that only depends on Ian's actions, we may once again describe her strategy by an automaton. The principal differences are: (1) the automaton generally has a countable number of states; and (2) the entire structure of the automaton depends on p . An example of such an automaton is shown in Figure 6.

The pattern of arrows is completely determined by p . The description of the strategy will be complete once we specify for each state, the probability of playing 1. Recall that the states are labelled by $(p_n)_{n \geq 0}$ and $(1 - p_n)_{n \geq 0}$. If the automaton is in state θ , we will define $x(\theta)$ to




FIGURE 6. Una's automaton for $p = 0.72$. The states on the left of the diagram are those where the belief of Una is p or $1 - p$. Each state corresponds to a value of θ . Those in the upper half of the diagram are those where Una believes it is more likely the system is in state S_1 . If a state θ is in the upper half, its mirror image in the lower half is $1 - \theta$. For states in the upper half of the diagram, if Ian plays 1, the state returns to $p_0 = p$, while if Ian plays 0, the state advances to the right. In the lower half of the diagram, if Ian plays 0, the state returns to $1 - p$, while it advances if Ian plays 1. The pattern of which arrows switch sides and which continue depends on p .

be the probability that Una chooses 1. In this case, we will say that $(x(\theta))_{\theta \in [1-p, p]}$ is the strategy that Una is playing.

As mentioned above, to show that σ^* is optimal, it suffices to find a strategy $x(\theta)$, to which σ^* is the best response. We therefore suppose that a particular strategy $x(\theta)$ has been selected by Una, and we ask whether σ^* is a best response for Ian. We will show that for certain p , we can exhibit an $x(\theta)$, solving the equations (1) for Ian.

The state space that we use for Ian will consist of a pair (θ, s) , where θ is Una's belief that the system is in state S_1 and $s \in \{S_0, S_1\}$ is the state of the system. We define $(x(\theta))_{\theta \in [0, 1]}$ recursively and give sufficient conditions for it to define a strategy for Una to which σ^* is a best response. For the time being, we restrict attention to the case $\Phi^n(p) \neq \frac{1}{2}$ for all n . This excludes countably many values of p . We set $\gamma = 2p - 1$ since this is a quantity that occurs frequently.

Let $A_0 = \begin{pmatrix} \gamma & -\gamma \\ 1-p & p \end{pmatrix}$, $A_1 = \begin{pmatrix} p & 1-p \\ -\gamma & \gamma \end{pmatrix}$, $b_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$ and $b_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$. Let $\epsilon(\theta) = 1$ if $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$ and 0 if $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$. For $\theta \in [0, 1]$, let $\eta_n(\theta) = \epsilon(\Phi^n(\theta))$.

Let $\iota_n = \eta_n(p)$. Define \vec{w} by

$$\vec{w} = (I + A_{\iota_0} + A_{\iota_0}A_{\iota_1} + \dots) \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}.$$

Define quantities v and Z (both depending on p) by

$$(3) \quad \begin{aligned} v &= 1/(pw_1 + (1-p)w_2) \\ Z &= (w_1 - w_2)v/2. \end{aligned}$$

Proposition 6. *Let $\frac{1}{2} < p < \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{3}}{6} \approx 0.789$. Suppose that $\Phi^n(p) \neq \frac{1}{2}$ for each n and let v and Z be as above. There is a unique solution to the equations*

$$(4) \quad \begin{aligned} \begin{pmatrix} V_1(\theta) \\ V_0(\theta) \end{pmatrix} &= A_{\epsilon(\theta)} \begin{pmatrix} V_1(\Phi(\theta)) \\ V_0(\Phi(\theta)) \end{pmatrix} - v \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} + (1 - \gamma Z)b_{\epsilon(\theta)} \text{ for } \theta \neq \frac{1}{2}; \\ V_1(\frac{1}{2}) &= V_0(\frac{1}{2}) = \frac{1}{2} - v - \gamma Z. \end{aligned}$$

Define $x(\theta)$ by

$$(5) \quad x(\theta) = \begin{cases} V_1(\theta) + v + \gamma Z & \text{if } \theta > \frac{1}{2}; \\ 1 - (V_0(\theta) + v + \gamma Z) & \text{if } \theta < \frac{1}{2}; \\ \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } \theta = \frac{1}{2}, \end{cases}$$

Suppose that the following inequalities are satisfied.

$$(6) \quad \begin{aligned} V_1(\theta) &\geq \gamma Z - v \text{ for } \theta < \frac{1}{2} \\ 4\gamma Z &\leq 1, \\ -\gamma Z - v &\leq V_1(\theta) \leq 1 - \gamma Z - v \text{ for } \theta > \frac{1}{2}. \end{aligned}$$

Then $0 \leq x(\theta) \leq 1$ for all θ . If τ is the strategy where Una plays 1 with probability $x(\theta)$ if her belief that the system is in state S_1 is θ , then σ^* is a best response to τ and the value of the game is v .

Proof. One can check that for $p < \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{3}}{6}$ that the matrices A_0 and A_1 are strict contractions (with respect to the Euclidean norm). Define the Banach space, $B = B([0, 1], \mathbb{R}^2)$, of bounded \mathbb{R}^2 -valued functions on $[0, 1]$ with norm given by $\|X\| = \sup_{\theta \in [0, 1]} |X(\theta)|$.

We then define an operator, \mathcal{L} , on B by

$$(7) \quad \mathcal{L}X(\theta) = \begin{cases} A_{\epsilon(\theta)}X(\Phi(\theta)) - v \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} + (1 - \gamma Z)b_{\epsilon(\theta)} & \text{if } \theta \neq \frac{1}{2}; \\ \begin{pmatrix} \frac{1}{2} - v - \gamma Z \\ \frac{1}{2} - v - \gamma Z \end{pmatrix} & \text{if } \theta = \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$

One sees that \mathcal{L} is a contraction of B , and therefore has a unique fixed point, $X^*(\theta) = \begin{pmatrix} V_1(\theta) \\ V_0(\theta) \end{pmatrix}$. This establishes the first claim.

We now show that $V_1(p) = V_0(1-p) = -Z$ and $V_0(p) = V_1(1-p) = Z$. Since one has $\Phi(1-x) = 1 - \Phi(x)$ one sees that if $\begin{pmatrix} V_1(\theta) \\ V_0(\theta) \end{pmatrix}$ is a solution to (4), then so is $\begin{pmatrix} V_0(1-\theta) \\ V_1(1-\theta) \end{pmatrix}$. Hence, by uniqueness, $V_1(\theta) = V_0(1-\theta)$. It follows that $x(1-\theta) = 1-x(\theta)$.

By iterating (4) and using the fact that the A_e are contracting, one obtains

$$\begin{pmatrix} V_1(p) \\ V_0(p) \end{pmatrix} = -v(I + A_{\iota_0} + A_{\iota_0}A_{\iota_1} + \dots) \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \\ + (1 - \gamma Z)(b_{\iota_0} + A_{\iota_0}b_{\iota_1} + A_{\iota_0}A_{\iota_1}b_{\iota_2} + \dots)$$

If one defines $\psi_i(x) = b_i + A_i x$, then the term in the last parentheses is $\lim_{n \rightarrow \infty} \psi_{\iota_0} \psi_{\iota_1} \dots \psi_{\iota_n} \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}$. Since the ψ_i are contracting and have a common fixed point of $\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$, we deduce this term is exactly this fixed point. Hence we have

$$\begin{pmatrix} V_1(p) \\ V_0(p) \end{pmatrix} = -v\vec{w} + (1 - \gamma Z) \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix},$$

so that $V_1(p) = -vw_1 + (1 - \gamma Z) = -Z$ and $V_0(p) = -vw_2 + (1 - \gamma Z) = Z$ and then $V_0(1-p)$ and $V_1(1-p)$ are $-Z$ and Z respectively by the symmetry.

Now define $x(\theta)$ using (5) and assume the inequalities (6) are satisfied. The final pair of inequalities of (6) ensures that $0 \leq x(\theta) \leq 1$ for each $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$. By the symmetry, one obtains $0 \leq x(\theta) \leq 1$ for each θ as required.

Let τ be the strategy for Una where if her belief is θ , she plays 1 with probability $x(\theta)$. Then define $V(s, \theta)$ to be $V_1(\theta)$ if $s = S_1$ and $V_0(\theta)$ if $s = S_0$. We show that σ^* is a best response to τ with average long-term gain v .

For (1) to be satisfied, if $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$ and the system is in state S_1 , Ian should receive equal long-term gain from playing either move (as he makes both with positive probability) whereas in state S_0 , he should make a larger gain by playing 0. In other words, to satisfy (1) if $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$, we require:

$$\begin{aligned} V_1(\theta) + v &= x(\theta) + pV_1(p) + (1-p)V_0(p) \\ &= pV_1(f_0(\theta)) + (1-p)V_0(f_0(\theta)) \\ V_0(\theta) + v &= 1 - x(\theta) + (1-p)V_1(f_0(\theta)) + pV_0(f_0(\theta)) \\ &\geq (1-p)V_1(p) + pV_0(p), \end{aligned}$$

with similar requirements when $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$.

Substituting the values for V_1 and V_0 at p and $1 - p$, these requirements are for $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (8) \quad & V_1(\theta) + v = x(\theta) - \gamma Z \\
 & = pV_1(f_0(\theta)) + (1 - p)V_0(f_0(\theta)) \\
 & V_0(\theta) + v = 1 - x(\theta) + (1 - p)V_1(f_0(\theta)) + pV_0(f_0(\theta)) \\
 & \geq \gamma Z,
 \end{aligned}$$

again with similar requirements when $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$.

The first equality of (8) is satisfied by definition of $x(\theta)$ and the second is the first component of (4). For the third equality, notice that by using the first two equalities one has $1 - x(\theta) = 1 - pV_1(\Phi(\theta)) - (1 - p)V_0(\Phi(\theta)) - \gamma Z$. Now, the second component of (4) gives $V_0(\theta) + v = (1 - 2p)V_1(\Phi(\theta)) + (2p - 1)V_0(\Phi(\theta)) + 1 - \gamma Z$. Combining these, we obtain the third equality of (8). Finally the hypothesis that $V_1(\theta) \geq -\gamma Z - v$ together with the symmetry yields $V_0(\theta) + v \geq -\gamma Z$ giving the required inequality in (8). \square

Notice that by (3) and Proposition 6, we now have a second, apparently independent equation for the long-term average gain, v , (whenever the conditions of the proposition are satisfied). We verify that the expressions are equal as this reveals useful identities.

Starting from this second expression, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 1/v &= (p \quad 1 - p) (I + A_{\epsilon_0} + A_{\epsilon_0}A_{\epsilon_1} + A_{\epsilon_0}A_{\epsilon_1}A_{\epsilon_2} + \dots) \begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} \\
 &= (1 \quad 1) (I + A_{\epsilon_0}^T + A_{\epsilon_1}^T A_{\epsilon_0}^T + A_{\epsilon_2}^T A_{\epsilon_1}^T A_{\epsilon_0}^T + \dots) \begin{pmatrix} p \\ 1 - p \end{pmatrix}
 \end{aligned}$$

Notice that

$$\begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} A_{\epsilon}^T \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} = U_{\epsilon},$$

for $\epsilon \in \{0, 1\}$.

Accordingly, we can rewrite the expression for $1/v$ as

$$\begin{aligned}
 & (1 \quad 1) \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ -1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} (I + U_{\epsilon_0} + U_{\epsilon_1}U_{\epsilon_0} + U_{\epsilon_2}U_{\epsilon_1}U_{\epsilon_0} + \dots) \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 1 & 1 \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} p \\ 1 - p \end{pmatrix} \\
 &= (0 \quad 1) (I + U_{\epsilon_0} + U_{\epsilon_1}U_{\epsilon_0} + U_{\epsilon_2}U_{\epsilon_1}U_{\epsilon_0} + \dots) \begin{pmatrix} p \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}.
 \end{aligned}$$

This expression matches the one that we found in (2).




FIGURE 7. The graphs of $\theta \mapsto x(\theta)$ for values of p ranging from $p = 0.6625$ to $p = 0.7325$ in steps of 0.01.

4. CONDITIONS FOR MONOTONICITY

To prove that the inequalities (6) are satisfied (in a range of values of p) we are going to show that V_1 (and V_0) are monotonic, and we control the boundary values. For convenience, we work in this section with a dynamical system α derived from Φ , namely $\alpha(t) = \max(\Phi(t), 1 - \Phi(t))$. This exploits the symmetry of Φ (that $\Phi(1 - t) = 1 - \Phi(t)$) and chooses the representative of each t in the interval $[\frac{1}{2}, 1]$. In this section, we show that the monotonicity conditions follow from a *pressure* condition for a given potential for the dynamical system α . We write $\alpha^n(t)$ for the n -fold iterate of the map α . It is easy to verify that $\alpha^n(t) = \max(\Phi^n(t), 1 - \Phi^n(t))$, where Φ^n similarly denotes the n -fold iterate of Φ .

Given a parameter p and a function g on $[\frac{1}{2}, 1]$, we define the α -*pressure* of g to be

$$P_{\alpha_p}(g) := \limsup_{n \rightarrow \infty} \frac{1}{n} \log \sum_{x \in \alpha^{-n}(\frac{1}{2})} \exp \left(\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} g(\alpha^i x) \right).$$

Pressure, introduced by Ruelle in [8], is a dynamical analogue of the partition function in statistical mechanics. Its value is a combination of the long-term average value along orbits of g with the complexity of α_p . The definition here is not equivalent to Ruelle's. Notice that $P_{\alpha_p}(0)$ simply counts the growth rate of the number of pre-images of $\frac{1}{2}$. Since α^n is a piecewise monotonic function where the direction of monotonicity changes at x exactly when $\alpha^j(x) = \frac{1}{2}$ for some $j \leq n$, $P_{\alpha_p}(0)$ is precisely the logarithmic growth rate of the number of intervals of monotonicity of α^n . This quantity was shown by Misiurewicz and Szlenk [5] and by Young [9] to be equal to the *topological entropy* of α_p (which is also equal to Ruelle's pressure evaluated at $g \equiv 0$). Topological entropy is a standard measure of complexity for a continuous dynamical system.

We will need the following simple result independent of our specific context:

Lemma 7. *Let (a_k) be a sequence in $[0, 1]$ with $a_k \neq a_{k'}$ for all $k \neq k'$ and let (b_k) be a summable sequence of non-negative numbers. Suppose that (f_n) is a sequence of real-valued functions defined on $[0, 1]$, each of pure jump type. Suppose further that the only discontinuities of (f_n) occur at the a_k 's and that $|\Delta f_n(a_k)| \leq b_k$ for each k and n , where $\Delta f(x) = \lim_{t \downarrow x} f(t) - \lim_{t \uparrow x} f(t)$. If $\|f_n - f\|_\infty \rightarrow 0$, then f is of pure jump type with discontinuities only at the a_k 's. The magnitude of the discontinuity of f at a_k is bounded above by b_k .*

Proof. Denote Vf the total variation of f :

$$Vf = \sup_m \sup_{0=x_0 \leq x_1 \leq \dots \leq x_m=1} \sum_{i=1}^m |f(x_i) - f(x_{i-1})|.$$

Let $V_I f$ be the variation of f on the interval I .

For any $0 = x_0 \leq \dots \leq x_m = 1$, notice that $\sum_{i=1}^m |f_n(x_i) - f_n(x_{i-1})| \rightarrow \sum_{i=1}^m |f(x_i) - f(x_{i-1})|$. Hence since the left side is uniformly bounded by $\sum_k b_k$ for all n and for all $0 = x_0 \leq \dots \leq x_m = 1$, we deduce that f has bounded variation.

Hence it has a unique (up to additive constants) Lebesgue decomposition as a sum $f_c + f_d$ where f_c is continuous and f_d has only jump-type discontinuities. It is known that $Vf = Vf_c + Vf_d$. For any $\epsilon > 0$, there exists a K such that $\sum_{k \geq K} b_k < \epsilon$. Letting I_1, \dots, I_M be any disjoint collection of intervals avoiding the a_k 's with $k < K$, we see that $\sum_{i=1}^M V_{I_i} f < \epsilon$. In particular, we deduce $Vf_c < \epsilon$ for arbitrary ϵ so that f has pure jump type. We also deduce that f_d cannot have any jump discontinuities other than at the a_k 's and the result is proven. \square

Proposition 8. *Let $\frac{1}{2} < p < \frac{1}{2} + \frac{\sqrt{3}}{6}$ be such that $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$ (where $h(t) = \gamma/t$ and γ , as before, is defined to be $2p-1$). Then the conditions (6) of Proposition 6 are satisfied. Hence σ^* is an optimal strategy for Ian for the game with this value of p .*

Proof. First, assume that p is such that $\Phi^n(p) \neq \frac{1}{2}$ for all n as this is a hypothesis for Proposition 6. Let $X^0(\theta) = \begin{pmatrix} -\gamma Z \\ -\gamma Z \end{pmatrix}$ and set $X^n = \mathcal{L}^n(X_0)$. Since \mathcal{L} is a contraction mapping, we have $\|X^n - X^*\| \rightarrow 0$, where $X^*(\theta) = \begin{pmatrix} V_1(\theta) \\ V_0(\theta) \end{pmatrix}$ is the fixed point of \mathcal{L} from Proposition 6. Notice that \mathcal{L} preserves the set of functions $\left\{ \begin{pmatrix} f_1(\theta) \\ f_2(\theta) \end{pmatrix} : f_2(\theta) = f_1(1 - \theta) \right\}$.

From the contraction mapping theorem, there exists $M > 0$ such that $|\Delta X^n(\frac{1}{2})| \leq M$ for all n . From (7), we observe that for $\theta \neq \frac{1}{2}$,

$$(9) \quad \Delta X^n(\theta) = A_{\epsilon(\theta)} \Delta X^{n-1}(\Phi(\theta)).$$

Notice that X^n only has discontinuities at pre-images of $\frac{1}{2}$ of order at most n and is piecewise constant between discontinuities. We now show that if $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$, then the conditions of Lemma 7 are satisfied by the components of $X^n(\theta)$ and that $V_1(\theta)$ and $V_0(\theta)$ are monotonically decreasing and increasing respectively.

Suppose that $\theta > \frac{1}{2}$. Then we have $\Phi(\theta) = f_0(\theta) = (3p - 1) - \gamma/\theta$ and we calculate

$$A_1 \begin{pmatrix} \Phi(\theta) - 1 \\ \Phi(\theta) \end{pmatrix} = \frac{\gamma}{\theta} \begin{pmatrix} \theta - 1 \\ \theta \end{pmatrix}.$$

Similarly, if $\theta < \frac{1}{2}$, we have

$$A_0 \begin{pmatrix} \Phi(\theta) - 1 \\ \Phi(\theta) \end{pmatrix} = \frac{\gamma}{1 - \theta} \begin{pmatrix} \theta - 1 \\ \theta \end{pmatrix}.$$

If $t \in \Phi^{-n}(\frac{1}{2})$, let $\theta_i = \Phi^{n-i}(t)$ (so that $\theta_0 = \frac{1}{2}$ and $\theta_n = t$) and let $\epsilon_i = \epsilon(\theta_i)$ and $u = \max(t, 1 - t)$. The above shows

$$A_{\epsilon_i} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_{i-1} - 1 \\ \theta_{i-1} \end{pmatrix} = \frac{\gamma}{\max(\theta_i, 1 - \theta_i)} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_i - 1 \\ \theta_i \end{pmatrix}.$$

Combining these equalities gives

$$(10) \quad A_{\epsilon_n} \cdots A_{\epsilon_1} \begin{pmatrix} -\frac{1}{2} \\ \frac{1}{2} \end{pmatrix} = \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{\gamma}{\max(\theta_i, 1 - \theta_i)} \begin{pmatrix} \theta_n - 1 \\ \theta_n \end{pmatrix}.$$

Using (9), we see that for $m > n$, one has

$$\Delta X^m(t) = A_{\epsilon_n} \cdots A_{\epsilon_1} \Delta X_{m^n}(\frac{1}{2})$$

By symmetry, we see that $\Delta X^k(\frac{1}{2})$ is a multiple of $\begin{pmatrix} -1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}$ for all k . Since $1 - p \leq t \leq p$, one obtains

$$|\Delta X^m(t)| \leq C \prod_{i=1}^n \frac{\gamma}{\max(\theta_i, 1 - \theta_i)},$$

where C does not depend on t , m or n . This can be re-expressed in terms of α by $|\Delta X^m(t)| \leq C \prod_{i=1}^n (\gamma/\alpha^i(u))$ for all m , where $u = \max(t, 1 - t)$ satisfies $\alpha^n(u) = \frac{1}{2}$. Hence we see the hypothesis, $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$, ensures that the conditions for Lemma 7 are satisfied. Hence V_1 and V_0 of pure jump type.

The jumps satisfy $\Delta X^*(\theta) = A_{\epsilon(\theta)} \Delta X^*(\Phi(\theta))$. By (10), they are all of the same sign. Now provided the pressure is negative and p is not a pre-image of $\frac{1}{2}$, we check using (4) that $V_1(\frac{1}{2}^+) = \gamma Z - v$, $V_1(\frac{1}{2}^-) = 1 - 3\gamma Z - v$ so that $\Delta V_1(\frac{1}{2}) = 4\gamma Z - 1$. On the other hand, the total of all discontinuities (all of the same sign) is $-2Z$. In order for these to have the same sign, one sees that $Z > 0$ and $4\gamma Z < 1$. The function $V_1(\theta)$ is therefore a decreasing function.

Now to check (6), it suffices to show that $V_1(\frac{1}{2}^-) \geq \gamma Z - v$, $V_1(\frac{1}{2}^+) \leq 1 - \gamma Z - v$ and $V_1(p) \geq -\gamma Z - v$. The first two of these follow from the fact that $Z > 0$ and $4\gamma Z < 1$. To verify the last inequality, we note that the above contraction argument works outside the range $[1 - p, p]$,

so that V_1 is monotonic on all of $[0, 1]$. Since $\Phi(1) = p$, we apply (4) to see that $V_1(1) = -\gamma Z - v$, so that the third inequality is satisfied by monotonicity.

In the case where p is a preimage of $\frac{1}{2}$, the above expressions for $V_1(\frac{1}{2}^+)$ and $V_1(\frac{1}{2}^-)$ are no longer valid as V_1 and V_0 are discontinuous at $1 - p$ and p . The essential modification is to show that $V_1(\frac{1}{2}^+) - V_1(\frac{1}{2}) = V_1(\frac{1}{2}) - V_1(\frac{1}{2}^-)$. The matrix equalities (4) then ensure that at each $x \in \bigcup_n \Phi^{-n}(\frac{1}{2})$, one has that $V_1(x)$ is the average of $V_1(x^-)$ and $V_1(x^+)$ (and similarly for V_0). For a fixed p , this allows us to deduce monotonicity and verify inequalities on entire intervals of θ values by checking the inequalities at a finite collection of points as before. \square

5. PRESSURE BOUNDS

In this section, we find ranges of p where $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$ is satisfied (so that σ^* is an optimal strategy for Ian). Indeed if $p \in [\frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}]$, then $\alpha^{-n}(\frac{1}{2})$ is empty, so that trivially $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$.

Henceforth, we assume $p > \frac{2}{3}$. Notice that $\Phi(t) < \frac{1}{2}$ if and only if $t < \frac{2}{3}$. The map α can therefore be expressed as:

$$\alpha(t) = \begin{cases} 2 - 3p + \gamma/t & \text{if } t < \frac{2}{3}; \\ 3p - 1 - \gamma/t & \text{if } t \geq \frac{2}{3}. \end{cases}$$

This map is unimodal: monotone decreasing on the left branch and increasing on the right branch with $\alpha([\frac{1}{2}, \frac{2}{3}]) = \alpha([\frac{2}{3}, 1]) = [\frac{1}{2}, p]$. We write $h^{(n)}(t) = h(t) \cdot h(\alpha(t)) \cdots h(\alpha^{n-1}(t))$.

We partition $[\frac{1}{2}, p]$ into sub-intervals, counting possible transitions between pairs of intervals, and over-estimating ψ on the intervals to give a rigorous, finitely-calculable estimate for the pressure in various ranges of p .

It turns out that for p in the range $[\frac{2}{3}, p^*]$ (where $p^* \approx 0.7589$ is the special p -value identified by Hörner, Rosenberg, Solan and Vieille in [4]), the map α is *renormalizable*. That is, there are disjoint intervals I_1 and I_2 with I_1 containing the critical point such that $\alpha(I_1) \subset I_2$ and $\alpha(I_2) \subset I_1$. Since $\alpha|_{I_2}$ is monotonic, we see that the *renormalized map*, $\alpha^2: I_1 \rightarrow I_1$, is a unimodal map. If α is renormalizable, then $I_1 \cup I_2$ is an absorbing set. Points outside $I_1 \cup I_2$ either eventually land in $I_1 \cup I_2$ under iteration or converge to fixed points so that all of the ‘interesting dynamics’ lies in $I_1 \cup I_2$. When a map is renormalizable, it decreases the growth rate of the number of iterated preimages lying in $I_1 \cup I_2$: an element of I_1 has at most one preimage in I_2 and an




FIGURE 8. The graph of $\alpha(x)$ (in black) for $p = 0.73$. The graphs of $\alpha^2(x)$ (dashed) and x are superimposed to illustrate the renormalization. The squares illustrate the fact that α^2 maps I_1 and I_2 to themselves.

element of I_2 has at most two preimages in I_1 , so that for $x \in I_1 \cup I_2$, $|\alpha^{-n}(x) \cap (I_1 \cup I_2)| \leq 2^{\lceil n/2 \rceil}$. The renormalization is illustrated for $p = 0.73$ in Figure 8.

To see that α_p is renormalizable for $p \in [\frac{2}{3}, p^*]$, let $p_i = \alpha^i(p)$ (so that $p_0 = p$). One can check that for $p \in [\frac{2}{3}, p^*]$,

$$(11) \quad \begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{2} < p_3 < p_1 < p_2 < \frac{2}{3} < p; \\ & \alpha([\frac{1}{2}, p_1]) = [p_2, p] \text{ and } \alpha([p_2, p]) = [\frac{1}{2}, p_1], \end{aligned}$$

establishing the (one-time) renormalizability. At the endpoint p^* of the range of p -values that we are considering, one has $p_2 = p_1$ and hence $p_n = p_1$ for all $n \geq 1$.

It may happen that the renormalized map is itself renormalizable. This is the case for $p < 0.709637$ and is illustrated in Figure 12. See Devaney's book [2] for more information about renormalization of unimodal maps and the relationship between interval maps and symbolic dynamics.

Proposition 9. *Let α be a continuous piecewise monotonic map of $I = [\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ and let g be a continuous on I . Suppose that I is partitioned into intervals J_0, \dots, J_{k-1} . Let $\beta_i = \max_{x \in J_i} h(x)$. Let the multiplicity $m_{ij} = \max_{y \in J_j} \#\{x \in J_i : \alpha(x) = y\}$. Let A be the $k \times k$ matrix with*

entries $a_{ij} = \beta_i m_{ij}$. Then

$$P_\alpha(\log h) \leq \log \rho(A),$$

where $\rho(A)$ denotes the spectral radius (i.e. maximal eigenvalue) of A .

Proof. Notice that there are at most $m_{i_0 i_1} m_{i_1 i_2} \dots m_{i_{n-1} i_n}$ n th order preimages x of a point y in J_{i_n} with the property that $\alpha^t(x) \in J_{i_t}$ for each $0 \leq t < n$. For each such preimage, the largest possible contribution to the sum is $\beta_{i_0} \dots \beta_{i_{n-1}}$, so that we see

$$\sum_{t \in \alpha_p^{-n}(\frac{1}{2})} h^{(n)}(t) \leq \sum_i (A^n)_{ij},$$

where j is the index of the interval containing $\frac{1}{2}$. Taking logarithms and dividing by n , the result follows. \square

For a fixed p and any partition of $[\frac{1}{2}, 1]$ into intervals, one can calculate the matrix A so that this proposition gives an upper bound for $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h)$. Hence in order to establish that $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$, it suffices to exhibit *some* finite partition such that the corresponding matrix A has spectral radius less than 1.

In fact, when dealing with α_p , the interval $[p, 1]$ plays no role in the pressure computation as points in this interval have no preimages. It therefore suffices to partition the interval $[\frac{1}{2}, p]$. A natural choice of intervals J_0, \dots, J_{k-1} is obtained by taking the points $\frac{1}{2}$ and $(\alpha^i(p))_{i=0}^{k-1}$ in increasing order as the endpoints of intervals. The reason this choice is a good one is that the endpoints of each of these intervals (except $\alpha^{k-1}(p)$) are mapped exactly into each other, so that for most pairs i and j , each point in J_j has *exactly* m_{ij} preimages in J_i , making the estimates reasonably tight. If p is fixed, one obtains in this way for each k a $k \times k$ matrix, $A_k(p)$, such that if its spectral radius is less than 1, then $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$ and hence σ^* is an optimal strategy for Ian. This gives a family (C_k) of sufficient conditions for σ^* to be optimal, namely:

(C_k) If $\rho(A_k(p)) < 1$, then σ^* is an optimal strategy for Ian.

Proposition 9 and (C_k) give a way to check that $P(\log h) < 0$ for a single p -value. We now obtain estimates on $P(\log h)$ in a range of p -values simultaneously.

5.1. The range (2/3, 0.709636). Here, and in the next range, we divide $[\frac{1}{2}, p]$ into 9 sub-intervals. In this range, we check that the following inequalities are satisfied:




FIGURE 9. The graphs of $\theta \mapsto \alpha(\theta)$ and first points of the orbit of p , for $p = 0.685, p = 0.7023 \dots, p = 0.709 \dots$ and $p = 0.719 \dots$. The renormalizability of $\theta \mapsto \alpha(\theta)$ may be seen from the fact that in each of the graphs points to the right of the fixed point are mapped to the left of the fixed point and vice versa.

$$\frac{1}{2} < p_7 < p_3 < p_5 < p_9 < p_1 < p_2 < \frac{2}{3} < p_6 < p_4 < p_8 < p.$$

We divide the interval $[\frac{1}{2}, p]$ into subintervals J_0, \dots, J_8 as follows: $J_0 = [\frac{1}{2}, p_7]$; $J_1 = [p_7, p_3]$; $J_2 = [p_3, p_5]$; $J_3 = [p_5, p_1]$; $J_4 = [p_1, p_2]$; $J_5 = [p_2, p_6]$; $J_6 = [p_6, p_4]$; $J_7 = [p_4, p_8]$; and $J_8 = [p_8, p]$.

The transitions between the intervals are shown in Figure 10.

There are three connected components, one (the interval J_4 by itself) with radius γ/p_1 , one (the intervals J_2 and J_6) with radius $\gamma/\sqrt{p_3 p_6}$. Both of these are less than 1 since $\gamma < \frac{1}{2}$. The third component is illustrated in Figure 11 and consists of two loops of period 4 sharing a common edge. The spectral radius of this component is the fourth root of the sum of the product of the multipliers around the two loops.




FIGURE 10. Full 9 interval transition diagram for $\frac{2}{3} < p < 0.709637$. The double arrow signifies that $m_{50} = 2$.




FIGURE 11. Principal component for $\frac{2}{3} < p < 0.709637$

That is, the spectral radius of this component is given by

$$\gamma \left(\frac{1}{p_5 p_2} \left(\frac{2}{\frac{1}{2} p_8} + \frac{1}{p_7 p_4} \right) \right)^{1/4}.$$

This quantity is less than 1 in the given range.

Notice that the principal component has period 4 because the original map is twice renormalizable.

5.2. The range $[0.709637, 0.719023]$. In this parameter range, the map is only once renormalizable. At 0.709636979, there is a coincidence $p_3 = p_5$ (so that all odd iterates beyond the third coincide; all even iterates beyond the fourth coincide).

The right end point of the interval, 0.7190233023, occurs when p_9 hits $\frac{1}{2}$. On the parameter interval $[0.709636979, 0.7190233023]$, the functions $p \mapsto p_i$ are monotone for each $1 \leq i \leq 9$. The graphs of the functions do not cross.

In this range, we have $\frac{1}{2} < p_9 < p_5 < p_3 < p_7 < p_1 < p_2 < \frac{2}{3} < p_8 < p_4 < p_6 < p$.

Again, we use these points (excluding p_9 and $\frac{2}{3}$) to define a collection of intervals: $J_0 = [\frac{1}{2}, p_5]$, $J_1 = [p_5, p_3]$, $J_2 = [p_3, p_7]$, $J_3 = [p_7, p_1]$,




FIGURE 12. Graphs of α (top left to bottom right) and α^4 (dashed) for $p = 0.7$. The map is twice renormalizable, so that there are intervals I_1 , I_2 , I_3 and I_4 each mapped by α to the next with I_1 containing the critical point. In particular, α^4 maps each interval to itself. This is illustrated by the boxes.




FIGURE 13. The transitions in the range $0.709637 < p < 0.719023$.

$J_4 = [p_1, p_2]$, $J_5 = [p_2, p_8]$, $J_6 = [p_8, p_4]$, $J_7 = [p_4, p_6]$ and $J_8 = [p_6, p]$. The transitions are $0 \rightarrow 8$; $1 \rightarrow 7$; $2 \rightarrow 6$; $3 \rightarrow 5$; $4 \rightarrow 2, 3, 4$; $5 \rightarrow 0, 0, 1$; $6 \rightarrow 0$; $7 \rightarrow 1, 2$; and $8 \rightarrow 3$ (where repeated transitions correspond to values of m that exceed 1).

This is illustrated in Figure 13.

The single component consisting of J_4 always has multiplier less than 1. The transition matrix of the principal component is given by

$$\gamma \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 2 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q_5 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q_3 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & q_7 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 2q_2 & q_2 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ q_8 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & q_4 & q_4 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & q_6 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{pmatrix}$$

where $q_i = 1/p_i$.

We check that q_4 , q_5 and q_8 are increasing in the parameter range, while q_3 , q_7 and q_6 are decreasing. Substituting the maximum values of each of these quantities in the range and also using the maximal value of γ , we obtain a matrix whose spectral radius is 0.9773, giving the required bound on the pressure in this range.

In principle it should be possible to extend by smaller and smaller intervals as long as the pressure remains negative. For example, the test (C_{230}) described above shows that the pressure is negative for $p = 0.7321$. Indeed applying a similar procedure to 10000 randomly chosen p -values in the range $[0.719, 0.732]$ using (C_k) with $k = 50, 100, 150, \dots, 500$ shows that $P_{\alpha_p}(\log h) < 0$ for each of them.

At this stage, we have proved that the strategy σ^* for Ian and the strategy τ for Una constructed in Proposition 6 are optimal if $\frac{2}{3} \leq p \leq 0.719023$.

We define p_c to be the supremum of the set of t such that for each p satisfying $\frac{1}{2} \leq p \leq t$, σ^* is an optimal strategy for Ian. Combining our results with those of [4], we have shown $p_c \geq 0.719023$. Computer evidence suggests $0.7321 \leq p_c \leq 0.7322$. We provide an upper bound showing $p_c \leq 0.73275300915$ in the next section. We conjecture, based on limited computer experimentation, that for almost all $p \geq p_c$, σ^* is not optimal for Ian.

6. BEATING σ^* AFTER THE CRITICAL POINT

For p beyond 0.7322, we suspect that the strategy σ^* is often not optimal, especially when the orbit of $1 - p$ comes close to $\frac{1}{2}$. Indeed, we propose strategies — far from optimal — which do better than σ^* for specific values of p ; we prove this claim completely for $\frac{3}{4}$ (which was an explicit open question); we also show the computation for the value $p = 0.73275300915$.

Let p be large enough so that we can expect σ^* not to be optimal. We choose k_0 so that $\tilde{\theta} = \alpha^{k_0}(p)$ is close to $\frac{1}{2}$. We also let $\epsilon > 0$ be a small real number.

We modify slightly σ^* to a strategy $\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}$ in the following way: if $\theta \neq \tilde{\theta}, 1 - \tilde{\theta}$, then Ian plays following σ^* . But if $\theta = \tilde{\theta}$ (recall that $\tilde{\theta} > \frac{1}{2}$), then Ian “perturbs” his reaction by ϵ : he plays 1 with probability:

- $(1 - \epsilon)\frac{1 - \tilde{\theta}}{\tilde{\theta}}$ if $s = S_1$,
- ϵ if $s = S_0$;

Meanwhile if $\theta = 1 - \tilde{\theta}$, Ian plays 1 with probability

- $1 - \epsilon$ if $s = S_1$,
- $1 - (1 - \epsilon)\frac{\tilde{\theta}}{1 - \tilde{\theta}} = \frac{1 - (2 - \epsilon)\tilde{\theta}}{1 - \tilde{\theta}}$ if $s = S_0$,

In the case $\theta = \tilde{\theta}$, the belief is updated as:

- if Ian plays 1, it becomes : $a_0 := p - \epsilon\gamma$;
- if Ian plays 0, it becomes $1 - b_0$, where b_0 is defined to be $2 - 3p + \frac{\gamma}{\tilde{\theta}} - \epsilon\gamma\frac{1 - \tilde{\theta}}{\tilde{\theta}}$.

If $\theta = 1 - \tilde{\theta}$, the updates are

- if Ian plays 1, it becomes b_0
- if Ian plays 0, it becomes : $1 - a_0$.

Notice that a_0 is a perturbation of p and b_0 is a perturbation of $\Phi(\tilde{\theta})$. The critical aspect in this choice of perturbation of the strategy is that it remains U-indifferent: If Una’s belief that the system is in state S_1 is $\tilde{\theta}$, then given the information available to Una, the probability that the state is S_0 and Ian plays 0; and the probability that the state is S_1 and Ian plays 1 are both $(1 - \epsilon)(1 - \tilde{\theta})$. Similarly if Una’s belief is $1 - \tilde{\theta}$, the probabilities are both $(1 - \epsilon)\tilde{\theta}$.

It is also greedy except when the belief is $\tilde{\theta}$ or $1 - \tilde{\theta}$, in which case the one-step expected gain is $(1 - \epsilon)\min(\tilde{\theta}, 1 - \tilde{\theta})$. As for σ^* , Una’s belief that the system is in state S_1 evolves as a Markov chain. Since Ian’s actions do not depend on Una’s, one may write down the transition probabilities from one state to the next and compute the expected one-step gain from each state (irrespective of Una’s choice of move due to the U-irrelevance of the strategy). Hence is is not hard to obtain an expression for the expected gain of the perturbed strategy.

We shall compare the value of this strategy $\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}$ with the value of σ^* . We are going to prove

Lemma 10. $v_p(\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}) > v_p(\sigma^*)$ if and only if

$$(12) \quad \tilde{\theta}(W(\alpha(\tilde{\theta})) - W(b_0)) > (1 - \tilde{\theta})(W(a_0) - (1 - \epsilon)W(p)),$$




FIGURE 14. Schematic depiction of the (symmetrized) Markov chain. At each state other than $\tilde{\theta}$, one choice leads back to the base, and the other goes to the right.

where $\tilde{\theta} = \alpha^{k_0}(p)$ and $W(\theta) := \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} \alpha^k(\theta)$.

In Section 6.3, we shall apply this lemma to the case $p = \frac{3}{4}$ suggested as a test case in [4].

Observe that with the strategy $\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}$, when $\theta = \tilde{\theta}$, the one-step expected payoff is a bit smaller than with the strategy σ^* . However, the update of the belief is slightly different and one may hope that this new belief puts Ian in a better position for the future: in a sufficiently improved position to compensate for the loss in the one-step expected payoff. The objective is to show that this is possible for some values of p . Note that we make no assertion about optimality of the perturbed strategy, but rather show that irrespective of Una's strategy, the expected gain is larger than that obtained by playing σ^* .

For this purpose, we have to find an expression for the long-term expected payoff. Whatever Una plays, the evolution is a Markov chain on the beliefs (governed by the random changes of the state and the values of his choices). The belief may take the values p and $1 - p$ and values in the k_0 first terms of the orbits of p and $1 - p$; when it reaches $\tilde{\theta}$, it may jump to the values of the belief after $\tilde{\theta}$; namely a_0 or $1 - b_0$ and then continue on their orbits for some random time and then go back to $1 - p$ or p . It is convenient to further assume that neither $\tilde{\theta}$ nor $1 - \tilde{\theta}$ belong to the orbits of a_0 and b_0 (this is true for all but countably many values of ϵ). We observe that the symmetry $\theta \mapsto 1 - \theta$ does not affect either the transitions or the payoff so it suffices to follow the orbits modulo the symmetry about $\frac{1}{2}$.

6.1. Invariant measure for the Markov Chain.

Proof of Lemma 10. Recall $\alpha(\theta) := \max(\Phi(\theta), 1 - \Phi(\theta))$. For $0 \leq k \leq k_0$, let $\Theta_k = \alpha^k(p)$, so that $\Theta_{k_0} = \tilde{\theta}$. Set $a_k = \alpha^k(a_0)$ and $b_k = \alpha^k(b_0)$.

We see that Una's belief evolves as a Markov chain on the countable state space $\{\Theta_k, 0 \leq k \leq k_0; a_k, b_k, k \geq 0\}$ with transition probabilities:

- If $k < k_0$, $\Theta_k \rightarrow \Theta_{k+1}$ with probability Θ_k and $\Theta_k \rightarrow \Theta_0$ with probability $1 - \Theta_k$.
- If $k = k_0$, $\Theta_{k_0} \rightarrow a_0$ with probability $1 - \tilde{\theta}$ and $\Theta_{k_0} \rightarrow b_0$ with probability $\tilde{\theta}$.
- For all $k \geq 0$, $a_k \rightarrow a_{k+1}$ with probability a_k and $a_k \rightarrow \Theta_0$ with probability $1 - a_k$; similarly $b_k \rightarrow b_{k+1}$ with probability b_k and $b_k \rightarrow \Theta_0$ with probability $1 - b_k$.

It is straightforward to compute the invariant measure for this chain. We denote by Π_s^ϵ the probability of being in s in the perturbed chain and by Π_s^0 the probability in the unperturbed chain.

For $1 \leq n \leq k_0$

$$\Pi_{\Theta_n}^\epsilon = \Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} \Theta_k.$$

For all $n \geq 0$

$$\Pi_{a_n}^\epsilon = \Pi_{\Theta_{k_0}}^\epsilon (1 - \tilde{\theta}) \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} a_k \quad \text{and} \quad \Pi_{b_n}^\epsilon = \Pi_{\Theta_{k_0}}^\epsilon \tilde{\theta} \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} b_k.$$

The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations for $\Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon$ give

$$(13) \quad \Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon = \sum_{n=0}^{k_0-1} (1 - \Theta_n) \Pi_{\Theta_n}^\epsilon + \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (1 - a_n) \Pi_{a_n}^\epsilon + \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (1 - b_n) \Pi_{b_n}^\epsilon.$$

Since it is a probability measure, it also must satisfy :

$$(14) \quad \sum_{n=0}^{k_0} \Pi_{\Theta_n}^\epsilon + \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Pi_{a_n}^\epsilon + \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \Pi_{b_n}^\epsilon = 1.$$

We introduce notation $Q = \prod_{k=0}^{k_0-1} \Theta_k = \Pi_{\Theta_{k_0}}^\epsilon / \Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon$, $A = \sum_{n=0}^{k_0} \prod_{j=0}^{n-1} \Theta_j$ and $W(\theta) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} \alpha^k(\theta)$. This latter quantity gives the ratio of the sum of the weights in the sub-tree rooted at θ to the weight of θ . Using this notation, we can write equality (14) as

$$\Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon \left(A + Q(1 - \tilde{\theta})W(a_0) + Q\tilde{\theta}W(b_0) \right) = 1.$$

Hence

$$\Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon = \left[A + Q((1 - \tilde{\theta})W(a_0) + \tilde{\theta}W(b_0)) \right]^{-1}.$$

Similarly, $\Pi_{\Theta_0}^0 = \left[A + QW(\alpha(\tilde{\theta})) \right]^{-1}$.

6.2. Expected payoff. The expected payoff can be written as the sum of the expected payoff (given the state) weighted by the probability of the state; namely,

$$v_p(\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}) = \sum_{n=0}^{k_0-1} (1-\Theta_n) \Pi_{\Theta_n}^\epsilon + (1-\epsilon)(1-\tilde{\theta}) \Pi_{\Theta_{k_0}}^\epsilon + \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (1-a_n) \Pi_{a_n}^\epsilon + \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} (1-b_n) \Pi_{b_n}^\epsilon.$$

Using (13), we obtain

$$v_p(\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}) = \Pi_0^\epsilon + (1-\epsilon)(1-\tilde{\theta}) \Pi_{k_0}^\epsilon = \Pi_0^\epsilon (1 + (1-\epsilon)(1-\tilde{\theta})Q).$$

We want to show that for well chosen p , k_0 and ϵ , $v_p(\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}) > v_p(\sigma^*)$.

We recall that $v_p(\sigma^*) = \Pi_{\Theta_0}^0 = 1/W(p)$.

We now have

$$\begin{aligned} v_p(\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}) - v_p(\sigma^*) &= \Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon (1 + (1-\epsilon)(1-\tilde{\theta})Q) - \Pi_{\Theta_0}^0 \\ &= \Pi_{\Theta_0}^0 \Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon \left(W(p)(1 + (1-\epsilon)(1-\tilde{\theta})Q) - (A + Q((1-\tilde{\theta})W(a_0) + \tilde{\theta}W(b_0))) \right) \end{aligned}$$

Since $W(p) = A + Q\tilde{\theta}W(\alpha(\tilde{\theta}))$, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} v_p(\sigma_{k_0, \epsilon}) - v_p(\sigma^*) &= Q \Pi_{\Theta_0}^0 \Pi_{\Theta_0}^\epsilon \left(\tilde{\theta}(W(\alpha(\tilde{\theta})) - W(b_0)) - (1-\tilde{\theta})(W(a_0) - (1-\epsilon)W(p)) \right), \end{aligned}$$

completing the proof of Lemma 10. \square

6.3. The case $p=3/4$. When p takes the value $\frac{3}{4}$, the symbolic dynamics of p starts with 11010101 and $\alpha^7(p) = 1137/2244 \approx 0.5165\dots$. We shall set $k_0 = 7$ and $\tilde{\theta} = 1137/2244$.

Next we estimate $W(\theta)$ for the relevant values of θ . First we do it for p and for $\alpha(\tilde{\theta})$. Recall that $W(\theta) = \sum_{n=0}^{\infty} \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} \alpha^k(\theta)$. The general term is positive. As soon as $k \geq 1$, $\frac{1}{2} \leq \Theta_k \leq p$. Hence, the remainder of the sequence is bounded by

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{n \geq N} \prod_{k=0}^{n-1} \alpha^k(\theta) &\leq \left(\prod_{k=0}^{N-1} \alpha^k(\theta) \right) \sum_{n \geq 0} p^n \\ &\leq \frac{\left(\prod_{k=0}^{N-1} \alpha^k(\theta) \right)}{1-p} \leq \frac{p^N}{1-p} \leq 4 \left(\frac{3}{4} \right)^N. \end{aligned}$$

We do the computation with $N = 50$, so the bound on the error is smaller than 10^{-10} (and the obvious bound p^{-N} is itself of order 10^{-7}). We obtain with this approximation $W(p) \approx 2.8354$ and $W(\alpha(\tilde{\theta})) \approx 2.7432$.

Then numerical experimentation (see Figure 15) suggests taking $\epsilon = 0.01$. For this value of ϵ , we also compute $W(b_0) \approx 2.7305$ and $W(a_0) \approx$




FIGURE 15. Numerical approximation of the graph of the left side of (15) (vertical axis) in the case $p = \frac{3}{4}$ as a function of ϵ (horizontal axis).

2.8203. This is sharp enough to see the difference between

$$(1 - \tilde{\theta})(W(a_0) - (1 - \epsilon)W(p)) \approx 0.0064$$

and

$$\tilde{\theta}(W(\alpha(\tilde{\theta}) - W(b_0))) \approx 0.0065.$$

We conclude that

$$(15) \quad \tilde{\theta}(W(\alpha(\tilde{\theta})) - W(b_0)) - (1 - \tilde{\theta})(W(a_0) - (1 - \epsilon)W(p)) > 10^{-4},$$

so that, by Lemma 10, we have shown that σ^* is not optimal for $p = \frac{3}{4}$. The expected payoff of the alternative strategy can be computed: we obtain $v_{\frac{3}{4}}(\sigma^*) = 0.35267910\dots$ and $v_{\frac{3}{4}}(\sigma_{7,0.01}) = 0.35267964\dots$, showing a difference between the values of

$$v_{\frac{3}{4}}(\sigma_{7,0.01}) - v_{\frac{3}{4}}(\sigma^*) \approx 5 \times 10^{-7}.$$

6.4. The case $p=0.73275300915$. By trial and error, we located a value of p slightly above the conjectured critical point $p_c \approx 0.7321$ for which σ^* is not optimal. Computations (using the Mathematica package with 200 digit accuracy) with $p = 0.73275300915$, $k_0 = 57$ and $\epsilon = 0.0002$ show that $\tilde{\theta} \approx 0.50000194899$, $v_p(\sigma_{57,0.0002}) \approx 0.361469540454503987436\mathbf{65121}$ and $v_p(\sigma^*) \approx 0.361469540454503987436\mathbf{10381}$, so that the gain of the perturbed strategy is larger by approximately 5.47×10^{-22} . This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.

7. OVERVIEW

We hope that ideas from this paper may find wider application in the theory of repeated games. We identify a couple of factors that play important roles in our analysis:

Renewal: The directed graph describing the evolution of Una's beliefs has a very simple structure (see Figure 6). Any time that Ian's move is aligned with Una's belief, her belief returns to the base of the tower. This renewal structure vastly simplifies computations.

Complexity and Contraction: Our construction of Una's best response to σ^* was based on solving a system of linear equations (4) relating the values of V before and after Ian's move. The contraction properties of the matrices guaranteed the existence of a fixed point of \mathcal{L} . Our method depended also on getting detailed information about the fixed point. The discontinuity of Φ at $\frac{1}{2}$ led to discontinuities of V at $\frac{1}{2}$. These are propagated by (4) to preimages of $\frac{1}{2}$ under Φ . A key role was played in the argument by the fact that the jumps at the discontinuity points were all of the same sign and summable (the summability ensured that the fixed point was of pure jump type and the sign condition ensured that the fixed point was monotonic). That the sign was constant appears to be a fortunate accident. The summability can be traced to the complexity of Φ . When $p < \frac{2}{3}$, there are no preimages of $\frac{1}{2}$. As p increases, the complexity of the system (the topological entropy) increases. This quantity measures the exponential growth rate of the number of preimages. The pressure measures a combination of the number of preimages with the size of the discontinuity at each.

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